

# UKRAINE'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN PRESENT-DAY CIRCUMSTANCES

Another discussion held within the framework of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network summed up the results of the Planning Conference of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR) "National Security Policy: Current Challenges, Adequate Responses" on March 23-25, 2009, in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany).<sup>1</sup>

At the Conference, working groups were discussing the following sectors: military threats; non-military threats; interdepartmental coordination; programmes of development. Working groups and plenary sessions reviewed the results of the previous stage of the NATO-Ukraine partnership and outlined, in the context of assessment of the present-day threats, its immediate tasks, including for their consideration at finalisation of Ukraine's Annual National Programme's draft (ANP).

The Conference also saw a presentation of the Strategic Assessment worked out by an expert group within the framework of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network.<sup>2</sup> The document was praised by the Conference participants, and it was proposed to discuss the possibility of its practical use at the following meeting of JWGDR in Warsaw (May 2009).

Discussing the Conference results, the panellists noted **serious deterioration of Ukraine's national security, first of all, in the information, energy, and defence sectors**. Most experts see one of the main problems in the **ineffectiveness of the state authorities and loss of public confidence in politicians and power institutions**.

Presentations made by the panellists are published below.<sup>3</sup>



## FRUITFUL CONTRIBUTION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS TO UKRAINE'S SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT



**Ihor ARHUCHYNSKYI,**  
*Deputy Head of Department  
of Foreign Policy's Aspects of  
National Security – Head of  
International Security Division  
of Ukraine's NSDC Staff*

**Presentation at the Garmisch Conference of the document prepared by an expert group within the framework of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network was a very positive signal, in the context of complaints**

**about the extremely low implementation rate of quite professional recommendations of non-governmental organisations.** I hope that after finalisation and discussion at the following high level meeting of JWGDR in Warsaw in May 2009 it will be presented for consideration to the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

On the other hand, the document is already being used for preparation of the new National Security Strategy. Use of that Document by experts of state institutions is good for the state policy formulation and is an evidence (and guarantee) of their more considerate approach to that activity and its results. Recommendations cited in the document will also be used in the JWG activity during preparation of plans and implementation of existing projects. The document prepared at this table not only gave the tone to discussions in working groups of the Conference but was used by them to prepare recommendations for further activities.

Generally speaking, the informal character of the Conference was favourable to exchange of opinions and experience between representatives of NATO and the Ukrainian side.

<sup>1</sup> The Conference was held with assistance from the Marshall Center, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Bundeswehr and the NATO International Secretariat. Ukraine for the first time attended the event with a large delegation of 24 persons representing both state structures and non-governmental organisations.

<sup>2</sup> The Strategic Assessment logically continues the material "Towards more adequate and coordinated national security policy in Ukraine" prepared for NATO-Ukraine consultations on the level of defence ministers in Tallinn on November 12-13, 2008. For the Document text see: Security of Ukraine in 21st century: challenges and needs of collective measures. – Kyiv, Razumkov Centre, 2009; [http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/securityXXI\\_ukr\\_eng.pdf](http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/securityXXI_ukr_eng.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> The expert discussion was held on April 23, 2009. The texts are prepared after the discussion records and are published in a shortened form, in the order of presentation at the discussion.

Presented at the Conference was a letter from the management of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) with proposals for the development of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network. I hope that after the Warsaw meeting, DCAF will become one of the Network's agents and join implementation of all projects by providing expert and, importantly, financial and technical assistance. Everybody knows the capabilities of that Centre, so, I believe that the appearance of such a strong actor in the Partnership Network will contribute to the promotion of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Now, regarding further intentions. The results of the Garmisch Conference will be specifically considered at a session of the JWGDR meeting in Warsaw. The agenda items will include the possibility of use of the Strategic Assessment prepared by the Partnership Network in JWGDR practical activity. ■

#### WE SHOULD STAND ON FIRM SOIL



**Viktor KORENDOVYCH,**  
*Director, Military Policy  
and Strategic Planning  
Department of the Ministry  
of Defence of Ukraine*

We consider the results of the Garmisch Conference as logical continuation of the achievements of the Bucharest (optimism) and December Brussels (realism) summits. The Conference added realism to the assessment of the situation in and around Ukraine, gave an opportunity to make right conclusions, concentrate on practical implementation of our commitments.

The conference discussed, in particular, the progress of drafting of the first Annual National Programme (ANP). The working group on military threats considered one of the best prepared sections of ANP drawn up by the Defence Ministry jointly with NSDC Staff and dealing with the defence sector problems. During the discussion it was noted that, unfortunately, the gap between words and deeds in the country continues to grow. In particular, all agencies verbally supported the idea of ANP, gave advice, but when it came to ANP drafting, realised that interdepartmental coordination was missing, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not perform such coordination. Meanwhile, despite the noted problems, the presented section in principle was praised by the Conference participants.

Further steps for ANP preparation, namely – a meeting chaired by Vice Prime Minister Nemyria, may be assessed as positive. Common understanding was achieved regarding the need to enhance coordination for ANP finalisation and soonest presentation of the national document to our partners for familiarisation before subsequent review in Warsaw.

Assignment of the coordination functions of ANP development and implementation from the Foreign Ministry to the Coordination Bureau of the Government's Secretariat may also be praised. I am sure that concentration

of coordinating functions in the Cabinet of Ministers (in the hands of a Vice Premiere) will add realism to ANP and promote its implementation.

**As regards military security issues, the main conclusion is as follows: we should stand on firm soil and realise that Ukraine should guarantee its military security through its own forces.** It is a highly conceptual, very important conclusion proven with preliminary assessments obtained within the framework of the Defence Review started in October, 2008.

At its first meeting, the analytical group of the Interdepartmental Commission for Defence Review led by V.Horbulin assessed threats in the domains of home and foreign security and their influence on the national security as a whole.

The obtained results and conclusions prove the difficult situation in which Ukraine appeared and therefore require publicising and appropriate public reaction. Urgent actions are needed with respect to physical components (arms and military equipment), human resources of the Armed Forces, as well as conceptual decisions concerning the actual capabilities.

Solution of those problems is now hindered by the economic crisis that became a determinant of the year. In particular, the passed budget endangered prospects of maintenance of Ukrainian peacekeeping forces abroad. If no proper decisions are passed, after June, collapse will come – there will be no possibility to withdraw or to further keep the troops. The economic crisis rendered unrealistic all talks of the Armed Forces' professionalisation, their provision with arms and military equipment. The stabilisation fund is merely exhausted. It is proposed that we take the small allocations to arms and military equipment and spend those funds on maintenance of the peacekeeping forces. But if we do this, we will, first, kill all prospects of rearmament of the army, and second, inflict the damage to the domestic defence industry.

In absence of funds, we can go forward in conceptual terms. This opportunity should be used, and we are doing that. We are using proposals worked out within the framework of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network under the Razumkov Centre leadership, during the Defence Review, and this is a serious contribution.

Working groups of the Conference in Garmisch reviewed the issues of risks assessment and threats for Ukraine.

