

2. INTER-ETHNIC AND INTER-CONFSSIONAL RELATIONS IN CRIMEA

The state of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations is among the key factors that shape the socio-political situation in the autonomy, and exactly those sectors saw alarming trends in 2005-2008. That is why it is interesting to outline the main features of inter-ethnic relations, the degree of cultural and social kinship or estrangement of the dominant national and ethnic groups, the level of their religious tolerance, and specificities of their understanding of each other's problems, readiness to cooperate in their solution.

Impartial assessment of the situation that arose in relations between ethnic groups in the autonomy also requires consideration of the common and different in their representatives' views of specific aspects of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional problems, assessments of the probability and possible reasons of inter-ethnic conflicts.

This section briefly describes inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The analysis gives grounds for the conclusions of rather a strong estrangement between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities and higher probability of aggravation of inter-ethnic relations, compared to inter-confessional.

Summary results of the poll are presented in Table "Specificities of assessments of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations and risks of conflicts" (p.30).

2.1. INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN TERMS OF CULTURAL SIMILARITY AND SOCIAL (ETHNIC) DISTANCE

Some idea of inter-ethnic relations in the autonomy can be produced on the basis of, *first*, self-assessments by representatives of national and ethnic groups of cultural similarity with residents of other regions of Ukraine and neighbouring (referent) countries¹, *second* – measurement of their distance from representatives of other ethnoses and residents of other regions (countries) on the E.Bogardus social distance scale². Summary data of said self-assessments and distances are presented on Diagrams "Cultural similarity of Crimea's ethnic groups to the inhabitants of the regions of Ukraine and referent countries" and "Level of social distance (on E.Bogardus scale)" (p.24).

Cultural similarity. First of all, it should be noted that a high level of cultural similarity with Russia is reported not only by ethnic Russians but also by Ukrainians. At that, their similarity with Russia is more manifest than with Ukraine (although assessments of the degree of similarity with residents of those two countries among Ukrainians differ much less than among Russians). This may be owed to the domination of the Russian (and/or Russian-language) culture in Crimea.

The self-assessment of cultural similarity of Crimean Tatars with Russia is notably lower than of Russians and Ukrainians; they also lower assess their cultural similarity with Ukraine, although the index of similarity with Ukraine among Crimean Tatars is higher than with Russia.

Regarding the self-assessment of cultural similarity with residents of different regions of Ukraine, representatives

of all national and ethnic groups consider residents of Southern regions of Ukraine to be the most similar to them, residents of Western regions – the least similar. Here, the following should be noted:

- Russians more than others differentiate their attitude to residents of different regions of Ukraine. While they assess similarity with residents of Southern regions at 8.01 points, on the average, similarity with residents of Western regions is assessed at only 3.74. At that, they assess their similarity with residents of Eastern regions higher than Ukrainians;
- assessments of Ukrainians are less "polar" by region; this even more refers to Crimean Tatars, who, for instance, assess their similarity with residents of Southern regions lower than Russians, but higher assess their similarity with residents of Western regions³.

Self-assessments of cultural similarity with the EU countries are low. This is especially true for Russians who assess that similarity at 3.66 points (Crimean Tatars – 4.66, Ukrainians – 4.74). Self-assessment of cultural similarity with Turks by representatives of ethnic groups differ fundamentally – for Crimean Tatars, residents of that country are as similar as of Ukraine, while Ukrainians assess that similarity at only 2.17 points, Russians – at 1.34.

Social (national) distance. By and large, among all those polled, the smallest social distance was reported for the groups "Russians inhabiting Crimea" (2.31 points) and "Ukrainians inhabiting Crimea" (2.61), the largest social distance – for Gypsies (5.88), Americans (5.78), Turks (5.52) and Georgians (5.38).


¹ Marks were put on a 11-point scale from 0 to 10, where "0" meant that residents of a certain region or country had nothing in common with the respondent in character, habits, traditions, "10" – that residents of the region or country utmost resemble the respondent in character, habits, traditions.

² The scale tested and modified in Ukraine by N.Panina has the following values: "1" – ready to accept representatives of some groups as family members, "2" – as close friends, "3" – as neighbours, "4" – as work colleagues, "5" – as inhabitants of Crimean, "6" – as visitors of Crimea, "7" – would not even let them in Crimea. Higher scale values correspond to the greater social distance from a certain group.








³ This may witness the influence of the political factor on the assessment of cultural similarity, namely, a stock association of Western regions of Ukraine with a "nationalist" political course prompting Russians to report a large cultural distance from its residents.



Cultural similarity of Crimea's ethnic groups to the inhabitants of the regions of Ukraine and referent countries*, average mark



Level of social distance (on E.Bogardus scale)*, average mark



* On a ten-point scale where "0" means that inhabitants of the given region (country) do not have anything in common in character, habits, traditions, and "10" – inhabitants of the given region (country) are the most similar in character, habits, traditions.

* On E.Bogardus social distance scale (approved and modified in Ukraine by N.V.Panina). Maximum value (7 points) corresponds to the maximum distance from representatives of a certain group, minimum value (1 point) – minimum distance.



Social distance between representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian communities in the autonomy is very small. For instance, for Ukrainians assessing Russians living in Crimea, its value equals 2.30 points, for Russians assessing Ukrainians living in Crimea – 2.53. Meanwhile, the distance of representatives of those two ethnic groups from Crimean Tatars is notably larger: of Ukrainians – 4.39, of Russians – 4.62 points.

At that, Crimean Tatars feel less remote from Ukrainians and Russians living in Crimea – respectively, 3.70 and 3.66 points⁴.

Gender specificities. Women tend to assess their cultural similarity with residents of Ukraine and Russia higher than men, and of Turkey – lower. This may be attributed, in particular, to differences in the ethnic structure of gender groups – among the polled women, there are fewer representatives of Crimean Tatar than among men, while ethnic Ukrainian and Russian women respectively make a greater share⁵.

