

# 6. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

The current stage of Ukraine-Russia partnership is characterised by instability, regular aggravation of the dialogue between the state and political elites, conservation of a number of long-standing problems. Relations of the parties are complicated by deepening geopolitical differences between Kyiv and Moscow, suspension of top level contacts envisaged by interstate mechanisms. Tension in political, economic, military and technical humanitarian and other sectors does not go down. Problems hit cooperation in the energy sector.

All this affects the information background of cooperation, and in the end result leads to deterioration of relations between citizens of both countries. By and large, there are grounds to speak about signs of a systemic crisis of Ukraine-Russia partnership. Such situation does not meet the interests of both countries.

Analysis of the state of Ukraine-Russia relations leads to the following conclusions.

## 1. Negative trends gain strength in cooperation in the political sector

**First. Relations of the state and political elites are mainly contentious. The political-diplomatic dialogue is reduced to mutual criticism.** Estrangement of the elites of the two countries continues. A large part of the Russian political establishment demonstrates a critical attitude to home political processes in Ukraine, actions of the country leadership on the international scene. This complicates contacts on all levels. There is a deficit of strategic approaches to development of cooperation. The official dialogue is full of accusative statements, critical comments, diplomatic demarches. The mutual practice of “black lists” banning entry of political and public figures, MPs of the neighbouring state to the country is not eliminated.

**Second. Mechanisms of bilateral cooperation are not fully employed.** The political factor affects operation of the Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Commission. The Commission last met at full strength in February 2008. A “pause” in the activity of relevant subcommittees continues. Contacts take place mainly on the sub-commission level. The gains included the work of the Committee for Economic Cooperation chaired by the Prime Ministers of the two countries.

**Third. Regulatory-legal framework does not fully meet present-day realities of cooperation.** Some framework treaties require elaboration in specific agreements, some documents lost relevance, others have not entered into effect due to unaccomplished internal procedures by the parties. The process of formalisation (delimitation) of the state border in the Azov and Kerch water area and demarcation of its land segment is actually “frozen”.

**Fourth.** Ukraine’s course of Euro-Atlantic integration affects actually all aspects of Ukraine-Russia relations. The Russian side views further enlargement of NATO as a direct threat to its security, wages a large-scale coordinated campaign to block accession to NATO for official Kyiv. Ukraine’s drive to the Alliance is the main “irritant” in bilateral cooperation, a pressing geopolitical challenge for Russia.

**Fifth. Unsettled problem of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet stationing in Crimea cause tension in relations.** Some

legally unsettled issues repeatedly cause complications, political-diplomatic conflicts. The basic agreements on the conditions of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet stationing in Crimea require elaboration and specification. After the military conflict in the Caucasus, the situation with the Russian military base in Sevastopol evidently sharpened. The problem of withdrawal of units of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in 2017 came to the forefront. The Russian side announces a desire to extend its military presence on Ukraine’s territory. Evidently, with the approach of the date of the Fleet withdrawal, the tension accompanying that subject will grow.

**Sixth. Differences in the parties’ positions regarding the content, forms and prospects of integration in the post-Soviet space deepened.** Russia views the CIS as an area of its “privileged interests”. Strengthening of the Commonwealth, EurAsEC and CSTO as mechanisms of political-economic, political-military, humanitarian influence of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space is inconsistent with the foreign political course of Ukraine. Official Kyiv does not prioritise activity in the CIS, as well as participation in the SES project, now actually stalled. The growing conflict of interests complicates coordination of activities on the regional level, deregulates the CIS structure, deepens the geopolitical split in the post-Soviet space. Russia is cautious regarding the EU initiative of “Eastern Partnership”, seen as a suspected EU attempt to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of Russia.

**Seventh. The information background of Ukraine-Russia relations is unfavourable.** The generally negative tone of the official dialogue reproduced by the media creates an unfavourable background for bilateral cooperation. The national media mainly work in the mode of mutual criticism, home political processes and actions of the leadership of the neighbouring country are commented in a biased manner. Such a trend in information creates a distorted idea of the partner, forms unfavourable stereotypes and convictions.

**Eighth. Trends arose towards deterioration of mutual relations of citizens of Ukraine and Russia.** The information background of cooperation affects the relations of the peoples of both countries. Recent public opinion polls in the Russian Federation witness



growth of critical spirits towards Ukraine among Russian citizens. Such trends arouse grave concern. By and large, the opinions of the Ukrainian and Russian population substantially differ – Russians mainly report a negative attitude to the neighbouring country, while Ukrainians in their majority cherish positive emotions towards Russia.