The long discussion proved that those issues can be solved effectively only within Ukraine. Just as we find it difficult to assess risks and threats for Norway or Spain, foreign experts find it difficult – morally and psychologically – to assess our problems.

While discussing potential challenges and threats in the field of military security, the first working group came to the conclusion that such threats exist, we are aware of them, but they should be finally identified as part of the Defence Review or in any other format acceptable for Ukraine.

**And one more important conclusion: information about military threats should be made known to the public. We should find effective forms to make society aware of military threats, arguments of the need of bringing up the political will for change implementation, passage of decisions, at this stage – at least conceptual but realistic.** ■



### THREAT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS LOSS BY ARMED FORCES BECAME A REALITY



**Yevhen SHELEST,**  
Head of the board,  
Military and Security  
Policy Centre


Among the main outcomes of the Conference in Garmisch, it was proposed to add to the list of new potential threats the threat of combat effectiveness loss by Armed Forces, now in sight. Such proposal deserves discussion, at least.

Viewing the current situation, one should note the lack of basic data for planning in the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. The State Programme of the Armed Forces development for 2006-2011 lost all sense, including due to the complete disruption of budget funding and unjustified assessments of rapid accession to NATO. Those assessments were critical for determination of the Armed Forces strength, all reform measures and their phased character. But today, those data proved erroneous, while new data are unavailable. For instance, how can one plan tasks of training the required number of officers for military educational institutions in absence of basic data? What shall we do with military personnel training plans worked out five years ago, using old basic data that envisaged a strong reduction in the number of military units? **So, there arose a deficit of basic data on whose basis the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff is performing strategic and defence planning.**

Publicising of those problems is getting increasingly important. We realise that if the public is unaware of the real defence capability and existing threats, Parliament and the Government, already entirely neglecting the needs of security and the Armed Forces, will persist. So, following the latest public hearings held by the Military and Security Policy Centre, we proposed establishment of an expert group made up from representatives of public organisations, to jointly perform the task of public information on national security and defence issues.

For the public opinion to influence the authorities, a common platform for expert discussion of security problems is needed. It is unimportant which public organisation takes the lead – it is not a matter of leadership. We should start with expert meetings, like those arranged by Razumkov Centre. **We should work out a programme of action (not necessarily long-term), identify the subjects, target audience, generate an expert opinion on the most topical for society issues – and start working.** ■

### PRIORITY TASKS INCLUDE RENOVATION OF THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF COORDINATION OF UKRAINE'S COOPERATION WITH NATO



**Petro KANANA,**  
Deputy Head of Euro-Atlantic  
Integration Department, Principal  
of Policy and Security Section,  
European and Euro-Atlantic  
Integration Coordination Bureau  
of the Cabinet of Ministers  
of Ukraine Secretariat

During the Garmisch Conference, at the working group “interdepartmental coordination in Ukraine” chaired by the Director of the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Coordination Bureau of the Cabinet of Ministers Secretariat Mr. Tryukhan, many panellists noted the importance of efforts and actions coordination of different agencies in Ukraine. In particular, it was stressed that reforms in the security sector lacked an integral approach and coordination. Irregular reformation of the security sector elements bars solution of tasks of its all-round restructuring, namely: more optimal redistribution of functions, required structural changes over the entire range with account of changes in kinds of threats and their nature. It was stressed that in absence of coordination in that field, positive effects are greatly reduced or totally absent.

The working group, involving representatives of Ukraine and NATO countries, made the following conclusions:

- there is a need of improvement of approaches and introduction of effective mechanisms of reforms (e.g., development and implementation of ANP, assessment of its implementation). This can be done only through creation of an effective system of interaction between all branches;
- the available mechanisms hinder effective participation of the Government in formulation, implementation and control in the field of national security, defence and foreign policy;
- the effectiveness of NSDC, despite the available powers in the security and defence sector, needs enhancement;
- the attitude of central executive bodies to implementation of annual NATO-Ukraine Target Plans remains formal – effective control of their implementation is absent;
- ineffective coordination of current activity of executive bodies in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration retards achievement of strategic goals of Ukraine's foreign policy;
- improvement of the Ukrainian executive and other state bodies activity coordination in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration should take place in line with the realities of the present stage of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO;



- there must be one centre of decision-making in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration.

On the basis of analysis and assessments of the state of coordination in the field of national security, the working group worked out a number of practical recommendations aimed at improvement of the national system of coordination of the Euro-Atlantic integration along the following lines.

1. Improvement of horizontal and vertical interaction of state bodies by means of: strengthening the Cabinet of Ministers' Secretariat structure, to support operation of the appropriate executive bodies and promote information exchange among them; facilitation of efficient coordination among the key actors (Cabinet of Ministers, NSDC, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Justice); use of informal mechanisms, employment of non-governmental organisations.

2. Formation of a common view and understanding of the problems of Euro-Atlantic integration through: creation inside the system of inter-agency coordination of a platform for exchange of ideas and opinions of the goals (as the case is with the ANP preparation); issuing a directory of inter-agency coordination on the Euro-Atlantic integration.

3. Enhancement of inter-agency interaction through better skills of state servants – employing the Main Department of State Service and using the NATO Programme of Professional Development of civilian personnel in the security and defence sector.

4. Reliance on support from Ukrainian and international non-governmental organisations of member states of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network for improvement of inter-agency coordination, outside monitoring of achieved results (in particular, implementation of ANP and the National Security Strategy).

Given the subjects of today's discussion and the noted recommendations, I wish to briefly dwell upon some measures taken by the Government for amelioration of the NATO-Ukraine coordination system.

In July 2008 the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Coordination Bureau was established within the Cabinet of Ministers' Secretariat. That body is charged with horizontal coordination of the majority of internal tasks in the field of the Euro-Atlantic integration.

The main task of the Bureau lies in provision and improvement of horizontal coordination in the activity of executive bodies, since the majority of issues associated with implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan measures for 2009, ANP drafting, etc. falls within the competence of executive bodies.

A draft of the President of Ukraine Decree "Issues of the National System of Coordination of Ukraine's Cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" provides for creation of a new effective mechanism of interdepartmental coordination of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO, with one centre of decision-making.<sup>4</sup> Such centre is to be presented by the relevant State Commission, to be set up as an advisory body under the Cabinet of

Ministers and led by a Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine. Its functional powers are to cover issues of Euro-Atlantic integration. The Commission will regularly report about its activity to the President of Ukraine.

To sum up, it should be noted that the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine can be a success only on the condition of joint concerted actions of the state authorities and non-governmental expert community. Our today's meeting is an element of that process. ■

#### SECURITY POLICY SHOULD BE PLANNED AND ASSESSED REALISTICALLY



**Oleksandr BELOV,**  
Advisor to the Head  
of the Security Service Ukraine

The NATO-Ukraine Working Group on democratic civilian control of the intelligence sector has been active since October, 2006 – since its foundation at a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission on the level of defence ministers in Sintra, Portugal. It incorporated experts from Ukraine (from the Presidential Secretariat, NSDC Staff, Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, other intelligence bodies), representatives of all member states and the NATO International Secretariat, which is supporting organisational issues. All in all, seven meetings were held. The latest one was held in 2008 in Kyiv.