Age differences. In all age groups, cultural similarity with Russia is described as the strongest (stronger than with Ukraine). But with the respondent age going down, there is a trend towards a lower assessment of cultural similarity with Russia and higher assessment of cultural similarity with the EU countries and Turkey (although, given the low values of the two latter assessments, it would be more accurate to speak about a decrease of the cultural distance from the EU countries and Turkey).

Assessments of the level of the social distance on the Bogardus scale reflect differences in the ethnic composition of age groups (the share of Crimean Tatars is higher in younger groups, of Russians – in elder ones). So, for instance, the indices of social distance for Russians and Ukrainians are the lowest in the eldest age group, for Turks – in the youngest).

The survey results prompt the conclusion that the Russian and Ukrainian communities in Crimea see each other as culturally similar. At that, not only Russians, but also Ukrainians report a higher assessment of cultural similarity with Russia than with Ukraine, which may be attributed to the domination of the Russian and/or Russian-language culture in Crimea.

The assessment of cultural similarity of Crimean Tatars with Russia is notably lower than of Russians and Ukrainians; they also lower assess their cultural similarity with Ukraine, although the index of similarity with Ukraine among Crimean Tatars is higher than with Russia, and equals the self-assessment of cultural similarity with Turkey.

Russians more than representatives of the other two ethnoses differentiate the assessment of their cultural similarity with residents of different regions of Ukraine.

Proceeding from the survey results, it may be assumed that the assessment of cultural similarity is influenced by the political factor, namely – stereotyped association of regions with political forces (since, as we know, there are serious differences in political sympathies of residents of different regions in Ukraine), that is, self-assessment of the cultural distance may reflect the “political distance”.

The social distance between Ukrainians and Russians is very small, while the distance of representatives of those two ethnic groups from Crimean Tatars is much

bigger (it is greater than Crimean Tatars distance themselves from Ukrainians and Russians living in the autonomy). This proves the estrangement between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar population of the autonomy.

As shown below, such estrangement is also demonstrated by the perceptions and assessments of problems of Crimean Tatars (and other repatriates) by the Slavic community, assessments of satisfaction of the rights and needs of different national and language groups, etc.

2.2. GUARANTEE OF RIGHTS OF ETHNIC AND LANGUAGE GROUPS

In polyethnic societies (states), guarantee of rights of ethnic groups and, the main thing, the assessment of their satisfaction by representatives of ethnic (language) groups themselves present an important factor of inter-ethnic relations and the attitude of those groups to the state authorities.

The basic rights (and needs) of ethnic and/or language groups in the first place include the right to education, information and communication in the native language, preservation and development of the national culture. Exercise of those rights conditions and guarantees preservation of ethnic identity of the concerned group and each of its representatives.

Guarantee of rights and national and cultural needs of ethnic and language groups

Analysis of the poll results dealing with the issues of guarantee of rights of ethnic and language groups in Crimea reveals substantial differences in assessments by representatives of ethnic (language) groups of the exercise of their rights and the rights of other ethnic (language) groups. The most critical assessments of the satisfaction of their rights and needs were reported by Russians (Russian-speakers) and Crimean Tatars.

General assessments. If one follows the opinion of Crimeans in general, he/she will come to the conclusion that the rights of Crimean Tatars are secured better, of the Russian-speaking population – worst of all. Meanwhile, if we take a look at the opinions in ethnic and language groups, it appears that representatives of each of them assess protection of the rights of another group higher than of their own. The greatest differences are observed in assessments produced by Russian-speakers and Ukrainian-speakers, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars, on the other.

For instance, the index of guarantee of the rights of Crimean Tatars in the eyes of all Crimeans equals 0.74 (in that, in the eyes of Russians – 0.79, Ukrainians – 0.78), and in the eyes of Crimean Tatars themselves – only 0.34⁶.

On the other hand, the index of guarantee of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the eyes of all Crimeans equals only 0.49 (there, Russians – 0.44, Ukrainians – 0.54), in the eyes of Crimean Tatars – 0.71.

So, each ethnic group believes that the rights of others are guaranteed better than its own. But while the opinions of Ukrainians and Russians on the issue differ insignificantly, their assessments of protection of the rights of Crimean Tatars strikingly differ from the assessments given by Crimean Tatars themselves. Such situation may be viewed as a sign of the

⁴ As regards other deported peoples, representatives of all the three mentioned ethnoses reported rather a large social distance: Ukrainians – 4.60 points, Russians – 4.62, Crimean Tatars – 4.20 points.

⁵ Such sample structure reflects the actual ethnic structure of gender groups in Crimea. According to the 2001 census, among Crimean women, the share of Crimean Tatars is somewhat lower than among men.

⁶ The index of guarantee of rights may range from “1” to “0”, where “1” means that rights are fully guaranteed, “0” – not guaranteed at all.

above-mentioned estrangement and kind of “national deafness” of the Slavic population to the needs of Crimean Tatars.

Education and information in the native language. The survey results let assume that Crimeans in general and each ethnic group in particular experience no major problems with satisfaction of their need to read books and get information from printed media (read newspapers and magazines) – the majority or overwhelming majority of representatives of said groups consider that need to be satisfied⁷.

Problems are reported in the fields of education, getting information from electronic media (TV, radio) and demonstration of movies in cinema theatres.

For instance, the opinions of Crimeans about education in the native language split almost equally: 43.5% believe that need to be not satisfied; 41.2% stick to the opposite opinion. At that, Ukrainians tend to believe that their needs in that domain are satisfied (48.6%, against 39.6% of those thinking otherwise), while Russians and Crimean Tatars stick to the opposite opinion. The ratio of those who suggest that need not to be satisfied, and those who stick to the opposite opinion, among Russians makes 45.2% : 36.7%; among Crimean Tatars – 49.6% : 40.4%.

Regarding electronic media and feature films, the majority of Crimeans cannot satisfy their needs for TV programmes (63.3%), movies (52.6%), and radio (51.2%). In this respect, the greatest dissatisfaction is reported by Russians⁸.