## 2. There is a number of problems in trade and economic cooperation

*First.* Some actions of the parties in the economic sector are politically motivated and may be termed as pressure on the partner. Trade contacts still feel the negative consequences of the “meat and milk war” unleashed by the Russian Federation in 2006. Russian executive bodies work out mechanisms for protection of the Russian economy from goods supplied from Ukraine. They consider cancellation or toughening of free trade rules with Ukraine, in fact in connection with deterioration of bilateral relations because of the military conflict in the Caucasus. The Russian side links Ukraine’s initiative of creation of a free trade area without exemptions and exceptions with the political decision of Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union.

*Second.* Contacts between manufacturers of both countries are complicated. Development of cooperative ties is hindered by the absence of the necessary regulatory-legal framework regimenting the procedure of cooperation of business entities, mechanisms of regulation of their interaction and settlements. Many agreements are of a framework nature, effective mechanisms of their implementation are absent. Mutual losses are caused by lack of coordination on markets of third countries, especially at export of competing goods (metal products, grain, defence industry products, etc.).

*Third.* Implementation of a number of large-scale joint projects is frozen. The parties failed to come to terms on the forms of possible cooperation at implementation of An-140 and An-148 aircraft projects. An-70 project is frozen by the Russian side. In the hi-tech sector, the Russian Federation toughens access of Ukrainian enterprises to participation in Russian projects (in the space sector) and limits access of Ukrainian designs to the Russian market (advanced control systems for NPPs).

*Fourth.* The main impediments for the growth of trade include the use of tariff and non-tariff restrictions by the parties (quotas, sanitary, veterinary standards), antidumping investigations. Analysis of that practice reveals the desire of the Russian Federation to reduce the segment of Ukrainian goods on the Russian market. Specific of application of restrictive measures by the Russian side is their evident focus on the most vulnerable sectors of the Ukrainian economy and neglect of agreements of use of protective measures causing minimal damage to bilateral trade.

## 3. The energy dialogue of the parties bears an asymmetric, conflict nature

*First.* Relations in the energy sector in 2005-2009 witnessed regular conflicts. The gas conflict in January 2009 grew into a political-economic crisis in bilateral relations, involving a number of European countries. The agreement of gas supply signed by the parties in January 2009

was largely asymmetrical and caused internal political differences in Ukraine.

*Second.* Ukraine-Russian “gas confrontation” touches interests of third countries, exerts a negative effect on the political-economic situation in the European region. The mass campaign of mutual accusations and ultimatums rather strongly undermines the international image of Ukraine and Russia alike. According to Ukrainian and Russian experts, both parties lost in the result of the January gas confrontation.

*Third.* Russia, acting from the position of an “energy superpower”, uses critical dependence of Ukraine on deliveries of Russian gas for the attainment of its political-economic interests. At that, the Russian Federation does not leave attempts to get control of the Ukrainian gas transportation system, to secure monopoly in the supply and transit of energy resources to Europe. For that, different means of political-economic pressure are used. Demonstrative in this respect was the strong critical reaction of the Russian side to the decisions of the international conference in Brussels (March 2009) regarding modernisation of the Ukrainian gas transportation system.

## 4. The humanitarian sector of cooperation presents a source of conflict situations

*First.* In some aspects of humanitarian cooperation, the dialogue bears a strongly conflict nature. Especially pressing are the problems of satisfaction (on a parity basis) of national cultural needs of Ukrainians in Russia and Russians in Ukraine. Mutual relations are seriously complicated by language problems, differences in assessments of some historic events.

*Second.* Deterioration of the situation in the humanitarian sector affects the relations between citizens of both countries, complicates contacts between the political, academic, artistic elites, expert communities. The potential of cultural exchanges is used ineffectively, contacts in the field of education, science, culture are limited.

## 5. Military cooperation contacts are limited

*First.* Differences in geopolitical positions of the parties hinder the development of cooperation in the sectors of defence policy and military operations. The Russian side views Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration as a threat to its national security. That segment of cooperation suffered from Russia’s moratorium on the Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the military conflict in the Caucasus and Ukraine-Russian gas confrontation in January 2009.

*Second.* Bilateral cooperation in the military and technical sector steadily goes down. The Russian side obstructs Ukrainian initiatives in the fields of defence industry cooperation, creation of joint ventures, arms disposal. Cooperative ties are restricted in such sectors as missile programmes, modernisation of aviation equipment, production of land-based air defence systems. The scope of mutual use of military ranges of the two countries goes down. Desire of the Russian side to create domestic cycles of production of military equipment and absence of an adequate policy of the Ukrainian



Government towards the national defence industry limit Ukraine-Russian military and technical cooperation.