The main task of the working group at the Conference in Garmisch was to hold consultations and get advice on approximation of the Ukrainian intelligence system – the home security service and intelligence bodies in the Western sense – to the political, legal, moral and professional standards applicable in EU states and countries of the Euro-Atlantic community.

The group worked only with unclassified materials, bypassing operational issues. The discussion covered general principles of organisation in Ukraine of special services, the system of democratic civilian control over the intelligence activity, funding, assessment of the reformation lines of special services in Ukraine by our partners. By and large, **the group got the required advice on the issues under review, and its work was deemed useful.**

**Two years of preparatory work brought creation of effective cooperation mechanisms between Ukraine and NATO in the field of the national intelligence sector reform.**

From the end of 2008 we work in the format of *staff talks*, i.e., consultations on a request of the Ukrainian side on issues whose list for the current year is already in place.

<sup>4</sup> As of December 7, 2009, the Decree is not signed.



Ukraine implemented some recommendations and assessments jointly prepared by experts of the Working Group. Say, using the mechanism of discussions and expert consultations, the Concept of the Security Service reform was adopted. The relevant law is now under discussion.

Preparation of reports about the most secret things in the state became a usual practice – [in the form of] the White Book of the intelligence sector activity. The year of 2008 saw publication of the White Book “Security Service of Ukraine”. In 2009, a separate subject White Book on the Security Service of Ukraine was compiled, with information on reformation of the Security Service, its international cooperation, public relations, as well as declassification of the former KGB archives.

Many experts of the Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service and military intelligence underwent language and professional training in different countries within the framework of the Programme of Professional Development.

Finally, the level of confidence on the part of NATO partners we managed to win let us extend cooperation to other, not less sensitive domains of the national security. In 2008, an international seminar on topical problems of fighting cyberthreats was held. Establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Working Group for fighting cyberthreats is being considered.

Under the auspices of the President of Ukraine, the Security Service jointly with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and National Institute of International Security Problems under NSDC arranged in April 2008 the first international scientific conference “Democratic Values and Human Rights Observance by Intelligence Agencies”; the second such conference was held in April 2009.

I note that the working group enjoyed steady support from the NSDC staff and the Presidential Secretariat, the Security Service of Ukraine leadership, Ukrainian intelligence bodies.

Finally, a few words about other problems. I suggest that we should **very realistically plan and assess the security policy, whereby events should be properly backed with resources. Many of today’s problems arose exactly because of inadequate backing of planned events with resources. That is why we are left with what we have got.**

I do not envy the experts now working on the Defence Review. Forecasts of defence expenditures make the core of the Defence Review, indispensable for realistic planning.

Now, the whole expert community should think how, in the conditions of tough resource limitations, to attain the goals set in the expert report delivered in Garmisch. I would like to invite you to attend the permanent seminar on budget planning in the security and intelligence sector that we are starting together with DCAF. This year, four events dedicated to budget planning and management in the intelligence sector are planned. ■

## UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY COURSE UNDER THREAT



**Valeriy CHALYI**  
Deputy Director General,  
Razumkov Centre<sup>5</sup>

The public will not solve issues of state bodies interaction. For that, appropriate coordination mechanisms are created on the state level. Such mechanisms include the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Coordination Bureau. The future of that structure is not clear yet but today, there are at least the people, a new team seeking to give a new impetus to interdepartmental coordination.

**Some issues we now discuss cannot be solved without political will of top officials and clear understanding of resources usage priorities.** After all, today, the problem lies not even in the scantiness of resources but in the perception of priorities. For instance, the state found UAH 12.5 million for collection of biometric data. Is that task really so important that we cannot do without it?

Who must decide the priorities of funds usage? The Government. With what mechanism? With the budget. However, the budget is not amended because of fears that the funds will be spent on the election campaign.

Solution of all more or less critical issues is transferred to a higher political level – “President – Prime Minister – opposition leaders”, with business structures, corporate and personal interests added there. Due to some not quite clear connections existing on the top level (that, furthermore, are rapidly and unpredictably changing), the process of prioritisation, political decision-making, distribution of resources can hardly be forecasted.

The absence of basic data for planning at the Defence Ministry and the General Staff indicates a more common problem: politicians and state leaders do not know what will happen in two months. In such situation, one can barely hope for clear answers to other questions. So, a solution must be found how to work in such system of coordinates, in the conditions of uncertainty, how to work and to minimise threats and challenges for the national security.

In 2010, presidential elections will be held. As a rule, it is a very uneasy time for Ukraine. One need not be an experienced expert to predict that they will bring another trial for our democratic system.

In particular, a threat of reversal of the foreign policy course arises. Discussions of the new format

<sup>5</sup> Presently, Valeriy Chalyi is a Deputy Minister of Foreign affairs of Ukraine.

of the parliamentary coalition (BYuT and the Party of Regions) involved appearance of provisions in the Ukrainian Constitution that may lead to amendment of the Law “On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine”, which defines the goal of NATO membership.

So, along with messages of the security sector funding needs, there should also be messages of the irreversibility of the course taken, as the one serving the national interests and resting on the effective Strategy of National Security. That course should not be a small coin in domestic political play.

Another new point: a psychological factor – growth of apathy, frustration in society. Such spirits are more dangerous than social protests and actions, since they witness public mistrust in the authorities and under certain conditions can grow into uncontrolled processes, attempts of society's problems solution without involvement of the state.

Today, we should try, using representatives of different structures – people preparing expert assessments for the President, Prime Minister, Defence Minister, other ministers and heads of power structures – to push our proposal of formulating a common coordinated stand of the leaders. Its importance is especially growing now, on the eve of transfer of power. Policy in Ukraine is overly personified. So, I propose finding mechanisms of soonest beginning of work with those proposals and their implementation.

The situation is changing even more dynamically than we discuss problems. At our meeting before last, we spoke about Georgia, then, of the situation in Transdnistria, then – of dangers emerging in Ukraine. Often, we seem to be harbingers of future events.


Two things should be done. *First*, try to form a hierarchy of threats in analytical materials and work out methods of their assessment. This is required to visualise the dynamic of the situation.

*Second*, after each discussion we should come to more concrete technological proposals, starting with passage of concrete documents and decisions that should be put forward now or in the near future. ■

Expert discussion, April 23, 2009



### ACTIVE USE OF NATO-UKRAINE CONSULTATIONS MECHANISMS GETS EVER MORE TOPICAL



**Mykhaylo HONCHAR,**  
Energy Programmes Director,  
NOMOS Centre

At a meeting of the working group on non-military threats at the Garmisch Conference we could not discuss the whole range of threats. We concentrated instead on the key problems – energy, information security, illegal migration.

