

DEFICIT OF SECURITY: FACTORS, TRENDS, ROLE OF EXPERT COMMUNITY IN ITS REMEDY



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The present-day globalised world presents an integral system where security of separate countries and their unions cannot be fully guaranteed if hotbeds of insecurity exist in their vicinity (immediate or more remote). Meanwhile, the global processes that led to serious changes in the geopolitical landscape and created new conditions for the world development also caused the comprehensive nature of threats and their effects. The capacity of international security systems set up in the last century to prevent and counter threats is nearly exhausted, which causes a substantial deficit of security and, therefore, gives rise to the need of transformation and strengthening of those systems.

The situation requires new approaches to solution of security problems by joining efforts of both collective security system participants and other countries, including those cooperating with such systems and seeking to join them.

All this is of particular significance for Ukraine, undergoing a “double breaking point” – without completion of the transitional stage and ultimate establishment in the world system after the break-up of the Soviet Union, it has to look for a new place in the post-crisis world, now in the making. In such conditions, internal reforms should be “imbedded” not only in the present but also in the future trends of the world order.

Challenges for international security systems

As we know, the modern world witnesses aggravation of old and appearance of new global risks and threats: proliferation of mass destruction arms and materials; emergence of more sophisticated forms of cybercrime; accelerated exhaustion of natural resources and growth of dangerous trends in climate change, etc. There are also complex in-depth processes of reformatting the geopolitical map of the world, fraught with the risks of conflicts, emergence of new dividing lines, resumption of the arms race.

In particular, **the list of the key world actors and their relations are changing**, contradictions among traditional and new centres of power – separate states and their alliances – appear and gain strength. With economic growth in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China), their claims of regional and global leadership, economic and political influence on the world processes go up. **The ideological context of international security gets more complicated:** instead of the definite “ally – enemy” system, inherent of the Cold War times, uncertainty and inconstancy are emerging. Meanwhile, **disparity between state and**



non-state actors deepens, asymmetry in their actions, countering and bringing threats alike, is on the rise.¹ Terrorism acquires international traits, massive forms, and is more actively used as a weapon against outside pressure and interference, including humanitarian.

Disintegration processes are intensified, leading to emergence of new potential conflicts areas. Meanwhile, international institutes have found no acceptable methods of reconciliation of the contradictions between the principle of territorial integrity – and the right of nations to self-determination, the right to sovereignty and non-interference – and the right to humanitarian interference. In such conditions, and given the growth of separatist movements, events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia may be not the last examples of undesired scenarios of shaping the new geopolitical map of the world.

The gap and contradictions are growing between developed countries and the rest of the world, especially in countries with a low life-standards. Risks of “weak states” bankruptcy go up, accompanied with the rise of opponents to legitimate governments

there and ever more frequent emergence of the threat of use of force.² **Regional security environments (first of all, in conflict areas) turn to the hostages of the world leaders policy**, whose interests not always meet the demands of regional security and needs of the local population. Signs are many that developed countries (and their unions), resorting to interference, pursue goals of not only imposing of peace and security but also of presence in the areas of their economic interests.

Crisis phenomena and their effects are spreading ever more rapidly under the influence of globalisation, liberalisation of economic relations, mutual penetration of economies and cultures. Global economic crises, violence and armed conflicts, epidemics of dangerous diseases, environmental accidents keep growing in scale, involve more countries, demand a higher price from the mankind.

Against the background of those and other processes, one sees the striking inconsistency of the structures and capabilities of contemporary collective security systems to the nature of present-day threats, their unreadiness to cope with the challenges posed by said processes, unless they are timely put under control.

The main drawbacks of the present security systems include, *first*, **conservation of the hierarchic structure of international and national security, its numerous and cumbersome bureaucratic machinery**, which reduces their flexibility and adaptability – while threats and their effects get a network nature and spread at an extreme speed. This reduces the promptness, effectiveness and adequacy of actions of said systems to prevent and counter threats.³

Second, **insufficiency of the resource support for member states joint actions in international security systems**. As we know, contribution to collective security is voluntary. We are also aware that some member states were either unwilling to provide troops and equipment for peacekeeping operations of the UN, NATO, African Union (AU) in hotspots, or were unable to do so in the required volumes.⁴ The reason may lie not only in actual scantiness of national resources but also in inadequate perception by some states of the interconnection of national, regional and global security, where national security is seen by governments as a vital need, and collective – only as an extra burden. So, if at the stage of a decision passage to begin the peacekeeping operations member states show political solidarity, during the

¹ The main features of such disparity include the loss of the state monopoly of the force usage, greater capabilities of non-state actors to influence the state and the world situation, enhancement of their role in global processes. See, e.g.: Bailes A. Global security governance: a world of change and challenge. – *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Oxford University Press, 2006, p.1-12.