**Permanent conflicts, political-diplomatic confrontation bring instability to bilateral relations. Both Ukrainian and Russian experts rather sceptically view the immediate prospects of cooperation of the two countries. This does not mean, however, that Ukraine-Russia partnership is doomed to stall. Evidently, there is no alternative to the establishment of good-neighbourly, mutually advantageous and equal cooperation of Ukraine and Russia.**

**So, the main task is to jointly find the ways and mechanisms of solution of disputed issues, to work out a new effective model of cooperation on the basis of fair coordination of national interests of the parties, refusal from forcible pressure. The countries' relations should rest on the European standards, norms and rules, with mutual respect for each other's interests.**

### **RAISE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTNERSHIP WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE FOLLOWING STEPS SHOULD BE MADE**

#### **1. Promote dialogue of the state and political elites within the framework of bilateral cooperation mechanisms**

1.1. Intensify activity of the Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Commission:

(a) prepare and hold in 2009-2010 meetings of subcommittees for international cooperation, security and humanitarian cooperation. In the subcommittee on international cooperation, to discuss problems of global and regional security, issues of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, cooperation of the Russian Federation with NATO. To consider the possibility of participation in a meeting of NATO representatives;

(b) in the Committee for Economic Cooperation, to hold a meeting of the relevant sub-commissions for: elaboration of programmes of bilateral cooperation in the field of nanotechnologies, preparation of programmes of cooperation in the field of nuclear power engineering, adoption of an agreements on protection of technologies of research of outer space for peaceful purposes, implementation of a number of joint scientific projects in the field of space research. In the sub-commission for transport, to promote development of international transport corridors, implementation of bilateral projects boosting cargo traffic between the countries through construction of highways, creation of container and contrailer corridors, perfection of the mechanism of motor vehicle passage on the state border;

(c) create within the Committee a sub-commission for cooperation in the field of environmental protection;

(d) consider the issue of inclusion of members of the Inter-Parliamentary commission for cooperation between the Verkhovna Rada and the Federal Assembly the Russian Federation in the relevant sub-commissions;

(e) continue talks about the conduct of the next meeting of the Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Commission at full strength.

1.2. Intensify the work of inter-Parliamentary cooperation mechanisms:

(a) speed up creation of a working group for development of Ukraine-Russia transborder cooperation within the Inter-Parliamentary Commission;

(b) at the next (ninth) meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Commission for cooperation between the Verkhovna Rada and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, to consider issues of perfection of legal norms of interstate relations in trade and economic, scientific-technological, humanitarian and other sectors;

(c) create within the Inter-Parliamentary Commission stable channels for exchange of information about the legislative activity of parliaments of the two countries. To adopt the practice of preliminary mutual consultations before discussion of issues related with bilateral cooperation in parliaments;

(d) arrange joint parliamentary hearings on issues of development of Ukraine-Russia cooperation in 2010.

1.3. Improve inter-regional cooperation:

(a) promote trade and economic, scientific-technological, humanitarian contacts on the basis of the established Euroregions. To speed up creation of "Donbas" Euroregion (Luhansk and Rostov regions);

(b) resume implementation of the bilateral project "Council of Regions" for development of transborder cooperation between regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation;

(c) in the Sub-commission for Inter-Regional and Transborder Cooperation, to consider a set of topical issues: opening new border crossing points, delegation of powers of organisation of joint transborder and customs control to border regions, introduction of a "one-stop" system for customs clearance of cargoes;

(d) arrange in the first half of 2010 a new meeting of foreign ministers of Ukraine and the Russian Federation with heads of border regions.

#### **2. Improve the regulatory-legal framework of cooperation**

2.1. In the Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Commission:

(a) accomplish all-round inventory of the regulatory-legal framework, monitoring of obsolete, ineffective agreements. To bilaterally denounce such documents. In particular, in the Sub-commission for Inter-Regional and Transborder Cooperation, to make inventory of inter-regional agreements on trade and economic cooperation;

(b) with account of the agreements reached within the Commission framework and tasks set by the Ukraine-Russia Action Plan through 2009, to provide for joint drafting of documents for further development of partnership in trade and economic, air and space, energy, military and technical, scientific-technological, humanitarian and other sectors.

2.2. Agree the list of bilateral agreements that must be passed in pursuance of provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.