The discussion of information security problems focused on domination of foreign influences in the Ukrainian media space. This is no discovery, and the results of Razumkov Centre's sociological surveys released today show the effects of the Russian domination. Stereotypes inherited from the Cold War not only survived in public consciousness but are on the rise, now actively promoted by Russian sources.

In the context of the events of January 2009, energy security problems aroused particular interest of our partners. Perception of that threat by the Alliance is not the same. They suggest that energy security mainly lies within the EU competence. Despite particular mention of that problem in declarations of the Riga and Bucharest NATO summits, it has not yet got the proper echo and reaction on the level of the Alliance's bureaucracy.

**There is some progress but the whole set of energy threats is largely identified as an issue of commercial relations of two corporate entities of Ukraine and Russia. The reasons included, among other things, Russia's promotion of its stand during the gas conflict.**

At the group meeting it was noted that during the gas conflict, **information about the Ukrainian stand was lacking.** Different interpretations were based on information from Russian sources. The subsequent sceptical perception of the Russian position in Europe was a result of “domestic” analysis of the events made in the partner states. After that, there appeared more questions to Russia than answers. However, the Ukrainian assessment of the events was missing.

It should be noted that the Garmisch event took place in parallel with implementation of one of the proposals of our common document, namely – attraction of foreign investments for modernisation of the Ukrainian gas transportation system. You know that a relevant declaration was signed in Brussels that caused a negative



reaction in Russia, but, as a Latin proverb says, danger can not be overcome without taking risks. Evidently, we will face some stages of escalation of tension in the energy sector, and this makes active use of mechanisms of bilateral NATO-Ukraine consultations even more topical.

**Meanwhile, if we try to draw up a rating of non-military threats, it will probably be topped by information threats.** They are manifest not only in the media sector. Reviewing energy security, we see that an “energy war” is always accompanied with an intense large-scale information and propaganda campaign. Similarly, any other issues of NATO-Ukraine or Ukraine-Russian relations are influenced by some information campaigns, consciously inspired and thoroughly planned to hit its target – the public consciousness of Ukrainian citizens. ■

#### THOSE PROBLEMS CANNOT BE REMOVED BUT CAN BE LIMITED



*Oleksandr LYTVYENKO,  
Deputy Department Head,  
Security Service of Ukraine*

All non-military threats should first of all be divided into two levels. The first level that can hardly be influenced by experts is associated with the political aspect, i.e., confrontation in the top bodies of state governance, destabilisation of the political situation in the country, etc. The second one is more of a technical nature, and exactly there we can propose actual measures.

Nevertheless, the expert community has some tools of influence even on the first level. This may seem strange but I mean the need of initiation and promotion of a discussion on security in Ukrainian society. We should insistently impose on and explain to society and political elites the clear for experts but not for the majority of citizens (as witnessed by the Razumkov Centre studies) idea of national interests, strategy and policy of national security.

At that, such discourse and our activity in general should be divided into two elements – strategic and tactical. The strategic component should cover the period at least through 2015, when one may hope for some changes in the thinking of the forthcoming political elites – if a large-scale campaign for change is started now. The tactical component should focus on response to specific challenges and threats of the day.

Now, on threats proper.

**One cannot but agree with the opinions of the priority of threats to information security, although I would prefer to revise its perception. In reality, it deals**

**not as much with fighting subversive influences from outside and inside as with reformatting the information and, first of all, the national intellectual space.**

Our society and, even worse, establishment has very strange, sometimes primitive, truly “unique”, as for our country, notions. Great many of our leading political figures and officials still mentally and consciously live in Russia and see priorities of the Russian Federation as their own.

Too many people live in the 19th century, unaware, for instance, of globalisation processes, considering formulation of the national security strategy relying on the domestic potential (I do not mean the defence sector, this is a separate issue). There is no understanding of the value of participation in international organisations. For instance, one may sometimes hear a Stalin’s style answer to the question of the weight of Estonia in our regions – “How many infantry divisions does it have?”. Such people are just unaware that Estonia as a member of NATO and the EU influences global decisions.

That is why that knowledge, in principle simple but incomprehensible for the bulk of our political establishment, should be promoted. Then, the required public opinion will also be formed at a much faster pace.

**Another threat that should be mentioned and can be practically fought now is posed by corruption, eroding state institutions.** One can argue what – excessive politicisation or corruption – paralyses the state machinery worse, but that threat is very serious.

There are simple, very clear recipes of fighting corruption. For instance, recently, the Blue Ribbon Analytical and Advisory Centre has presented a report on economic and institutional reforms in Ukraine.<sup>6</sup> It rather clearly and comprehensibly set out anticorruption proposals, such as the creation of an anticorruption bureau, deprived of repressive law-enforcement functions, declaration of expenditures by officials, along with incomes, and so on. Those measures are of a technical nature, they will not lead to fundamental changes but can seriously curtail the basis of corruption.

The same may be said about **other non-military threats**: drug trafficking, drug addiction, illegal migration, intelligence and subversive activity of foreign special services. Comprehensible recipes do exist in all those domains. Those problems cannot be removed but can in principle be limited, even in the present, very difficult conditions. ■

Expert discussion, April 23, 2009



<sup>6</sup> Policy recommendations on economic and institutional reforms 2009. – Kyiv, April 2009, [brc.undp.org.ua/publications/books](http://brc.undp.org.ua/publications/books)

**APPEAL TO SOCIETY  
IS STILL POSSIBLE**

**Yuriy RUBAN,**  
*Director, National Institute  
for Strategic Studies*

We should speak not just about Russia's information influences. Indeed, Russia is waging a well thought-over information war against Ukraine. This has long been clear to everyone. Any event, from arms contracts to the international arbitration court ruling delimiting the sea shelf, gives a pretext for its unleashing.

Another problem mentioned in the Document is the "readiness to take tough measures". But if we speak about the formation of an adequate discourse, let us have it formed. Even this brilliant document names one of the sections in Ukrainian "*Vidnovlennia druzhnikh stosunkiv z Rosiyeyu*" – Restoration of friendly relations with Russia, while in English – "Renewing relations with Russia". That is, we are trying to seat on two chairs even verbally.

So, as soon as we speak about the formation of discursive practices, it is clear that in a situation where the political class is inclined to revision of previous gains, there must be some intellectual opposition. This is a process of discourse-making.

If in the conditions of an information war, an absence of a serious appeal of the Ukrainian authorities to society, 3.4% of citizens have managed to trace the origins of the threat for Ukraine, this means that appeal to society is still possible.

**The problem of the Ukrainian authorities lies in the absence of leadership and of what Americans call vision – a view of the prospects.** The President of Ukraine alone stood in Tbilisi at a meeting when Russian tanks were a few kilometres from the capital. In my opinion, despite all his shortcomings, this is an evidence of his vision.