It should be added that despite rather critical assessment of satisfaction of the needs for education and information in the native language, problems related with satisfaction of national and cultural needs did not top the overall list of problems seen as the most urgent and critical by Crimeans. For instance, impracticability of study in the native language was described as an urgent and critical problem by 15.5% of Crimeans, including 14.3% of Ukrainians, 16.6% of Russians, and 13.6% of Crimean Tatars. Absence of opportunities for the development of the national culture was noted by 8.4% of Crimeans: 8.5% of Ukrainians, 6.9% of Russians, and by 18.1% of Crimean Tatars.

Age differences. Younger respondents somewhat higher assess satisfaction of their cultural and information needs, compared to representatives of elder age groups.

2.3. PROBLEMS IN INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS, REASONS AND PROBABILITY OF INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Interesting for impartial assessment of the state of inter-ethnic relations in Crimea are the assessments of Crimeans themselves concerning the presence/absence of problems in those relations, their tensivity, presence/absence of discrimination on national and ethnic grounds, as well as the attitude of Crimeans (including the Slavic community) to the problems of repatriates.

It should also be found out how Crimeans in general and representatives of ethnic groups in particular assess the reasons for inter-ethnic conflicts and the probability of occurrence of an acute ethnic conflict in the nearest future.

Problems in inter-ethnic relations

General assessments. The majority of all Crimeans and representatives of each national group admit the existence of some problems in inter-ethnic relations in Crimea. They were admitted by 62.9%⁹ of Crimeans – only 23% reported that such problems did not exist.

Representatives of different national and ethnic groups differently assess the existence of problems. Fewer problems are reported by Ukrainians (57.2%), while among Crimean Tatars and Russians, they were reported by roughly equal shares of those polled – more than 65% in each group, the only difference lying in the assessment of the acuteness of problems (“some”/“pretty acute”)¹⁰. Among Russians, comparatively fewer people see no problems in inter-ethnic relations – (20.6%), among Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars their shares make about a quarter of the polled¹¹.

Tension in inter-ethnic relations. Admitting the existence of problems, Crimeans at the same time rather modestly assess the level of tensivity in relations between concrete ethnic groups. According to their assessments, relations between Russians and Ukrainians are the least tense, actually normal (average mark on a five-point scale – 1.70), more tense – between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (2.60), still more tense – between Russians and Crimean Tatars (2.77, in the eyes of UOC believers – 3.05).

By and large, this opinion is shared by Ukrainians and Russians. Crimean Tatars describe the relations between them, on one hand, and Ukrainians and Russians – on the other, as less tense, compared to the assessments made by Ukrainians and Russians.

Also interestingly, in the overall list of problems seen as the most urgent and critical, Crimeans did not prioritise the problems of inter-ethnic relations. Tension in inter-ethnic relations was noted as a topical problem important for Crimea by only 16.4% of Crimeans, namely: 17.3% of Russians, 15.5% of Ukrainians and 14.6% of Crimean Tatars. The index of urgency of that problem generally equals 0.44. Crimean Tatars put it as follows – 0.47; Ukrainians and Russians – 0.44 and 0.43, respectively¹². It should be added that the urgency of the problem of tension in inter-ethnic relations is assessed by Crimeans and representatives of each ethnic groups higher than of the problem of tension in inter-confessional relations.

Ethnic discrimination. The overwhelming majority (77.1%) of Crimeans did not encounter cases of ethnic discrimination at employment and/or educational establishments, only 11.1% encountered them.

However, data of cases of ethnic discrimination **differ substantially**.

For instance, cases of discrimination were not encountered by the overwhelming majority (81.3%) of Russians (against 7.1% of those who encountered such facts) and a bit fewer but also the overwhelming majority (77.5%) of Ukrainians (against 9.8%).

Among Crimean Tatars, the picture is entirely different: the share of those who encountered cases of ethnic discrimination – 36.5% – more than three times exceeds Crimean average, is almost four times higher than for Ukrainians, and more than five times higher than

⁷ In his question answer variant “satisfied” is made up of sum of answers “fully satisfied” and “most likely satisfied”; variant “unsatisfied” – of “unsatisfied” and “most likely unsatisfied”.

⁸ The majority or relative majority is not satisfied with their ability to watch TV programmes (Ukrainians – 50%, Russians – 71.0%, Crimean Tatars – 53.1%) and movies in cinema theatres in the native language (Ukrainians – 47.9%, Russians – 56.5%, Crimean Tatars – 42.6%).

⁹ “Some problems” – 47.5%, “pretty acute” – 15.4%.

¹⁰ 40.6% of Ukrainians admits the existence of “some” problems, 16.6% – of “pretty acute” ones; among Russians, respectively – 49.3% and 16.1%; among Crimean Tatars, respectively – 57.0% and 8.1%.

¹¹ Among Ukrainians – 26.9%, among Crimean Tatars – 25.4%.

¹² The index of urgency of a problem may range from “0” to “1”, where “1” means the highest urgency of the problem, “0” – total absence of such problem.



for Russians. Meanwhile, among Crimean Tatars, one and half times fewer people did not encounter cases of discrimination (52.4%).

Similarly big differences are observed in the opinions of representatives of ethnic groups about discrimination of Crimean Tatars and other repatriates in Crimea.

The majority (56.5%) of Crimeans are sure that such problem does not exist in Crimea. Almost 30% admits separate cases¹³. Existence of discrimination as a phenomenon (i.e., its regular occurrence in most sectors of public life) is admitted by only 5% of Crimeans.

The opinions of Ukrainians on that issue are generally the same as of all Crimeans¹⁴. Among Russians, the ratio changes towards an increase in the number of those who entirely deny discrimination (65.2%), and a decrease in the number of those who admit separate cases (24.3%). Existence of discrimination as a phenomenon is admitted by only 1.6% of Russians.

The opinions of Crimean Tatars fundamentally differ from those of Ukrainians and Russians. Only 13.4% of them believe in the absence of discrimination. The majority (58.5%) admit separate cases, another 23.8% are sure that it exists as a phenomenon.

So, the number of people convinced in the existence of discrimination of repatriates as a phenomenon in Crimea among Crimean Tatars almost five times exceeds Crimean average, more than four times – among Ukrainians, and almost 15 times – among Russians.