² Schnabel A. The human security approach to direct and structural violence. – *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Oxford University Press, 2008, p.87-95.

³ Bailes A. A world of risks. – *SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Oxford University Press, 2007, p.1-20.

⁴ In particular, the lack of resources is mentioned as the usual reason for the low effectiveness of the UN and AU missions in Darfur, NATO in Afghanistan and so on. See: Soder K. Multilateral peace operations in 2007 – *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, p.129-130.



conduct of operations and provision of resources (human, material, financial) solidarity often yields to national egoism, fraught with erosion of collective security systems.

In the end result, **disparity is growing between the level and nature of threats, declared intentions of their prevention and available capabilities** – now specific of actually all international security systems (UN, EU, NATO, CSTO, AU). This brings to the forefront the need of their adaptation (transformation) to the new conditions. In particular, NATO faces serious problems whose solution requires a shift of accents from external aspects of its activity (expansion of the security space, improvement of forms and methods of peacekeeping activity) to internal ones: perfection of the structure, provision of the required capabilities, political solidarity and joint efforts. Such strengthening is to be secured by the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance.

Strengthening of Russian ambitions and growing aggressiveness of its policy

Starting from 2000, there is a growing trend towards greater aggressiveness in the policy of the Russian Federation, first of all, against neighbouring post-Soviet countries: the conflict of the Tuzla island, economic and energy wars with Belarus and Ukraine, finally – the armed conflict in Georgia in 2008. The effects of those actions (along with not always effective and coordinated political steps of the West before and after them) give Russia more confidence, feeling of impunity and grounds to view the post-Soviet space as its sphere of influence.

The seriousness of Russia's political intention is proven, in particular, by its firm stand regarding the observance of the Istanbul arrangements (on withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova), control of conventional weapon systems in Europe (Russia's suspension of obligations under the current CFE Treaty), hard "exchanges" with the USA on the issues of strategic offensive weapons, European AMD, the Iranian nuclear programme, permanent gas conflicts with Ukraine, proving that Russia will continue to use its standing of the gas monopolist as a tool of pressure on Ukraine and European countries as a whole.

One should also note the aggressive character of the Russian information policy, its focus on consolidation of Russian society and pro-Russian communities in

other countries, trying to present neighbours, including Ukraine, as nearly enemies.⁵

Against that background, we see weak attempts of the EU to find adequate responses to unfriendly actions of the Russian Federation, even worse – "commercialisation" of relations of separate EU members with it (especially in the gas sector).⁶ The generally weak position of the EU may well bring about a danger of "frozen conflicts areas" in the CIS space (Transdnistria, Karabakh) and potential conflict areas (including in Ukraine) becoming a small coin in the game of the world and regional leaders.

Presence on the territory of those countries of zones of "frozen" or potential conflicts, a large share of the Russian-speaking population (or people with dual citizenship), Russian military bases and peacekeeping forces, combined with Russia's readiness to use the army for "repulsion of aggression against other states" and protection of "compatriots" are fraught with solution of internal problems turning armed conflicts.⁷ And this poses a threat not only for Ukraine and other post-Soviet states but for the security of the entire Eurasian continent and the whole world.

Challenges for Ukraine

The developments in the world security environment did not bypass Ukraine, experiencing a transformational deficit of security caused by the impairment of its defence potential due to the large-scale cuts in the Armed Forces, within the framework of their modernisation in line with the NATO standards.⁸ The situation is further aggravated by a number of internal and external factors, whose aggregate effects may deepen the mentioned deficit of security and bar its removal in the near future.