2.3. Accomplish intrastate procedures for validation of number of agreements important for the development of cooperation: of mutual recognition of rights and regulation of relations of ownership; on establishment and activity of information-cultural centres; on the procedure of Ukraine-Russia state border crossing by residents of border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; on measures in support for cooperation in the gas sector, etc.

2.4. Speed up preparation and signing of a number of bilateral agreements of cooperation in the field of navigation, fishing, sea protection and environmental safety in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, in the Kerch Strait.

2.5. Accomplish coordination of bilateral documents in the field of pensions (Agreement of Pensions) and healthcare.

### **3. Intensify solution of problem issues of bilateral relations.**

Draw up and consistently implement a mid-term schedule of solution of disputable issues. With that purpose:

3.1. Solve topical issues related with Russia's Black Sea Fleet stationing in Crimea:

(a) prepare and hold in Kyiv the seventh meeting of the Sub-commission for Operation of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Crimea and its stationing on the territory of Ukraine planned for June 2009;

(b) in the Sub-commission, to work out and coordinate detailed agreements: on navigation-hydrographical support for shipping in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov; on the procedure of crossing the state border of Ukraine; on cooperation for prevention of emergency situations and removal of their consequences; on inventory of property and land plots transferred to Russia's Black Sea Fleet for use; on the legal status of military servants of Russia's Black Sea Fleet and their families, including issues of citizenship;

(c) finally accomplish inventory of land plots leased out to Russia's Black Sea Fleet. To jointly check execution of permissive documents for the use of nature by Russia's Black Sea Fleet. To accomplish remedy of effects of environmental violations at facilities of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.

3.2. In the Subcommittee for International Cooperation, to continue negotiation of disputed border issues:

(a) prepare and hold in the II half of 2009 a meeting of the Sub-commission for Azov-Kerch Settlement. To prepare the Treaty of Ukraine-Russia State Border in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea for signing;

(b) concentrate negotiations on the need of completion by the Russian side of intrastate procedures of preparation of the Agreement of Demarcation of Ukraine-Russia state border for signing.

3.3. Promote bilateral partnership in the CIS in the fields of mutual interest. To promote implementation of Ukrainian proposals of formalisation of borders in the CIS, deepening cooperation in the energy sector, perfection of the mechanism of the free trade area.

3.4. In the dialogue with Russia, to proceed from the fact that the initiative of "Eastern Partnership" is not an

alliance, a league of countries or sphere of influence of the EU aimed against the Russian Federation. This is not an alternative to other integration projects. This position should be backed with the following initiatives:

(a) propose to the initiative participants to involve the Russian Federation in cooperation within the framework of specific projects: integration of electricity markets, guarantee of reliable transit and deliveries of energy resources, transborder cooperation, development of small and medium business, border management;

(b) encourage participation of civil society structures of the Russian Federation in discussions of the Civil Society Forum, established within the "Eastern Partnership" framework;

(c) propose organisation of the international conference "Eastern Partnership" – Russia: bridges of cooperation" involving representatives of the programme member states and the Russian side in Kyiv in the first half of 2010.

3.5. Expand formats of bilateral contacts for improvement of the information background for cooperation:

(a) concentrate on normalisation of the tone of mutual relations, to remove harsh, confrontational sayings, categorical statements from the political-diplomatic vocabulary;

(b) hold in Kyiv in the IV quarter of 2009 media forum "Information background for partnership: from confrontation to cooperation", involving representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian media, expert communities of the two countries;

(c) encourage conferences, seminars, round-tables of state and non-governmental structures on problems of bilateral cooperation;

(d) in the Ukraine-Russian Consultative Council, to plan publication of joint information-analytical products (bulletin "Monitoring of development of Ukraine-Russia relations"), creation of a specialised web site "Ukraine-Russia: problems and prospects of cooperation";

(e) initiate a regular Kyiv-Moscow TV bridge on the problems of bilateral relations involving representatives of executive and legislative bodies, experts, public figures;

(f) exchange popular, scientific, cultural TV and radio programmes with impartial, depoliticised information about the two countries.

### **4. Promote economic cooperation between the two countries**

4.1. Perform all-round modernisation of the regulatory-legal framework and mechanisms of economic and foreign economic regulation, first of all, in the field of taxation of foreign economic operations, pricing, customs, financial, tariff policy, etc. For that, the following should be done:

(a) bring mechanisms of regulation of bilateral trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation in compliance with the principles applied in the European countries;

(b) simplify the procedure of certification of goods and quotas of imports in mutual trade;



(c) ensure compliance of customs and transport fares.