The trustworthiness of the opinion of existence of discrimination as a phenomenon in Crimea is indirectly proven by the fact that it was reported mainly by those who personally encountered cases of ethnic discrimination. Say, among Crimean Tatars who admitted the phenomenon of discrimination, 63% personally encountered such cases (against a third of those who did not).

The general Crimean indices are similar: among Crimeans admitting the existence of discrimination as a phenomenon, 61.6% of those polled personally encountered cases of discrimination (against 32.9%), while among those who denied discrimination, only 2.6% personally encountered its manifestations (against 87.8%)¹⁵.

It may be assumed therefore that cases of discrimination of repatriates in Crimea get little attention and no public condemnation. On the contrary, there is an impression that members of the Ukrainian and Russian communities do not wish to see those cases, being another sign of the estrangement between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities in Crimea.

Attitude to problems of repatriates. The list of material problems critical for repatriates is topped by those of jobs, housing, land plots, of political problems – sufficient representation in the authorities of the autonomy and local administrative bodies. However, general assessments of the importance and urgency of those problems for Crimea by representatives of different ethnic groups strikingly differ, proving the above assumption of “ethnic deafness” of Crimean Slavic community.

For instance, the problems of provision of repatriates with jobs, housing, land plots worry 54.7% of Crimean Tatars – and only 10.4% of Ukrainians and 6.4% of Russians.

The urgency and importance of the problem of insufficient representation of previously deported peoples in the authorities the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and local authorities was noted by 49.8% of Crimean Tatars – and only by 6.2% of Ukrainians and 3.6% of Russians.

Especially different are the opinions of representatives of ethnic groups about the main political goals of Crimean Tatars. Say, the overwhelming majority (77.6%) of the Tatars seek the status of an indigenous people of Ukraine for Crimean Tatar nation. However, this wish is supported by only 16.2% of Crimeans, 62.2% is against such status. So, opponents of the status prevail both among Russians (70.3%) and among Ukrainians (60.9%).

Aspiration for official recognition of the Crimean Tatar Majlis as a fully legitimate representative body of Crimean Tatars by the Ukrainian state is shared by 77% of representatives of that ethnic group – and only by 16.5% of Crimeans (against – 52.7%). Opponents of official recognition of the Majlis make 62.4% of Russians, and 48.2% of Ukrainians.

So, Russians demonstrate somewhat higher, compared to Ukrainians, rejection of political aspirations of Crimean Tatars. Meanwhile, both Russians and Ukrainians reported actually equal low understanding of the material problems of repatriates and interest in their solution.

Gender specificities. Women more critically assess satisfaction of rights of the Russian-speaking population in Crimea, while the assessments of satisfaction of rights of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians show no differences on gender grounds. Women less tend to admit discrimination of Crimean Tatars and other deported peoples, they more often object to the prospects of granting Crimean Tatars the status of an indigenous people of Ukraine and official recognition of the Crimean Tatar Majlis (the latter may also be attributed to the above-mentioned differences in the ethnic structure of gender groups).

Inter-ethnic conflicts: reasons and probability

Reasons of inter-ethnic conflicts. The poll results show that Crimeans tend to rest responsibility for inter-ethnic conflicts in the autonomy mainly on the central authorities: a relative majority (44.4%) see the main reason for conflicts in their incompetence or evil intent, that is, in the purposeful support of inter-ethnic tension in Crimea¹⁶.

Far fewer people see the reason for conflicts in socio-economic, political and cultural inequality of national and ethnic groups (15%).

Still fewer (13.2%) people see the main reason for conflicts in incompetence or evil intent of Crimean authorities. And only one in ten Crimeans attributes conflicts to provocative actions and statements of Crimean ethnic public organisations, republican branches of political parties, and politicians.

Opinions of representatives of all ethnic groups very much resemble Crimean average – with the exception that Crimean Tatars less tend to rest responsibility for conflicts on the central authorities, and more – on local. Crimean Tatars also pay more attention to the socio-economic, political and cultural inequality of ethnic groups.

¹³ In this subsection, the answer “cases of discrimination” is the aggregate of answers “rarely occurs” and “exists, but only occurs at certain times in certain spheres”.

¹⁴ 54.1% see no discrimination, 30.8% admit its separate cases, 5.6% admit it as a phenomenon.

¹⁵ Among those who believe that discrimination exists but occurs from time to time in certain spheres, cases of discrimination were encountered by almost three times fewer people – 23%, not encountered – by 65.4%. Among those who believe that discrimination occurs rarely, 9.5% encountered it, 75.6% did not.

¹⁶ Incompetence of the authorities – 25.8%, purposeful support for inter-ethnic tension in the Crimea – 18.6%.

Common for all ethnic groups, in each of them only a small minority (3-4%) see the reason for conflicts in provocative actions and statements of foreign state structures, representatives of the authorities, and politicians.

So, the majority of Crimeans, as well as in each of the main ethnic groups, see more or less acute problems in inter-ethnic relations in the autonomy. Only a minority – nearly a quarter – are sure of the opposite. The level of tension in inter-ethnic relations is generally described as not too high, although it is admitted that in relations between Russians and Crimean Tatars and between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars it is higher than in relations between Ukrainians and Russians.

Crimeans rest responsibility for inter-ethnic conflicts in Crimea mainly on the Ukrainian and Crimean authorities; few residents of Crimea attribute those conflicts to outside influences.

Probability of a serious inter-ethnic conflict. Given evident differences in the views of representatives of the Slavic and Crimean Tatar population of the autonomy (especially regarding discrimination on ethnic grounds and political aspirations of Crimean Tatars), and rather poor social kinship between Ukrainians and Russians, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars – on the other, a lawful question arises: can tension in inter-ethnic relations and estrangement between said national and ethnic groups make the basis for an inter-ethnic conflict?

Crimeans have no definite answer to this question: almost a quarter (24.4%) of them consider such conflict possible. The other opinions split almost equally: 37.9% called a conflict impossible; 37.7% remained undecided.

The breakdown of opinions in each ethnic group is similar to Crimean average.