Lack of political unity of the Ukrainian elite, prevalence of personal and narrow party interests over national within it. Corruption (including political) is widely spread, strategic state management is replaced with tactical steps of doubtful use, focused professional discussion/dialogue on the problems of security on the national and interstate levels – with propagandist declarations. All this results in a political crisis, institutional weakness of the state authorities, low effectiveness of the state policy, deterioration of the international image of Ukraine – combined together, undermining the pace of its reformation and development.

⁵ In relations with Ukraine, the Russian establishment used to treat its independence disrespectfully, sometimes – insultingly. Given the ineffectiveness of Ukraine's information policy, this presents another very weighty factor of deterioration of the international image of Ukraine.

⁶ Meaning the extension of *Gazprom's* control to companies (and even politicians) of some European states – so-called "Schröderisation". The term was introduced by Russian analyst A. Piontkovsky – after Germany's former Chancellor G. Schröder, now heading the *North European Gas Pipeline Company* – operator of the Russian *Nord Stream* project. According to the analyst: "Schröderisation proved a universal picklock to the hearts of Western "intellectuals" and politicians". See: Piontkovsky A, *Pir Dukha Tikhona* (Feast of Tikhon's spirit). – *grani.ru*, 13 February 2008.

⁷ Russian military bases and/or peacekeeping forces are located in actually all post-Soviet countries, except Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Baltic states. On Russia's readiness see: Law of the Russian Federation "On Defence", as amended in 2009.

⁸ If the deficit of security on the global and regional levels arises primarily because of the lack of capabilities of collective security systems, the transformational deficit of security arises from conscious limitation by specific countries seeking integration in a collective security system of their defence capabilities and resultant weakening of the defence potential during the process of integration.



In such conditions, even in absence of serious threats, any situation is actually uncontrolled and can turn dangerous. In combination with destabilising external influences, this is fraught with the loss of sovereignty and “political default”.⁹

Critical state of the system of national security.

In the years of independence, the security sector accumulated many structural problems that cannot be solved by target measures usual for the Ukrainian authorities. Their most demonstrative traits include the following:

- **deregulation of the national security system**, caused, in particular, by the lack of coordination in reformation of its elements, which makes the system fragmented, ineffective, impairs its capability to prevent critical phenomena and react to them;
- **impairment of the effectiveness of power structures**, in particular, due to their politicisation and “privatisation”; political bias in the human resources policy turned some power structures and institutes of governance (courts, public prosecutor’s offices, law-enforcement bodies) into tools of fighting political (and economic) rivals, which enhances the risk of a violent conflict in society;
- **impairment of the defence capability of the country** due to, *first*, too long transformation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,¹⁰ with uncertain targets, priorities and end goals, in the result of protraction of NATO accession, *second*, due to the long-standing shortage of funds for the Armed Forces and ineffective use of the limited resources allocated to their maintenance.

Growing Russian pressure. Growth of aggressiveness in the Russian policy noted above

most directly deals with Ukraine. In particular, some Russian organisations and political figures promote in Ukraine’s regions a large-scale PR campaign aimed at instigation of separatist spirits, public discontent with actions of the Ukrainian authorities and, by contrast, propaganda of the Russian government effectiveness.¹¹ That campaign often addresses the subjects of a possible a Ukraine-Russian armed conflict¹²; limitations of the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5 application by NATO (in case of Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance); topicality of a neutral status for Ukraine, etc.

Preoccupation of politicians and public with those subjects diverts attention from another (quite real) threat for Ukraine – economic and political absorption of attractive for the Russian business economically developed (and largely pro-Russian minded) Eastern and Southern Ukrainian territories by Russia. Implementation of that scenario threatens not only Ukraine – with the loss of integrity, but entire Europe – with the emergence of new dividing lines and areas of conflicts on the continent.

Hindrance of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

Given the above-mentioned deficit of security, Ukraine might naturally be interested in reduction of the term of joining NATO. However, this process is hindered by a number of obstacles.

(1) *Lack of political will, uncoordinated and ineffective actions of Ukraine itself.* The behaviour of the Ukrainian side shows inability of its political leaders and authorities in general for coordinated actions at promotion of the declared foreign political course, which causes largely justified references (in particular, by Germany and France) to Ukraine’s internal unreadiness for accession. Even official representatives of NATO and its member states find it increasingly difficult to conceal their “fatigue” from the instability and hesitation in Ukraine’s policy.