Other politicians impose pragmatism upon us, but that is the road of pragmatism without vision. So, in that situation, intellectuals are to play a critical role, especially in the national security sector. I do not claim to make the contribution like Volodymyr Horbulin makes with his publications, or the authors of this Document do. But we should do what we can, that is, shape the discourse and clearly understand what the discourse is – with its lexical practices, relevant rhetoric, with all ensuing consequences. I see the beginnings of such discourse in publications by Mr. Horbulin and in this Document. So, I suggest just continuing those efforts. ■

**PROCESS OF EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION  
IS HINDERED BY PROBLEMS  
OF STATE GOVERNANCE**

**Mykola SUNGUROVSKYI,**  
*Director, Razumkov Centre  
Military Programmes*

**The quality of state governance in Ukraine does not let society move forward at the desired pace, and the situation** is unlikely to improve during the next at least five years. The managerial team cannot be reformatted so rapidly – it involves the change of generations. As Nils Bohr once joked, if a new paradigm is introduced in human life with mother's milk, an old one dies together with its bearers. Its signs include viability of old methods of governance. The authorities are still trying to solve problems arising, in particular, on the road of Euro-Atlantic integration, by old administrative methods – creating new bodies.

The newly-established Euro-Atlantic Integration Coordination Bureau will face serious difficulties. On one hand, it is expected to produce a new quality of work and a faster pace of development of the NATO-Ukraine relations, on the other – the environment in which it will have to work cannot be termed favourable: old myths persist and new ones appear in society about the Alliance, and in the system of state governance, corrupt and bureaucratic mechanisms are very viable, that hamper any development and can extinguish any constructive initiative, including of the Bureau staff.

What is promising is that the Bureau staff are no novices – many of them have the experience of similar work at other executive bodies. But it will be very sad if due to the complexity of the case, administrative and procedural drawbacks will make the newly established coordinating body another bureaucratic link in the chain of the Euro-Atlantic integration process management. An alarming signal thereof is presented by the lack of logical thinking in the Bureau staff – what and how should be coordinated, as well as an integral idea of elements of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration and needs of their coordination.

Coordination requires efforts of different actors (not only the state) at management and implementation of reforms in many sectors: economy, defence, border control, internal affairs and justice, etc. Identification of the goals of reforms in those sectors, their planning and implementation are performed under different state programmes and plans (including ANP) with their specific management, coordination and control systems. The bodies responsible for implementation of those programmes, plans and their elements will hardly be willing to share powers, even with a branch of the Cabinet of Ministers' Secretariat.



If a state programme is correctly designed, it sets out a certain algorithm of performance of set tasks – in a due sequence, with appropriate mechanisms of interaction and passage of output from one executive to another. Such algorithm also specifies the functions of coordination of the actors' activity: a manager (division of a ministry or agency) responsible for the programme administers and coordinates it. Even if implementation of a programme involves several ministries and agencies, one manager is appointed, charged with administrative and coordinating functions. Coordination of coordinators is all too much.

**So, "outside" coordination may be necessary and possible only at the stage of passage of decisions, programmes, plans, state orders.** If there is a need to employ state and non-state actors alike for the programme implementation, one should predict in advance and clearly specify mechanisms of their effective interaction – this is the sense of coordination. But under the existing approaches to state strategic planning, it is next to impossible to combine measures of different programmes and plans in one process (and coordinate their implementation).

Reforms in the Armed Forces are a showy example. A reformation programme was adopted in 2005, envisaging, among other things, cuts in the troops number. Everybody knows the problems related with contractual service, technical modernisation, combat training, which as early as at the beginning of 2008 made it clear that the programme failed. At the end of 2008, the Ministry of Defence started the Defence Review, to be completed in October 2009 and designed to assess the current situation, new threats, defence needs and capabilities, resource limitations. Following the review, the effective model of the Armed Forces and the ways of their further development are to be identified. But suddenly, before the appearance of even preliminary results of the Review, at the beginning of 2009, the Defence Minister initiated a strange decision to increase the Armed Forces' number, and *post factum* (as usual), that decision found "scientific" substantiation. So, if the process of reformation is not coordinated on the level of political decision-making, what coordination on the level of clerks can we talk about?

**Moreover, that example reminds that there are those willing and even the mechanisms that can reverse the defence reform.** In absence of a single concept of reformation of power structures, such attempts can seriously deregulate the system of national security, while fragmentation of that system (a general concept of the security sector reform is still absent) during the election campaign bears a threat of "privatisation" of power structures with unpredictable consequences. That is why processes of the security sector reform should be coordinated, beginning from the stage of political decision-making. That seems to be up to the NSDC level.

The Coordination Bureau could coordinate implementation of events initiated by it (including preparation and conduct of appropriate information campaigns). But for that, it should administer the relevant budget funds. **In absence of tools of financial influence, that body, most probably, will only slow down the promptness of management and add mistakes.**

What ways can there be out of the difficult situation, where society feels the need for efficient actions, but the authorities cannot formulate a constructive state policy? There are two ways: *on one hand*, influence on

the authorities through improvement of their human resources potential – through training and practical events on national security issues and strategic management in general involving young promising politicians and state servants; *on the other* – influence on the citizens who elect those authorities and feel the results of their actions (inaction) – through implementation of projects aimed, in particular, at teaching regional analytical centres and representatives of communities the principles of drawing up local development plans and comparison of those plans with election programmes of politicians. Forms of such influence may be many – involving representatives of the state and non-state sectors. By the way, this opinion is shared by the Coordination Bureau staff, as was witnessed at a meeting of its management with representatives of public organisations after the NATO-Ukraine Conference in Garmisch. ■

#### WHERE IS THE CRITICAL POINT?



**Vadym HRECHANINOV,**  
President,  
Atlantic Council of Ukraine

Speaking of changes in the military-political situation, one should take a new look at the threats and challenges for Ukraine, already mentioned today. One should analyse and consider such things as the role of Romania in the events in Moldova, or a new classification of enemies in Russia, where they are now classified as virtual, potential and actual. One should find the answer to the question: "What kind of an enemy Ukraine is treated like?" Now, Russia put forward a new interesting thesis, in my opinion, applicable to Ukraine in the first place – that there are states seeking to guarantee their security at the expense of other states. In fact, they are using this as a cover for solution of many issues. We should be realists in those things.

Is there any difference in the assessment of threats from Russia by the whole population, experts, intellectuals, students? I ask because I see it expedient to single intellectuals out in a separate group. Recently, I have spoken a lot at universities. Students put very specific questions: "Who is to blame for the failure of integration in NATO? When did it happen? Where was the critical point?"...

That is why, when polls are held, we should speak not about the whole population but about groups distinguished according to such classification. Probably, during polls, emphasis should be made on the more educated stratum of the people, to find them and work with them.

Results of public opinion polls show that over the past three years we did not manage to achieve positive results trying to enhance the trust of Ukraine's citizens in NATO. And the lack of funds for information events is not the only reason.

The thing is that the authorities do not understand the role of public organisations. When representatives of the authorities speak of their adherence to NATO, this causes many false rumours and contradictions, mainly involving Russia. If public organisations could do more in that field, if they could operate not only for foreign grants but also for state subsidies, the problem might be solved in an entirely different manner. Moreover that vast experience has been accumulated. For instance, “Molodyi (young) Rukh” and “Molodyi BYuT” (Young BYuT) begin to play a greater role now – they should not be left unnoticed, since their stand substantially differs from that of political leaders; we should cooperate with them.