Probability of a conflict is admitted:

- among those who reported “pretty acute problems” in inter-ethnic relations – by 38.9%, against 8.7% sticking to the opposite opinion (the rest remained undecided);
- among those who reported “some problems” – by 28% against 35.6%;
- among those denying any problems – by 13.4% against 63.6%.

Crimeans who believe in the likeliness of such conflict in the near future mainly suggest that its parties may be Russians and Ukrainians, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars, on the other (46.5%)¹⁷; least of all they agree that those parties may be Russians and Crimean Tatars, on one hand, and Ukrainians – on the other (1.9%).

The breakdown of opinions on this matter among all ethnic groups is actually the same as Crimean, with two exceptions: much fewer Crimean Tatars (29.3%) see the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities as the parties to a hypothetical conflict, while more Crimean Tatars admit a conflict between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, and between Russians and Ukrainians.

Gender specificities. Women less tend to believe in an inter-ethnic conflict between Ukrainians and

Russians, and more – between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic community of the autonomy (72.7% of the women admitting the probability of a conflict suggest that it may arise primarily between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic population (either with the Ukrainian and Russian communities at a time, or only with Ukrainians or with Russians), while among men, this opinion is shared by 65.1%. Men and women showed actually no differences in assessments of the reasons for inter-ethnic conflicts in Crimea.

By and large, it should be noted that among all Crimeans and representatives of each ethnic group, quite many (nearly or more than a third) could not give a definite answer, which witnesses to the hesitation and uncertainty of the public opinion regarding the stability of inter-ethnic relations in the autonomy.

On the other hand, the breakdown of opinions about the parties to a hypothetical conflict may once again prove the “national deafness” of the Slavic community to the problems of Crimean Tatars and repatriates in general. In reality, that community is well aware of the actual social, political and cultural inequality of ethnic groups in Crimea, but this awareness takes forms not of support for fair and lawful aspirations of repatriates, but of fears of a conflict caused by such inequality.

2.4. INTER-CONFESSIONAL RELATIONS

Inter-confessional relations greatly depend on satisfaction of religious needs of believers and mutual attitude of confessional and/or church communities (religious tolerance of communities and believers). So, to describe them, we should cite the relevant assessments and self-assessments of Crimeans, and since there were cases of inter-confessional confrontation in 2000s – assessments of the reasons for conflicts and opinions of actors responsible for such conflicts.

Satisfaction of religious needs. According to the survey results, all Crimeans and representatives of all main ethnic and confessional groups rather highly assess satisfaction of their religious needs – all average marks on a five-point scale were above 4: among Crimeans in general – 4.31; among Russians – 4.35; Ukrainians – 4.29; Crimean Tatars – 4.26.

At that, assessments given by UOC and UOC-KP believers are higher than by all Crimeans and by each ethnic group (average marks, respectively – 4.55 and 4.49).

Attitude to religious organisations of different faiths. The majority (61.3%) of faithful Crimeans treat religious organisations of different faiths positively (29.5%) or tolerate them (31.7%). 29.1% are indifferent to them. A negative attitude was reported by a small share (3.4%) of those polled.

The breakdown of opinions among faithful Ukrainians and Russians is similar to the Crimeans'. Specific of the breakdown of opinions among Crimean Tatars is the lower percentage of those indifferent (17.1%) and somewhat higher – of those who disapprove organisations of different faiths (8.2%).

¹⁷ Noteworthy, Crimeans admitting the possibility of a conflict between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities tend to believe that the main reason for inter-ethnic conflicts in the Crimea lies in social, political and cultural inequality of ethnic groups.



The percentage of those who positively or tolerably treat religious organisations representing another faith prevails among all three key confessional groups – UOC, UOC-KP and Muslims¹⁸.

Meanwhile, Muslims are less indifferent to religious organisations of different faiths than the Orthodox (14.4%), while more of them treat those organisations negatively or oppose them (10.1%).

Reasons for inter-confessional conflicts. The majority of Crimeans see the main reasons for inter-confessional conflicts beyond religion, first of all – in introduction of political and ethnic contradictions to the sphere of religion (26.2%) and in clashes of economic interests of different ethnic groups using religious slogans as a cover (25.2%). Meanwhile, 10.3% see the reason of conflicts in religious fanaticism, intolerance of believers, 8.5% – in selective, prejudiced attitude of the authorities to different religious organisations, as a result of which, their constitutional rights are not evenly protected. Quite many (29.3%) could not answer the question.

Opinions of representatives of ethnic groups are similar. One small difference is that among Crimean Tatars, compared to other ethnic groups, somewhat fewer people see the main reason for conflicts in the clashes of economic interests of ethnic groups, and somewhat more referred to introduction of political and ethnic contradictions to the sphere of religion.

In each confessional group, the majority also believe that the main reasons for inter-confessional conflicts lie beyond religion. However, among UOC believers and Muslims, twice more people see the main reason for conflicts in politicisation of the religious sector than among believers of UOC-KP (respectively, 32% and 32.7%, against 16.1%).

Meanwhile, believers of UOC-KP more tend to see the main reason for conflicts in clashes of economic interests of ethnic groups (30.8%); among the believers of UOC, this opinion is shared by 27.1%, among Muslims – 18.8%.

The breakdown of answers of Crimeans to the question about the main reason for inter-confessional conflicts, dependent on their attitude to religious organisations of different faiths, is of interest.

For instance, among those who attribute said conflicts to introduction of political and ethnic contradictions to the sphere of religion or selective, prejudiced attitude of the authorities to different religious organisations, the relative majority tolerate religious organisations of different faiths; a positive attitude was second in both categories.

Among those who attribute inter-confessional conflicts to clashes of economic interests of different ethnic groups using religious slogans as a cover, actually equal shares treat positively (25.7%) or tolerate (24.1%) adherents of different faiths.

Among those who attribute conflicts to religious fanaticism and intolerance of believers, relatively more people (26.4%) positively treat religious organisations of different faiths; 18.1% tolerate them.