(2) *Counteraction of Russia, setting non-admission of Ukraine to NATO as one of the priority tasks of its foreign policy.* To attain that task, Russia does not stop at economic pressure and concealed threats of use of force, contrary to the Budapest Memorandum.

(3) *Lack of unity regarding Ukraine in the Euro-Atlantic community,* fears of practical losses from deterioration of relations with Russia outbalancing potential gains of Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

(4) *Aggravation of relations of several Alliance members with Ukraine.* In particular, unfriendly steps of Romania (the “spy scandal”, renewed statements of territorial claims, instigation of separatist spirits in the border regions of Ukraine) do not meet due criticism within the Alliance.

⁹ See also: Towards more adequate and coordinated national security policy in Ukraine: Strategic Assessment for NATO-Ukraine consultations on 12-13 November 2008, Tallinn. – Kyiv, Razumkov Centre, 2008.

¹⁰ The 2004 Strategic Defence Bulletin outlined the future model of the Armed Forces, with a view of Ukraine’s participation in the Euro-Atlantic collective defence system. The Programme of Reformation of the Armed Forces Ukraine for the period of 2005-2015 was worked out and adopted on that basis.

¹¹ For more detail see: Ukraine-Russia: from crisis to effective partnership. – *National Security & Defence*, 2009, No.4, p.12-14.

¹² See, e.g., the books: Kalashnikov M. Independent Ukraine: Project failure; Savitsky G. Battlefield Ukraine. Broken trident; Shirokorad A. Russia and Ukraine. When guns speak...



(5) *Change of the format of NATO-Ukraine cooperation from Target Plans to ANP* – instead of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) – met mixed reaction of the Ukrainian politicians and experts. Some consider it to be a positive development – ANP with its mechanisms of verification is seen as the best replacement of MAP; others allege that the Alliance in that way demonstrated a decrease in the level of cooperation with Ukraine.

Now, when prospects of Ukraine's accession to NATO remain illusive, the Ukrainian public, especially political scientists and military experts, raise the issue of revision of approaches to provision of the defence capability of the state, namely: proclamation of the permanent neutrality status by Ukraine, accession to CSTO, an increase in the Armed Forces' strength, restoration of the nuclear potential.

In the conditions of weakness of the authorities, controversial foreign political orientation of society, promotion of those unrealistic proposals may (and is actually intended to) result in revision of the legislatively provided course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, curtailment of its European project and further drift to the zone of the Russian influence.

Drift (forcing out) of Ukraine to the buffer zone between the West and the East. In addition to the weak policy of Ukraine itself, it is conditioned, on one hand, by the so-called "reset" of US relations with Russia and the wait-and-see position of the EU and NATO (especially – the indulgent to the Russian Federation policy of Germany, France, Italy), on the other – by Russia's desire to make the CIS space the CSTO area of responsibility recognised by the West, with its gradual transformation into the "Eurasian NATO" enjoying the respective status.

Against the background of the weakening position of the Alliance, caused by the need of its transformation, strengthening of CSTO means for Ukraine a more definite stand on the alternative (Eurasian – by contrast to Euro-Atlantic) vector of outside security guarantees. In absence of a proper public relations campaign, this substantially complicates its orientation and conscious choice of foreign political priorities, prompts political speculations and threatens with deepening dividing lines in Ukrainian society.

A concealed danger of any of those vectors' choice (NATO – CSTO) may be posed by unjustified expectations. In particular, orientation to NATO standards in military technologies and expectation of arrival of investments and advanced technologies – without due

results of the ANP implementation, proper funding of the Armed Forces and development of the national defence industry – will result in gradual "freezing" of Euro-Atlantic (and European) aspirations. On the other hand, the desire to make use of CSTO preferences of getting cheaper arms is fraught with saturation of the Armed Forces with obsolete weapon systems, which will keep the structure and quality of the Armed Forces at their present level for a long time.

Need of new common approaches

The world economic crisis added to the need of finding the equilibrium: between market principles of the national and world economy – and the level, forms and methods of influence of government, international organisations and economic alliances on it; between economic expediency – and supremacy of social values and environmental protection needs; between national interests – and the imperative of global survival; between state sovereignty – and the need of joint actions.