**It is a pity when some politicians suggest dropping the subject of NATO, using various party interests as an excuse. This is not just antipatriotic – this is unwise and short-sighted.** ■

#### THEORETICAL PROJECTS SHOULD BE ADAPTED TO THE NEEDS OF SPECIFIC SOCIAL GROUPS



**Oleh BODRUK,**  
*Head of Military Policy and  
Security Department,  
National Institute for  
International Security Problems*

I wish to say about the information war Ukraine is waging against itself. Now, there are lots of “*talking heads*” – so-called experts who consider themselves specialists in all sectors, comment all events, give all kind of advice. At that, each of those experts enjoys absolute confidence in his rightness, ambition, disrespect for the opinions of others. Their number is growing in a geometric progression. Unfortunately, we ourselves turn out such “experts”. For instance, recently, the Internet carried an article by Mr. Paliy, pretending to be an expert in the Black Sea Fleet problems. He says that the Black Sea Fleet will go, and statements by representatives of the Russian establishment should be ignored.

Those experts represent some institutes or centres, although our community well knows who is who, who can or cannot do something. **However, the existing demand, some kind of a request create the stratum actually waging a war against Ukraine in our information space.**

How can that be opposed? We speak little about professional things, do not comment specific examples and events. This leaves space for that stratum.

Having studied the Document, I came to rather pessimistic conclusions.

*First, I saw that the state is actually losing all state functions, first of all, the function of defence.* If the population feels unprotected, if the majority of people are not confident in their future, the state set up to defend the people, not just to collect taxes and establish “rules of the game”, does not perform its main task and therefore

loses the sense of existence. This should be said aloud and brought to attention on all levels.

**Problem of experts.** A minister is appointed – no matter who he is and what experience he has. A minister is appointed on political grounds. Nobody knows what he will do on the ministerial post. He leads people devoted to him personally. They change people who for years dealt with specific problems and are recognised experts. This creates the problem of experts – officials who “shape” politicians.

**Lack of funds.** In 2008, when funds for NATO support were distributed, who took them? The main grant went to the Ministry of Education, as if for the promotion of NATO. What have they done, who reported of that work, what was the result? No answer. They sank in the bureaucratic structure. And nobody is responsible for nothing.

We speak about propaganda, but when talking to the people, we operate in abstractions. NATO for the people is an abstraction, very few know the difference between CSTO and NATO. We should speak about specific things, clear for everyone. We should clearly say to the people: “Ladies and gentlemen, if you want to feel defended as a neutral country, for that, military expenditures of some 7-10% of the GDP are needed (compared to the present 1-1.5%), we must maintain an army of a far greater strength and set entirely different tasks for it”.

By the way, strategic tasks for the Armed Forces of Ukraine were actually set as for an advanced armed forces: conduct of operations and high intensity war. But nobody says whether the Armed Forces will be able to perform them. Nobody specifically says about the state of the Armed Forces, that they have passed the red line, after which, something could be reanimated. If this is not discussed, everybody thinks that we have an army. We have the draft, we have the Defence Ministry, some tanks crawling, but nobody says what that all can do.

**In the current political rivalry, every political force is solving tactical issues. But Ukraine as a whole is losing a strategic perspective of its place in the world, its strategic tasks. The authorities cannot set those tasks for power structures.** They are in a permanent state of transformation, and in the end result, “we are left with what we have” [as president Kravchuk once put it]. They cannot fulfil the tasks vested in them by the state, the state is losing the main motive of its existence, and sooner or later, we will come to the point where we are considered a failed state, ruled from outside by the countries that make the policy. We must tell the people about such alternatives, too. The people should be aware of the possible alternatives. And we speak about general things and targets – NATO, CSTO!

Now, back to alternatives. The situation that arose in the neighbouring country is uneasy. Moscow and St.Petersburg live in isolation, all the rest lies beyond the borders of that “state” and is funded with what is left. Every regional governor is the plenipotentiary ruler who can do anything he wants. The main thing is that he must report and bow to the head of state, show his respect and subordination. By the way, problems also exist with the new stage of the military reform in Russia. The tasks set in 2000 are still set in 2008-2009. Ambitious goals were not achieved then and will not be achieved now.



That is, if we come back to our alternatives: “if you want to Russia – welcome”, but in that case, Ukraine will have to contribute its defence budget to the total budget of Russia or a union state, take part in armed conflicts in the Caucasus, send our soldiers there. Why is Russia now refusing from the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? Because it is adopting a strategy of use of tactical nuclear weapons in low-level conflicts against non-nuclear states – this is written in the Russian military doctrine, – contrary to all international agreements and conventions.

Therefore, there are specific things, while we speak of abstractions, incomprehensible for the people. **Our theoretical projects should be adapted to the needs of specific social groups, to be clear for everyone.** ■

#### ALL THIS, UNFORTUNATELY, REPEATS FROM YEAR TO YEAR



**Andriy SOBOLEV,**  
*Leading expert,  
Institute for National  
Security Problems*

Problems in the sector of the national security policy arose not today, they were roughly the same yet 15 years ago. They were discussed all the time, serious studies were written about them, but nothing changed. The Armed Forces are still funded with what is left. The budget is planned, then, it appears that money is lacking, it is taken from the military to plug some hole in the state budget... unfortunately, the situation repeats from year to year.

The value of the matter is one of the main issues of the national security policy. The cost of building an armed forces possessing the required capabilities is very high, counted in hundreds billions of dollars. One can not procure all the required arms and equipment within 2-3 years. Yet in mid-1990s, serious calculations of the army needs were made. The average service life of equipment is 20 years, that is, 4.5% should be replaced every year. If procurements are not funded this year, the next year, as much as 9% will be needed. And what if nothing has been procured for 17 years? Calculations of 1994-1995 showed that around 2010, actually all weapons would be outdated.

Now, it is very important to work out a realistic draft of Ukraine's national security strategy through 2020. 10 years is the minimum term to implement at least some practical reforms, to “raise” the Armed Forces, not to cherish illusions that we have them – without combat training, maintenance, servicing and renovation of equipment. Those who served in 1970s-1980s know what maintenance of equipment means. Who is doing that in the Armed Forces now?

Now, there are even no specialists who could look for themselves and train more or less competent maintenance people.

Speaking on the alternatives, it makes sense to figure out several scenarios for our top political leadership. Say, one scenario – “Ukraine as a NATO member”, the other – “Ukraine as an CSTO member”, with realistic calculations of the value of each of them.

As regards our information defeat, one should be aware that every state defends its national interests and pursues its policy. Russia, indeed, is waging a serious information war on the territory of our state “for minds and hearts”. It is our problem that we let it behave the way some Russian circles want.