Responsibility for inter-confessional conflicts. Crimeans rest somewhat greater responsibility on Crimean and central authorities (average marks on a five-point scale – 3.98 and 3.94, respectively), leaders of Crimean religious organisations (3.87) and believers taking part in conflicts (3.86), smaller – on foreign religious centres (3.53) and representatives of foreign state, political and public structures (3.32), although the spread of assessments was insignificant.

The assessments given by representatives of national and ethnic groups were very similar. However, Russians and Crimean Tatars rest much greater responsibility for conflicts than Ukrainians on central and Crimean authorities and leaders of religious organisations; at that, Crimean Tatars rest greater responsibility on Crimean authorities than on central. Meanwhile, Russians much more than Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians tend to rest responsibility for conflicts on the involved believers.

Russians more often than Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars rest responsibility for conflicts on foreign religious centres, state political and public structures. Crimean Tatars more often than Ukrainians and Russians rest responsibility on leaders of Crimean public and political organisations.

Assessments of representatives of confessional groups somewhat differ from the assessments made by national and ethnic groups. For instance, UOC-KP believers rest much smaller responsibility on each of the mentioned institutes and bodies of power than Crimeans in general and representatives of each national and ethnic group. At that, they rest on the central and Crimean authorities even smaller responsibility for conflicts than on involved believers.

UOC believers and Muslims rest the greatest responsibility on the central and Crimean authorities and leaders of religious organisations; at that, Muslims more tend to blame Crimean authorities, UOC believers – the central. UOC believers rest greater responsibility than Muslims and much greater than believers of UOC-KP on foreign religious centres, foreign state, political and public structures.

It should be added that Crimeans in general and representatives of all national and ethnic groups assess the urgency of the problem of tension of inter-confessional relations much lower, compared to the urgency of the problem of tension in inter-ethnic relations. For instance, the index of urgency of the problem of tension in relations between followers of different confessions made 0.22 – against 0.44 for inter-ethnic relations. In that, among Crimean Tatars: 0.22 against 0.47; for Russians – 0.24 against 0.43; for Ukrainians – 0.26 against 0.44. Additionally, in the overall list of topical problems critical for Crimea, tense relations between believers of different confessions and churches were noted by 7.4% of Crimeans, in that: among Ukrainians – 10%; among Russians – 7%; among Crimean Tatars – by 2.8%.

It may be concluded therefore that at present, inter-confessional relations in Crimea are rather tolerant and evidently less tense than inter-ethnic relations in general. If the issues of religion are not politicised and/or identified with national and ethnic ones, the probability of aggravation of inter-confessional relations or emergence of a conflict on religious grounds looks rather low¹⁹. ■

¹⁸ Believers of UOC: positively – 33.1%, tolerate – 35.6%; UOC-KP: positively – 37.6%, tolerate – 22%; Muslims: positively – 37.5%, tolerate – 32.2%.
¹⁹ Another thing is that conflicts arising from entirely different reasons may take religious forms.



Specificities of assessments of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations and risks of conflicts						
	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	TOTAL IN CRIMEA		
Inter-ethnic relations						
To what extent are your needs at receiving education and information in native language are satisfied? ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> education 	Unsatisfied (49.6%) Satisfied (40.4%) Balance ² (-9.2%)	Unsatisfied (45.2%) Satisfied (36.7%) Balance (-8.5%)	Satisfied (48.6%) Unsatisfied (39.6%) Balance (9.0%)	Unsatisfied (43.5%) Satisfied (41.2%) Balance (-2.3%)	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> reading books 	Satisfied (59.8%) Unsatisfied (32.1%) Balance (27.7%)	Satisfied (72.7%) Unsatisfied (22.8%) Balance (49.9%)	Satisfied (74.4%) Unsatisfied (21.6%) Balance (52.8%)	Satisfied (71.9%) Unsatisfied (23.4%) Balance (48.5%)
			Satisfied (61.9%) Unsatisfied (31.0%) Balance (30.9%)	Satisfied (70.6%) Unsatisfied (23.9%) Balance (46.7%)	Satisfied (70.3%) Unsatisfied (24.4%) Balance (45.9%)	Satisfied (69.6%) Unsatisfied (24.7%) Balance (44.9%)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> watching TV programmes 	Unsatisfied (53.1%) Satisfied (44.0%) Balance (-9.1%)	Unsatisfied (71.0%) Satisfied (27.7%) Balance (-43.3%)	Unsatisfied (50.0%) Satisfied (47.8%) Balance (-2.2%)	Unsatisfied (63.3%) Satisfied (34.9%) Balance (-28.4%)
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> watching movies in the cinema 	Unsatisfied (42.6%) Satisfied (35.3%) Balance (-7.3%)	Unsatisfied (56.5%) Satisfied (22.3%) Balance (-34.2%)	Unsatisfied (47.9%) Satisfied (34.0%) Balance (-13.9%)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> listening to the radio 		Satisfied (45.4%) Unsatisfied (42.8%) Balance (2.6%)	Unsatisfied (57.2%) Satisfied (33.3%) Balance (-23.9%)	Satisfied (48.9%) Unsatisfied (41.5%) Balance (7.4%)
To what extent are the rights of the following groups upheld in Crimea? ³						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Crimean Tatars 	0.34	0.79	0.78	0.74		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Russian-speaking population 	0.71	0.44	0.54	0.49		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ukrainian-speaking population 	0.77	0.66	0.63	0.66		