As a result, more attention is paid to the problem of deep reformation of the systems of global and regional security and international law. This is witnessed by the attempts:

- to apply the old paradigm of violent confrontation "friend or foe" to the processes of preventing and countering new threats ("global war against terrorism" proclaimed by the USA);
- to expand the concept of security, with emphasis on preventive measures at solution of socio-economic problems (implementation of development assistance programmes, initiatives of joint threat reduction, the European neighbourhood policy by the EU, creation of province rebuilding groups within the framework of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan);
- to replace (supplement) ineffective international systems with more workable organisations capable of prompt response to threats (appearance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, CSTO, US-led situational coalitions for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq);
- to renew and adapt to the new conditions old systems, in particular, the Bretton Woods institutes and the Euro-Atlantic security system (decisions of the Brussels summit of G-20 and the Strasbourg NATO summit¹³);
- to propose establishment of new collective security systems (Russian proposal of creation of a new European security system¹⁴).

¹³ Main novelties approved at the G20 summit: the increase of IMF resources with expansion of the scale of measures, "necessary for resumption of economic growth, stabilisation of banks, growth of consumer demand and limitation of reduction of jobs"; creation of the Financial Stability Fund empowered to control the market of capitals and banks. See: Results of G20 summit: continuation of anti-crisis measures and reformation of IMF. – *NEWSru.ua* news agency, 8 September 2009, <http://www.newsru.ua>

¹⁴ At a world policy conference in Evian (October 2008) the Russian President D. Medvedev put forward five principles of building the new European security system: (1) observance of the international law; (2) inadmissibility of the use of force or threat of use of force in international relations; (3) equal security guarantees; (4) refusal of states and international organisations from the exclusive right to maintenance of peace and stability in Europe; (5) introduction of basic parameters of arms control and reasonable sufficiency in defence-building. See: Arbatova N. Reconstruction of European security. – *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 23 March 2009, <http://www.ng.ru>



However, deepening disparity between the present threats and capabilities of security systems of all levels, increasingly grave consequences and protracted character of crises prompt the conclusion that attempts of revival of old international systems are futureless, and the longer their agony lasts, the deeper and more dangerous the effects of critical phenomena are.¹⁵

The would-be result of reformation of the existing security systems – a network of international organisations with a modernised hierarchic structure, a new hierarchy of specialised international organisations with a network structure, or another option of an international security system – is to be produced by serious studies, large-scale consultations and talks.

Meanwhile, now, in the conditions of the global deficit of security noted above, there arises an urgent need of search of mechanisms of joint actions, which, with respect to Ukraine, is to cover the following domains:

- **prevention of threats, minimisation of their effects.** A threat (even unlikely) of instigation of a conflict in Ukraine involving neighbouring countries requires initiation of multilateral economic, political, cultural projects, whereby “potential enemies” would get practical benefits from partnership. In particular, the energy security of the EU and NATO countries in the conditions of the Russian gas monopoly requires joint efforts in such domains as: formulation of a common European energy policy and a “common order” for energy resources; integration of the Ukrainian gas transportation system in the European one; introduction of transparent mechanisms of supply and transit of Russian gas on mutually advantageous conditions;
- **enhancement of effectiveness and acceleration of the defence reform.** Today, Ukraine faces a dilemma: to continue the process of approximation of the Armed Forces to NATO requirements and standards, or to quit it and concentrate on territorial defence by own forces. Meanwhile, both options require large-scale re-equipment of the Armed Forces and large expenditures, which, in the conditions of resource limitations and neglect of threats, looks questionable. All this requires fundamental revision of the defence reform parameters – its pace, content, phases, resources, personnel training, and enhancement of civilian control of the military sector;¹⁶
- **design, provision and acceptance of assistance, granted by the principle of political solidarity,**

until the accession to the collective security system. The probability of actualisation of the threat of an armed conflict on the territory of Ukraine and its spread to the neighbouring countries is low, but possible consequences require from NATO and the EU the mechanisms of conflict localisation and management at early stages that, unlike analogues of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, would remove aggravation of confrontation with Russia; there is a need of intensification and enhancement of effectiveness of NATO-Ukraine partnership and consultations mechanisms. Legal principles of acceptance of foreign assistance by Ukraine (including admission of foreign troops for joint exercises, border crossing, information exchanges, use of financial and technical assistance for disposal of ammunitions and missile fuel, etc.) require serious revision;

- **reduction of the integration period – as a condition reducing probability of a conflict before the actual accession to a collective security system.** Ukraine is facing a number of problems complicating sooner Euro-Atlantic integration: insufficient public support for that course; lack of political will and ability of the state authorities for joint actions; aggravation of relations with Russia; absence of a common stand in NATO. Exactly their solution should in the first place be addressed by ANP and NATO assistance.