Are we a virtual, potential, or actual enemy for Russia? I think, virtual. Russia does not view us as a serious enemy. It does not want us to become a potential enemy. ■

#### THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS, WITH COORDINATION, EVEN IF THE EXECUTIVE HIERARCHY IS NOT ESTABLISHED



**Oleksandr SEMIKOV,**  
*Deputy Head of Staff,  
National Centre for Euro-Atlantic  
Integration of Ukraine*

A few words about coordination. The annual national programme means the change of the format of the NATO-Ukraine relations. **If we speak in terms of challenges and opportunities for Ukraine, we missed that challenge but have not yet missed the opportunity. Why it happened is clear.**

This week, one year has passed after non-implementation of the NSDC decision on amelioration of the Ukraine-NATO cooperation system. Probably we should lend an ear to the opinion that in Ukraine, any business is hindered when raising the decision-making level. The same occurred with the system of coordination. In 2008, the task was set, proposals prepared and submitted to the concerned structures – and stalled there. We lost one year.

Now, we returned to the same proposals put forward last year, seemingly came to accord, but again, the decision cannot reach the level of a presidential decree for six weeks.

That is why the ANP format, designed as a higher level of Ukraine's dialogue with NATO, failed to meet its goal. The relevant decision was passed in Brussels yet in December 2008, but did not become “a direction for action”. Why? Because **nobody assumed responsibility for preparation and implementation of the ANP.**

January and December passed, then, the Foreign Ministry began to do something, but in the result, we've

got what we have got. The draft prepared and even passed to the NATO International Secretariat for discussion was assessed rather critically – despite the rather diplomatic language of the letter Ukraine got in response.

What should be done and is being done for coordination? We already mentioned the working meeting held by Vice Prime Minister Nemyria, that finally gave an impetus for thorough preparation of the ANP. What did not let hold such a meeting at least in February? It is hard to say.

If we speak of vertical or horizontal coordination, this time, horizontal coordination worked. What is in the focus of disputes here? – “who will be held responsible?”, “who will be in charge?” As soon as a higher level is reached, problems begin with decision-making. Invited to the meeting held by the Vice Premiere were representatives of different ministries and agencies, including those not subordinated to the Cabinet of Ministers. That is, experts already involved or planned to be involved in that process. Everybody came, frankly discussed problem issues without any conflicts, and literally the following day, meetings of the first working groups were held, for amelioration of the prepared ANP draft.

At that meeting, mid-level executives themselves took decisions, set terms – first, second, intermediary and final, for preparation of an acceptable document for review on a higher level. That was a good example of horizontal coordination.

Indeed, it would be nice if those issues – who is responsible for what, who does what, who prepares a report for someone else, etc. – were solved on the top level last year. But if that was not done, for political reasons – and the reasons were purely political – this does not mean that experts working in that domain cannot use horizontal coordination. We (at least, the experts working in the field since 2002, when Ukraine moved to the Action Plan after the Prague summit) know each other by sight, and there are no problems with coordination here, even if the hierarchy is not established. Such is the practical situation in the managerial staff.

Where is the problem now? As the Document rightfully says, **ANP preparation became a test for the Ukrainian authorities, whose results for the time being may be termed as negative**, first of all – from the organisational viewpoint: we lost time. The main thing now – the **test should not be negative for us also from the viewpoint of substance**. That is, the substance of ANP draft, now being prepared, should make up for the organisational problems present in the country that sets ambitious goals, although their achievement is now hampered by politicians.

Support, advice and proposals of the non-governmental sector will be very useful for that work. Why is that important? ANP for 2009 will be transitional. Now, the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan containing a long list of objectives – nearly 400 – is being implemented. ANP will at some stage (after approval) absorb it. **The task is to exclude from ANP measures that cannot be implemented**. This was said in comments and proposals, including from the NATO International Secretariat. That is, **that Programme should be realistic**.

To prove that, I will cite the following figures. The National Centre for Euro-Atlantic integration summed up

implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan in the 1st quarter of 2009. One of the conclusions was that there was no information about the progress of implementation of every fourth measure of the Target Plan. This has never been the case before – not at all! This should be taken into account at the ANP preparation. There is a budget, there are “holes” in the budget, and one already sees what is realistic, and what is not.

On information. To make statements of propaganda and agitation, one should once or twice visit regions and talk to the people. I suggest that the past year of 2008 was a turning point in information issues. The work indeed went an entirely different way. That was neither propaganda nor agitation for NATO, at least in the events held by the Ukraine-NATO Civic League and the National Centre. In 2008, our employees took part in more than 160 events, 80% of them – on the regional level. Those events were not round tables in Kyiv but talking to people face-to-face. They are attended not only by those who needn't be convinced of NATO anyway but by different people representing different political parties, including communists and Vitrenko's adherents with their slogans. When not 20 experts but students, lecturers, state servants of lower ranks with different political views gather in a room, they really have a quiet discussion about national interests, different options of guarantee of the national security. Nobody is agitating for NATO.

Such events, of course, are not intended to immediately convince someone or the majority that the Euro-Atlantic is the only right endeavour for Ukraine. But people at least begin to think about those things, and this is the most important. ■

#### CITIZENS OF UKRAINE ARE UNITED BY THE PERCEPTION OF HUMAN SECURITY



**Serhiy DZHERDZH**  
*Head of the Ukraine-NATO  
Civic League*

It is very important that society is discussing security issues. If there are fears that the issue of NATO may alert some social groups or is controversially viewed in the regions, security issues are taken by everyone in the same way, because everybody needs security. **That is what we speak with people about. Not only about the national security in general – economic, political, environmental, information, but also about personal security – security of an individual citizen who needs secure dwelling, workplace, environment – things needed and comprehensible for everyone. Such perception of security unites citizens of Ukraine**, and through that understanding, we show what Ukrainian citizens need – the same feeling of true security as citizens of NATO member states.



Speaking on information about NATO, we are doing a lot. The Ukraine-NATO Civic League in 2008 arranged 223 events, mainly in the regions – conferences, seminars, interviews, articles, etc. Regions badly need information platforms: people want to hear something, learn something. What actually differs our activity from, say, the analytical work of Razumkov Centre – also very important? We deal with regional information. At that, we are aware that we will not be able to make all citizens of Ukraine experts on NATO who will consciously vote at the future referendum.

On the 18th of May, 2009, Kharkiv will host a conference, invited to which were members of the Interdepartmental Working Group (IWG) on Information Policy, led by A. Murakhovskiy (First Deputy Head of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting). The previous 25 IWG meetings were held in Kyiv, it for the first time moves to Kharkiv – a big city with a huge potential. It is important for us that state servants, mass media, all those concerned in the regions see that issues of NATO are not scholastic talk in the newspapers, on TV, but practical work made by state servants, daily work that brings result, brings gains. ■

#### WHAT AND WHOM TO COORDINATE?



**Ihor DOLHOV,**  
*Deputy Head, Department of  
Defence Mobilisation Activities,  
Head, Sector of Defence  
Activities of the Cabinet of  
Ministers of Ukraine's Secretariat*

Proceeding from my experience of a state servant, I wish to stress that a certain sector and cooperation in that sector cannot be coordinated. Why? There is a minister in the country responsible for those things, and you will not impose your opinion upon him. Nobody, even the Cabinet of Ministers' leadership, may impose his opinion – look into our legislation. Then, a big issue arises: what to coordinate?