<p>How urgent for Crimea is the problem of restriction of ...use?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Russian language 	<p>Not really urgent (31.1%) Urgent to a certain extent (30.6%) Such problem does not exist (17.8%)</p>	<p>Very urgent (57.9%) Urgent to a certain extent (30.0%) ... Such problem does not exist (2.6%)</p>	<p>Very urgent (40.4%) Urgent to a certain extent (34.3%) ... Such problem does not exist (7.2%)</p>	<p>Very urgent (48.2%) Urgent to a certain extent (31.4%) ... Such problem does not exist (5.3%)</p>
<p><i>Index of urgency of the problem of restriction in Russian language use*</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ukrainian language 	<p>Such problem does not exist (58.3%) Not really urgent (20.9%) ... Very urgent (2.9%)</p>	<p>Such problem does not exist (61.0%) Not really urgent (24.5%) ... Very urgent (1.6%)</p>	<p>Such problem does not exist (51.0%) Not really urgent (25.9%) ... Very urgent (3.8%)</p>	<p>Such problem does not exist (57.3%) Not really urgent (24.8%) ... Very urgent (2.4%)</p>
<p><i>Index of urgency of the problem of restriction in Ukrainian language use*</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Crimean Tatar language 	<p>Urgent to a certain extent (35.0%) Very urgent (30.6%) ... Such problem does not exist (15.4%)</p>	<p>Such problem does not exist (49.3%) Not really urgent (22.7%) ... Very urgent (1.6%)</p>	<p>Such problem does not exist (42.2%) Not really urgent (26.4%) ... Very urgent (3.4%)</p>	<p>Such problem does not exist (43.7%) Not really urgent (23.0%) ... Very urgent (4.9%)</p>
<p><i>Index of urgency of the problem of restriction in Crimean Tatar language use*</i></p> <p>Do you agree with the statement that population of Crimea is enduring ukrainisation?⁴</p> <p>Are there any problems in inter-ethnic relations in Crimea?</p>	<p>Yes (55.3%) No (34.2%) <i>Balance (21.1%)</i></p> <p>There are some problems (57.1%) There are no problems (25.4%) ... Yes, there are pretty acute problems (8.1%)</p>	<p>Yes (84.7%) No (10.5%) <i>Balance (74.2%)</i></p> <p>There are some problems (49.3%) There are no problems (20.3%) Yes, there are pretty acute problems (16.1%)</p>	<p>Yes (62.0%) No (30.0%) <i>Balance (32.0%)</i></p> <p>There are some problems (40.6%) There are no problems (26.9%) Yes, there are pretty acute problems (16.1%)</p>	<p>Yes (75.2%) No (18.5%) <i>Balance (56.7%)</i></p> <p>There are some problems (47.5%) There are no problems (23.0%) Yes, there are pretty acute problems (15.4%)</p>

* Index of urgency of the problem may have the value from "0" to "1", where "1" means that such problem does not exist, and "0" means very high urgency.
 1 In his question answer variant "satisfied" is made up of sum of answers "fully satisfied" and "most likely satisfied" and "most likely unsatisfied".
 2 Here and further on *balance* is calculated as a difference between the part of those who give an affirmative answer to the question, and part of those who answer negatively.
 3 According to the index of protection of rights which takes the value from "0" to "1", where "0" means that the rights are not upheld, and "1" – fully upheld.
 4 In his question answer variant "yes" is made up of sum of answers "agree" and "most likely agree"; variant "no" – of "do not agree" and "most likely do not agree"



	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	TOTAL IN CRIMEA
Estimate of tension in inter-ethnic relations ⁵				
• Russians and Ukrainians	1.98	1.67	1.63	1.70
• Russians and Crimean Tatars	2.34	2.88	2.67	2.77
• Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars	2.23	2.67	2.62	2.60
Have you encountered ethnic discrimination in the employment process and/or in educational institutions?	No (52.4%) Yes (36.5%) Balance (-15.9%)	No (81.3%) Yes (7.1%) Balance (-74.2%)	No (77.5%) Yes (9.8%) Balance (-67.7%)	No 77.1% Yes (11.1%) Balance (-66.0%)
Does discrimination against Crimean Tatars and other repatriates exist in Crimea?	Exists, but only occurs at certain times in certain spheres (48.1%) Exists and occurs in a majority of spheres (23.8%) Does not exist (13.4%)	Does not exist (65.2%) Rarely occurs (14.7%) Exists, but only occurs at certain times in certain spheres (9.6%)	Does not exist (54.1%) Rarely occurs (20.6%) Exists, but only occurs at certain times in certain spheres (10.2%)	Does not exist (56.5%) Rarely occurs (16.2%) Exists, but only occurs at certain times in certain spheres (13.7%)
Should Crimean Tatars be granted the status of indigenous people of Ukraine?	Yes (77.6%) No (11.9%)	No (70.3%) Hard to say (21.4%)	No (60.9%) Hard to say (26.0%)	No 62.2% Hard to say (21.6%)
Should Ukraine officially recognize the Crimean Tatar Majlis as the fully legitimate representative body of the Crimean Tatar nation?	Yes (77.0%) Hard to say (11.8%)	No (62.4%) Hard to say (15.4%)	No (48.2%) I do not care (19.7%)	No (52.7%) Yes (16.6%)
How urgent is the problem of tense inter-ethnic relations for Crimea?	Urgent to a certain extent (48.2%) Not really urgent (20.5%) Very urgent (17.7%) Such problem does not exist (7.0%)	Urgent to a certain extent (42.2%) Not really urgent (26.2%) Very urgent (15.8%) ... Such problem does not exist (7.5%)	Urgent to a certain extent (38.3%) Not really urgent (24.4%) Very urgent (18.5%) Such problem does not exist (9.4%)	Urgent to a certain extent (41.6%) Not really urgent (25.0%) Very urgent (16.9%) ... Such problem does not exist (8.0%)
Could a serious inter-ethnic conflict arise in the nearest future in Crimea?	No (40.8%) Hard to say (32.3%) Yes (26.9%)	Hard to say (39.8%) No (37.3%) Yes (22.9%)	No (37.8%) Hard to say (36.3%) Yes (25.9%)	No (37.9%) Hard to say (37.7%) Yes (24.4%)