4.2. Promote full-scale implementation of the Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. For that, the following steps should be taken:

(a) practically observe cooperation rules provided in the intergovernmental Memorandum of principles of use of special measures against imports of goods originating from customs territories of the parties. To continue efforts at simplification and unification of national laws;

(b) work out a mechanism of removal of technical barriers and other similar restrictions hindering the development of mutual trade;

(c) continue the practice of mutual consultations on national market protection measures for minimisation of possible negative consequences for mutual trade;

(d) resume full-scale deliveries of Ukrainian meat and dairy products;

(e) hold consultations on the state and prospects of bilateral trade in sugar, and on regulation of deliveries of Ukrainian treacle.

4.3. Create mechanisms of implementation of agreements in the economic sector (first of all, in the field of investment and production-technological cooperation). With that purpose:

(a) concentrate on removal of trade barriers for deliveries of products for production cooperation;

(b) provide favourable conditions for interaction between enterprises interested in establishment of mutually advantageous cooperative ties (including at construction of facilities in third countries);

(c) streamline procedures of creation of Ukrainian-Russian joint ventures and transnational financial-industrial groups. To encourage such entities to commence production of new of products and goods that can reduce dependence of the countries on imports of strategic and hi-tech goods from third countries.

4.4. Provide for effective implementation of joint activities and projects envisaged by the Programme of Economic Cooperation of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for 2008-2010. To identify bottlenecks and to promote their removal, to employ non-state enterprises for implementation of the Programme. For that:

(a) introduce tax exemptions for enterprises involved in implementation of joint projects envisaged by the Programme;

(b) extend preferences to foreign investors already working in Ukraine and the Russian Federation and agree to reinvest obtained profit in implementation of the Programme projects.

4.5. Actively promote scientific-technological cooperation. Ukraine prioritises partnership in the field of missile and space equipment, aircraft building, nuclear energy, radio electronics, ferrous, non-ferrous and special metallurgy, metal processing, advanced materials, material and energy saving science-intensive technologies. To deepen contacts in those sectors, the following should be done:

(a) focus efforts on creation of a common innovative infrastructure (including joint innovative-industrial complexes), to improve economic and financial mechanisms of innovative activity;

(b) provide proper legal conditions, to improve the legislative framework in the field of scientific-technological security, protection of copyrights and intellectual property. Given the differences in the national legislations, to implement joint project activities on the basis of licensing agreements between business entities of the parties.

## 5. Promote improvement of contacts in the energy sector

5.1. With account of the consequences of the recent gas crisis for Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the EU, and to prevent emergence of similar situations in the future, the parties should put forward the initiative of ensuring transparency of the entire technological chain “extraction-transportation-consumption”. To facilitate mutual access of consumers, suppliers and transmitters to information in all links of the technological chain – from the well head to the consumer.

5.2. Initiate creation of an on-line communication system among the control centres of “Gazprom”, “Naftogaz of Ukraine” and European companies (SPP in Slovakia, PGNiG in Poland, MOL in Hungary, “Transgas” in Romania), showing real time movement of all gas. This would enhance the transparency of all segments of international energy markets (production/export, transit, consumption/import), perfection of early warning mechanisms involving suppliers, consumers and transit states.

5.3. At negotiation of new intergovernmental agreement of cooperation in the gas sector, to return to the discussion of the package of agreements in the gas sector signed in January 2009. To take the required measures for removal of asymmetry in the contractual commitments of “Gazprom” and “Naftogaz of Ukraine”. To intensify the activity of the joint working group for inventory of intergovernmental agreements in the gas sector.

5.4. Promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. For that purpose, in the sub-commission for nuclear energy and nuclear materials, to prepare programmes of establishment of cooperation in the field of nuclear power engineering and technical cooperation at NPP building in Ukraine and Russia, in third countries.

Agree the draft intergovernmental agreement of cooperation of the two countries at construction of the third and fourth power units of Khmelnytskyi NPP. To intensify cooperation of experts of nuclear power engineering sectors of the two countries.

5.5. Promote an agreement of transportation of additional 9 million tons of Russian crude by the route Samara-Kremenchuk-Pivdennyi instead of the reverse route Samara-Unecha-Mozyr-Brody-Pivdennyi. Jointly with European experts, to plan the route of transportation of low-sulphur Russian oil shipped from Tuapse using oil pipelines Odesa-Brody and Southern “Druzhba” for deliveries to the EU countries.