Another question: if a minister, as an official, his deputies, his staff enjoy no support – scientific, practical support from experts who understand in what domains that ministry can cooperate with NATO countries, there will be no cooperation.

Show me at least one minister who knows all. There is none, and never will be. A minister is made by his staff, and if the staff has no required division and experts, one should think: why? Who should do that in a state? Maybe, public organisations? Thanks a lot


for the attempts to replace the state machinery, but the state machinery cannot be replaced entirely.

We rightfully speak about the security policy, explaining how it will be implemented. **But if our citizens see no personal interest, if our citizens do not understand what cooperation with NATO and EU gives them, what material benefits it brings – they will reject it.** This task may be implemented only when a specific ministry works jointly with the relevant NATO committee, cooperating within the framework of concrete programmes.

The Ministry of Education and Science is one example. Recall their involvement in the URAN network.<sup>7</sup> Nobody actually coordinated their cooperation with NATO. When their experts took it upon them, the result was produced. But coordination of the work of an individual expert is senseless. One can help him, organisationally coordinate issues of cooperation, but not interfere into his work. He will immediately set you down, because he is the expert and knows the nuances unknown to a broader specialist.

So, we should think well, what and how to coordinate? Even in the issue of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In due time, I dealt with those issues. Everything looked as follows. The Government had commissioners on European and Euro-Atlantic integration. I would not say that those persons helped but they at least signed documents. There were deputies who kept those documents for several months, and when they went on leave, I commandeered them, to pass further. So it was. That is why one should very sceptically view the past experience and realise what we want to do and, the main thing, by what means. I do not believe that this can be done through pure enthusiasm. ■

#### ON ILLUSION AND REALITY



**Volodymyr VAHAPOV**  
*Chief Editor,  
Nauka I Oborona magazine*

There are things that cannot be assigned to anyone, that one should personally take care of. Guarantee of personal security and security of one's family may be the most important of them. And although this requires much funds, we put armoured entry doors, buy a gun, get ourselves a dog or, together with neighbours, hire a security guard, install TV surveillance cameras, hoping that this will protect us, our property, life and calm.

<sup>7</sup> Ukrainian Research and Academic Network (URAN) was created under decision of Ministry of Education of Ukraine and National Academy of Science of Ukraine with support of universities, institutes of Ministry of Education of Ukraine and National Academy of Science of Ukraine in accordance with Joint resolution of Presidium of NAS of Ukraine and Board of Ministry of Education of Ukraine of June 20, 1997. The main concept of the Network was approved by International Meeting "Ukrainian network for institutions of higher education and science" with participation of representatives of the Scientific department of NATO (April 24-26, 1997 Kyiv) and by an international conference the "Networks in higher education" (May 26-28, 1997, Kyiv).

History teaches that there may always be someone seeking our land. Despite declarations of peacefulness and will to cooperation, from time to time, border claims are heard, or attempts of interference into our home affairs are made. Is there a guarantee that we will not appear guilty though guiltless? So we should think about defence, military security of the state.

Now, a few points about the problem of choice the Ukrainian society now faces in the defence sector.

**Defence and taxes.** The majority of Ukrainian citizens now cares about not political and military issues but, first of all, economic – a general decrease in the standard of life, economy, employment. However, military security as the guarantee of normal peaceful life of citizens has always been among the main duties of the state. For the sake of security, people pay taxes, with which the state creates and maintains an army.

The bulk of arms and military equipment of the Armed Forces Ukraine is the legacy of the former Soviet Union, their service life is almost over. Our funds invested in the Soviet Army devaluated, as did our deposits in the Soviet Savings Bank, while the money and resources spent on the military over the years of independence brought no dividends for Ukraine's military security.

However, today, Ukraine cannot afford to invest much in the military. At the beginning of 2009 the Defence Minister said that full implementation of reformation programmes required UAH 32.4 billion a year, another 17.5 billion – on discharge of the functions of the country defence. Meanwhile, this year's state budget allocates to defence only 8.4 billion – 0.87% of the GDP.

What to do, when you are short of money? Defence, when deprived of the veil of patriotic secrecy, is nothing more than a business project. Before spending money on defence, the state is to decide the level of threat of an armed attack. The General Staff should on the basis of all-round analysis calculate how many soldiers, how much and what type of arms, military equipment, ammunitions, fuel, etc. are needed for reliable protection of the country against a potential aggressor.

**And when money is not enough for defence orders, we should think whether we correctly organise the military security of the state. Maybe we should join efforts with other countries, building common defence?** Clear thing, it will be cheaper, although in that case, the issue of confidence in the alliance members and their reliability in a hard time arises. Furthermore, enemies of our new friends will become our enemies, too.

**Absence of an international “demand” for a neutral, non-aligned Ukraine, economic inability to ensure reliable defence on its own prompt consideration of possible accession to a collective security system.** Detailed calculations of “pros” and “contras” of all alternatives of military security will be accepted better than political slogans. Even if a person does not care about politics and considerations of choice between the Eastern perception of the Slavic unity and democratic values of the West, he is not indifferent to the money spent by his state.

Expert discussion, April 23, 2009



When the people realise that the state cannot financially ensure military security on its own, that funds are not enough for butter and for guns at a time, they will understand that there is no alternative to collective security.

**On the problem of choice.** Ukraine has two options of a collective security system: Euro-Atlantic – NATO, and Eurasian – CSTO.

In fact, the problem of choice is simple: to join, or not to join NATO? However, the essence of that choice is very difficult, since NATO is a defence alliance of the countries – potential enemies of the Soviet Union, the predecessor of the modern Ukrainian state. In fact, it is about the civilisational choice.

The following question: “is the problem of accession to NATO really so pressing now?” The probability of an armed attack from the North, with which some politicians frighten us, is so low that it may be considered theoretical. That is, there is no danger for human lives from that side.

Meanwhile, due to internal reasons, Ukraine's population steadily goes down, and according to demographic forecasts, in 2050, we will number some 30 million, because of alcoholic intoxication, tuberculosis, AIDS, road chaos, occupational traumatism, labour emigration, substantial reduction of the age of chronic diseases and so on. In fact, it is a war that took lives of 6 million citizens of Ukraine in course of 17 years.

I think that in a few years the public opinion on joining the Alliance will change for the better for two reasons: first – natural reduction in the number of those who now ardently oppose NATO (mainly elderly people); second – further implementation of the state information policy concerning the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. So, there is no need to boost the process of accession to the Alliance.

**On illusions and reality. Accession to the Alliance will not raise the national economy, not teach working and respecting the law, not bring political stability and not eliminate corruption. Accession to the Alliance will only give additional tools for building a civilised democratic state. We shouldn't abase ourselves now and bother NATO and the EU, insisting on accession. We should solve our internal problems.** ■