<p>If you believe that such a conflict could arise, which of the following groups would most likely be in conflict?⁶</p>	<p>Russians and Ukrainians, on one side, and Crimean Tatars, on the other (29.3%) Russians and Crimean Tatars (18.2%) Russians and Ukrainians (15.4%) Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (14.3%)</p>	<p>Russians and Ukrainians, on one side, and Crimean Tatars, on the other (50.0%) Russians and Crimean Tatars (17.5%) Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, on one side, and Russians, on the other (7.4%) Russians and Ukrainians (6.5%)</p>	<p>Russians and Ukrainians, on one side, and Crimean Tatars, on the other (46.7%) Russians and Crimean Tatars (13.5%) Russians and Ukrainians (11.3%) Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (7.0%)</p>	<p>Russians and Ukrainians, on one side, and Crimean Tatars, on the other (46.5%) Russians and Crimean Tatars (16.0%) Russians and Ukrainians (9.3%) Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, on one side, and Russians, on the other (7.0%) Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (6.6%)</p>
<p>What is the main cause of inter-ethnic conflicts in Crimea?</p>	<p>Socio-economic, political, and cultural inequalities of different ethnic groups (18.9%) Incompetence of Ukrainian authorities regarding inter-ethnic problems of Crimea (17.4%) Purposeful support by Ukrainian authorities for Inter-ethnic tension in the region (14.9%)</p>	<p>Incompetence of Ukrainian authorities regarding inter-ethnic problems of Crimea (28.1%) Purposeful support by Ukrainian authorities for Inter-ethnic tension in the region (21.4%) Socio-economic, political, and cultural inequalities of different ethnic groups (14.3%)</p>	<p>Incompetence of Ukrainian authorities regarding inter-ethnic problems of Crimea (24.3%) Socio-economic, political, and cultural inequalities of different ethnic groups (16.1%) Hard to say (15.7%)</p>	<p>Incompetence of Ukrainian authorities regarding inter-ethnic problems of Crimea (25.8%) Purposeful support by Ukrainian authorities for Inter-ethnic tension in the region (18.6%) Socio-economic, political, and cultural inequalities of different ethnic groups (15.0%)</p>
<p>How would you assess the results of activity of... In the sphere of inter-ethnic relations?⁷</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ukraine's state authorities Crimean republican authorities 	<p>Negatively (73.7%) Positively (13.3%) Balance (-60.4%)</p> <p>Negatively (76.7%) Positively (11.2%) Balance (-65.5%)</p>	<p>Negatively (87.1%) Positively (3.8%) Balance (-83.3%)</p> <p>Negatively (75.8%) Positively (10.3%) Balance (-65.5%)</p>	<p>Negatively (76.6%) Positively (9.8%) Balance (-66.8%)</p> <p>Negatively (75.7%) Positively (12.0%) Balance (-63.7%)</p>	<p>Negatively (82.6%) Positively (6.8%) Balance (-75.8%)</p> <p>Negatively (75.8%) Positively (11.1%) Balance (-61.7%)</p>
<p>Index of urgency of the problem of tension in inter-ethnic relations</p>	<p>0.47</p>	<p>0.43</p>	<p>0.44</p>	<p>0.44</p>
Inter-confessional relations				
<p>Assessment of conditions for satisfaction of religious needs⁸</p>	<p>4.26</p>	<p>4.35</p>	<p>4.29</p>	<p>4.31</p>

5 On a five-point scale, where "1" means that there is no tension in relations, and "5" – relations are very tense.

6 This question was answered only by those who believe that a serious inter-ethnic conflict could arise in Crimea.

7 In his question answer variant "positively" is made up of sum of answers "positively" and "most likely positively"; variant "negatively" – of "negatively" and "most likely negatively".

8 On a five-point scale where "1" means there are no conditions, and "5" – there are all necessary conditions to satisfy one's religious needs.

	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	Total in Crimea
What is your attitude toward religious organisations associated with faith other than yours? ⁹	Positive (34.2%) Tolerable (29.7%) Indifferent (17.1%) ... Help them/Fight them 3.3%/ 1.9%	Tolerable (34.1%) Indifferent (30.0%) Positive (27.5%) ... Help them/Fight them 1.9%/ 0.7%	Indifferent (32.7%) Positive (30.7%) Tolerable (27.4%) ... Help them/Fight them 1.9%/ 1.2%	Tolerable (31.7%) Positive (29.5%) Indifferent (29.1%) ... Help them/Fight them 2.3%/ 1.0%
How urgent is the problem of tense inter-confessional relations for Crimea?	Such problem does not exist (32.9%) Not really urgent (30.7%) Urgent to a certain extent (21.6%) ... Very urgent (6.4%)	Such problem does not exist (32.3%) Not really urgent (28.0%) Urgent to a certain extent (19.8%) ... Very urgent (8.4%)	Such problem does not exist (32.6%) Not really urgent (26.4%) Urgent to a certain extent (22.8%) Very urgent (9.6%)	Such problem does not exist (32.2%) Not really urgent (27.7%) Urgent to a certain extent (21.1%) ... Very urgent (8.5%)
<i>Index of urgency of the problem of tension in inter-confessional relations*</i>	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.24
What is the main cause of inter-confessional conflicts?	Introducing controversial political and ethnic issues into the religious sphere (34.2%) Hard to say (25.0%) Clashes of economic interests amongst different ethnic groups (19.6%)	Hard to say (28.5%) Introducing controversial political and ethnic issues into the religious sphere (27.0%) Clashes of economic interests amongst different ethnic groups (25.4%)	Hard to say (33.7%) Clashes of economic interests amongst different ethnic groups (25.6%) Introducing controversial political and ethnic issues into the religious sphere (22.8%)	Hard to say (29.3%) Introducing controversial political and ethnic issues into the religious sphere (26.2%) Clashes of economic interests amongst different ethnic groups (25.2%)
To what extent are the following institutes and representatives of authorities responsible for inter-confessional conflicts in Crimea? ¹⁰	Crimean authorities 4.18 Leadership of religious organisations of Crimea 3.95 Ukrainian authorities 3.93 ... Foreign structures 3.03	Ukrainian authorities 4.01 Crimean authorities 4.00 Believers who take part in these conflicts 3.95 ... Foreign structures 3.42	Crimean authorities 3.89 Leadership of religious organisations of Crimea 3.78 Ukrainian authorities 3.77 ... Foreign structures 3.24	Crimean authorities 3.98 Ukrainian authorities 3.94 Leadership of religious organisations of Crimea 3.87 ... Foreign structures 3.32

⁹ This question was answered only by those who consider themselves to be believers.

¹⁰ On a five-point scale where "1" means, that the institute is not responsible at all, and "5" – responsible to the full extent.