Ukraine’s response to internal and external challenges can be adequate only on the condition of political actors and society consolidation, mobilisation of the scanty internal resources (financial, human, political) for practical changes. Success can be achieved with the refusal from the fallacious policy of isolated steps, not combined in a single technology of priority goals attainment, and transition to strategic management of the country development.

From this viewpoint, attempts of setting the priorities of Ukraine’s development through “European standards” look irrational. The variety of those standards in the EU countries misleads the executive branch, and in case of NATO standards – arouses suspicion (or rejection) in society. Why not specify the desired for Ukraine standards (development priorities) unambiguously – in numerical terms? In this case, with approach to those standards, the Western vector of integration would mean progressive accession to the relevant European socio-economic and security institutions, and the Eastern one would sound like “Back to Russia”.

¹⁵ Interview with L.Larouche: “International monetary and financial system is breaking apart and has no future in its present form”. – *Planeta*, October 2008, <http://www.larouchepub.com>; Kornilov H. Geopolitics: “double fracture with a shift”. – *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, 5 April 2009.

¹⁶ See the article by L.Polyakov “Civilian control: the Pentagon experience”, published in this magazine.



Tasks for expert community and public organisations

Positive shifts in Ukraine may be ensured on the condition of renovation of the political elite: not only new figures coming to power, but accumulation within the authorities of the critical mass of the new generation of politicians – pragmatic realists, ready for changes and capable of their implementation, with ambitious goals of building a strong Ukraine on the principles of civil society, who can work in the conditions of transparency, abidance by the principles of the rule of law, unconditional domination of national interests. However, the current ruling elite, now controlling the resources, not only deeply established in power (due to corruption and solidarity), but also obstructed all approaches to it, actually barred “team” arrival of the new elite.¹⁷

The situation requires from the expert community and public organisations concentration on the sectors that were neglected previously: training of experts for the state sector and young politicians, their acquisition of skills of strategic management and public policy; change of the public political demand – i.e., the attitude of citizens to their role and the role of public associations in the formation of representative bodies of power, state policy and control of the state machinery.

At the same time, the third sector should use the traditional tools of influence on the authorities, on its own initiate the policy of change and find workable mechanisms of implementation of those initiatives even in the conditions of active or passive obstruction on the part of disinterested political actors and the state bureaucracy.

One cannot say that nothing is being done in those domains, but such activity is fragmentary and therefore, not too effective. The reason lies in the specificity of activity of the third sector organisations that, in absence of the state order, *have* to survive and work with funds of domestic non-state sponsors and foreign donors. So, resource support for non-governmental think-tanks and other public organisations now representing Ukrainian civil society remains a key issue.



CONCLUSIONS

The feature of the present international situation is the deficit of security, both in the member states of collective security systems and other countries, including those seeking membership in such systems.

Presence of key world actors in Europe and its vulnerability to present-day challenges give rise to the need of implementation of a joint project, politically and economically attractive for all European countries, whose implementation would promote confidence and security in the region.

The probability of conflicts emergence on the territory of Ukraine fraught with consequences unacceptable for Ukraine and whole Europe requires joint efforts, search and introduction of effective security mechanisms.

The key internal preconditions for threat reduction and provision of the acceptable level of Ukraine’s national security include consolidation of the political elite and society, stabilisation of the home political situation and effective implementation of the foreign political course of the state.

The main tasks of public organisations in this situation include enhancement of influence on formation of the new political elite, and a more exacting public attitude to the activity of the Ukrainian authorities. ■

¹⁷ Even changes in the Ukrainian political community after the Orange revolution resembled reshuffling of the old cadres, rather than renovation of the elites.