## 6. Promote humanitarian cooperation

6.1. Provide for utmost de-politicisation of the dialogue on humanitarian problems, to minimise confrontation of relations in that sector:

(a) put an end to the two-year break in the meetings of the Sub-Committee for Humanitarian Cooperation. To hold the next meeting of the Subcommittee in 2009, to work out effective coordinated approaches to language problems, to find non-conflict, civilised methods of support for ethnic minorities on the territory of both countries;

(b) consider organisation of a permanent scientific forum of academic circles of Ukraine and Russia for tolerant and impartial discussion of problems and prospects of humanitarian cooperation, ways of satisfaction of cultural needs of Ukrainians in Russia and Russians in Ukraine;

(c) encourage the work of the Joint Ukrainian-Russian Commission of Historians studying little known, disputable and mythologised events of the common history. To provide support for continuation of publication of the series of books prepared by the Commission. To create conditions for implementation of the joint international scientific project of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Belarus “1941: country in fire”. To encourage historic conferences planned for 2009-2010.

6.2. Create conditions for more effective satisfaction of national-cultural rights of Ukrainians in Russia and Russians in Ukraine. With that purpose:

(a) more effectively employ the potential of cultural exchanges, to implement mutually advantageous projects in cultural, scientific-technological sectors. To promote cooperation within the framework of joint projects in the field of nanotechnologies, IT, material science, humanitarian sciences;

(b) solve, with account of interests of the parties, problems of work of Russian schools in Ukraine and teaching in the Ukrainian language in schools of the Russian Federation, provision with personnel, training and methodological literature. To continue the practice of regional forums of teachers of the Russian language in Ukraine, international seminars for perfection of teaching of Ukrainian studies at Russian educational establishments – in Russia;

(c) arrange a joint meeting of the leadership of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine and the Ministry of Communication and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation, for the development of joint media projects, cultural-educational programmes, establishment of regular exchanges of TV and radio programmes;

(d) the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine jointly with the Federal Education Agency of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, to consider a substantial increase in the quotas of students and postgraduate exchanges.

6.3. Promote cooperation between higher educational establishments of Ukraine and Russia. To continue the practice of contacts on the level of university chancellors, scientific library directors. To promote regular conduct of

scientific-practical conferences, seminars among higher educational establishments. To hold the next phase of the International Student Forum “Ukraine-Russia” in 2010. To improve the legal framework of partnership of higher educational establishments of Ukraine and Russia.

## 7. Optimise partnership in the defence sector

7.1. Make the defence policy dialogue more productive:

(a) in negotiations with the Russian Federation, instead of confrontational subject of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, to concentrate on creation of the pan-European security system with account of interests of all European countries in different sectors (policy, economy, energy, environmental protection);

(b) concentrate on creation of the climate of trust in the Ukraine-Russia-NATO triangle, joining efforts in the search of answers to new challenges to the European and global security;

(c) initiate talks about the Black Sea Fleet stationing in Crimea with account of the actual state of the Fleet, security requirements in the Black Sea basin, economic ability of the parties to redeploy the Fleet and creation of a “peaceful” infrastructure in Sevastopol;

(d) intensify participation of Ukraine and the Russian Federation in multilateral projects in the military sector (including BLACKSEAFOR, “Black Sea Harmony” operation, participation in anti-piracy operations).

7.2. Promote military-operational cooperation in sectors of mutual interest:

(a) promote restoration and creation of new effective channels for exchange of experience between the Defence Ministries and the General Staffs of the two countries;

(b) resume operation of trial centres, to resume mutual extension of ranges for military unit training;

(c) conduct joint exercises for fighting terrorism, removal of effects of emergency situations on the level of the Defence Ministries.

7.3. Provide conditions for effective military-technological cooperation:

(a) more effectively employ the potential of cooperation in missile and space projects;

(b) concentrate on solution of problems hindering the development of cooperative ties among aviation concerns of Ukraine and Russia;

(c) create conditions for organisation (including with of third countries) joint ventures for production of air defence systems, radar and missile equipment, radio electronics, modernisation of weapons;

(d) promote implementation of joint projects of control of movement of man-portable air defence systems, disposal of redundant stocks of arms, ammunitions and missile fuel;

(e) create legislative framework for equal and mutually advantageous participation of third countries in privatisation of strategic enterprises (including of defence industry) in Ukraine;

(f) pursue a coordinated policy of cooperation of Ukrainian and Russian industrial enterprises and agencies on markets of third countries.