

UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN EXPERTS ABOUT THE STATE, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS

Today, Ukraine-Russia relations are in a state of crisis. “Radial deterioration” of contacts is observed in actually all sectors of cooperation. Encouraging changes for the better are, unfortunately, absent. Beyond doubt, the situation requires all-round, impartial analysis of the state of partnership between Ukraine and Russia and problem factors hindering its development, joint search of the ways and mechanisms of creation of an effective format of cooperation. Involvement of representatives of expert communities from both countries in the process may be productive.

With that purpose, Razumkov Centre and the “Russian Public Policy Centre” Foundation supported by Arseniy Yatseniuk’s “Open Ukraine” Foundation simultaneously held in Ukraine and Russia in March-April 2009, another expert poll on topical issues of bilateral cooperation¹. Summary results of the surveys of 2006-2009 present kind of a “remote dialogue” of the expert elites of Ukraine and the Russian Federation². Comparison of opinions and assessments, analysis of their dynamic lead to the following conclusions.

First. Representatives of the expert communities in Ukraine and Russia rather critically assess the state of bilateral relations, mainly terming them as either unstable or deteriorating. Russian respondents are more sceptical. According to experts, Ukraine’s policy regarding Russia, as well as the Russian policy regarding Ukraine, is dominated by negative trends. As before, the majority of Ukrainian experts are sure that Ukraine has no clear strategy of action regarding Russia. Russian experts are less categorical regarding the Russian strategy in relations with Ukraine, but most of them still reported its absence.

Second. Expert opinions about the attitude of Ukrainians to Russia and Russians to Ukraine fundamentally differ. The Ukrainian expert community mainly believes that Ukrainians treat Russia positively, while Russians treat Ukraine negatively and critically. The majority of Russian experts consider the attitude to be positive and kind in both cases. What is alarming, however, is that the majority of both Ukrainian and Russian experts believe that the relations between peoples of the two countries deteriorated.

Assessments of the attitude of the Russian state and political elite to the present Ukrainian leadership also substantially differ. The absolute majority of Ukrainian experts described it as negative, critical, of Russian experts – rather, as pragmatic, positive. Experts also see problems in the information background for the Ukraine-Russia cooperation.

Third. Among the main reasons for deterioration of bilateral cooperation, Ukrainian experts note attempts of the Russian Federation to keep Ukraine in the sphere of its influence using different forms of pressure. Russian experts see the main reason for deterioration in Russia’s rejection of Ukraine’s course of accession to NATO. Among the factors exerting the greatest negative influence on contacts between Kyiv and Moscow, both groups of experts in the first place noted the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and problems of cooperation in the gas sector.

Fourth. Assessing the situation in both countries, Ukrainian and Russian experts generally more critically assess the socio-economic situation in Ukraine, its esteem on the international scene, level of trust in the authorities and political stability at home. However, experts are sure that by some parameters of democracy development (freedom of mass media, protection of civil rights and freedoms, state of inter-ethnic relations), Russia yields to Ukraine.

Fifth. Experts quite sceptically assess the nearest prospects of cooperation between Kyiv and Moscow. The majority of both Ukrainian and Russian respondents believe that instability will persist, relations will regularly aggravate. However, despite all differences in opinions about the priority factors of rapprochement, the general picture of assessments witnesses a strong potential of development of Ukraine-Russia cooperation. Few experts consider rapprochement between the two countries impossible. Also important, representatives of expert communities of the two countries are sure that building relations between the countries in line with the European norms, rules and standards should be the key line of normalisation of cooperation.

¹ The first survey was simultaneously held in two countries in the period of April 26 - May 18, 2006. In Ukraine, 109 experts were polled, in the Russian Federation – 101. The second expert poll was held on March 25 - April 15, 2009. In Ukraine, 105 experts were polled, in the Russian Federation – 100. Polled were representatives of the executive and legislative branches (in the capitals and regions), ministries and agencies, business structures, leading state research institutions and non-governmental think-tanks, independent experts and journalists specialising in Ukraine-Russia relations.

² Comparison of the results of expert polls of 2006 and 2009 is mainly for illustration.



1. STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS

Experts from both countries very critically assess the state of bilateral cooperation. Unfortunately, no changes for the better are observed in general assessments. In 2006, roughly equal shares of Ukrainian and Russian respondents noted “instability” and “deterioration”. In 2009, that trend generally persisted. An increase was observed among Ukrainian experts reporting stagnation, and among Russians noting deterioration of cooperation. At that, no respondent in both groups saw progress in the relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Expert opinions entirely coincided with the opinions of Ukrainian citizens, the majority of whom (93.7%) term Ukraine-Russia relations as either unstable or bad³.

A very interesting picture is produced by expert assessments of the reasons and factors influencing the relations between Kyiv and Moscow. The rating of the reasons for deterioration of relations produced by Ukrainian experts looks as follows. Experts rank first “attempts of the Russian Federation to maintain Ukraine in the sphere of its influence using different forms of pressure” (58.1%). Next goes “Ukraine’s desire to leave the sphere of Russian influence and pursue an independent foreign policy” (40%). The third place is shared by the factor of “unreadiness of the parties to form transparent, civilised, mutually advantageous relations” (30.5%), and “Russia’s non-acceptance of Ukraine’s course of accession to NATO” (29.5%).

The rating of assessments of Russian experts is entirely different. Their absolute majority (87%) see the main reason for deterioration in “Russia’s non-acceptance of Ukraine’s course of accession to NATO”. Next, with a large gap (49%), goes “absence of a strategy of development of bilateral relations of the parties”. The top three is closed by the “unreadiness of the parties to form transparent, civilised, mutually advantageous relations” (27%)⁴.

Therefore, Russian experts are very sensitive to the issue of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic course, Ukrainian – to Moscow’s pressure to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence. It should be noted, however, that the Russian Federation exerts coordinated political-economic and diplomatic pressure to bar the Euro-Atlantic course of Kyiv, which may be viewed, *inter alia*, as a desire to strengthen control of Ukrainian developments, its foreign policy, that is, to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence.

Among the factors exerting the greatest negative influence on bilateral relations, both Ukrainian and Russian experts in the first place note Ukraine’s intention to join NATO and problems of cooperation in the gas sector⁵. The absolute majority of respondents in both groups reported those factors as exerting the greatest negative influence on contacts between Kyiv and Moscow. Assessing the answers in general, one may draw the following conclusions.

First. According to Ukrainian respondents, the countries’ relations are strongly affected by the long-standing “Crimean subject” – problems of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet stationing in Crimea, delimitation of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. For Russian experts, the negative influence of those factors is less important. In their view, bilateral cooperation is more affected by intensification of Ukraine’s activity in GUAM – the structure traditionally seen by the Russian political community as unfriendly.

Second. Both Ukrainian and Russian experts are really concerned about the insufficient intensity and effectiveness of the official dialogue. The efficiency of political-diplomatic contacts is evidently low, negotiations stall, including in the Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Commission. Experts (mainly Russian) also note insufficient employment of public channels of interaction.

Third. In 2009 (compared to 2006), some factors receded into the background – less importance is attached to the negative effect of divergence in the parties’ positions concerning the Transdnister settlement, the factor of Ukraine’s refusal to join the Federal State of Russia and Belarus. Evidently, in the eyes of both groups of experts, Ukraine’s accession to it looks, to put it mildly, not too realistic. Critical assessments of different approaches to the SES format also remained in the past. (Among Russian experts, the “level of negativism” of that factor fell from 46.8% to 7%.) Few Russian respondents believe that bilateral relations are affected by the proclaimed course of Ukraine’s integration into the EU. Evidently, they proceed from the uncertain prospects of Ukraine’s accession to that organisation.

As noted above, one of the strongest negative factors of bilateral cooperation is presented by conflicts in the gas sector.

Experts sceptically assess outcomes of the “gas conflict” between Ukraine and Russia in January 2009. The majority of respondents in both groups (Ukrainians – 66.7%, Russians – 72%) gave a flat answer – both parties lost. Few polled tend to admit the victory of Ukraine or Russia. Actually nobody believes that both parties won⁶. The opinion of Ukrainian citizens is less certain – roughly equal shares of respondents believe that Russia won (37.2%) or that both parties lost (34%).

2. RELATIONS BETWEEN CITIZENS OF UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

Expert opinions about the attitude of Ukrainians to Russia and Russians to Ukraine substantially differ. The majority of Ukrainian respondents believe that Ukrainians treat Russia positively, are well-disposed to it (59%), while Russians treat Ukraine negatively, critically (71.4%). In the Russian group,

³ Cited hereinafter are the results of nation-wide public opinion polls presented in the article “Ukraine-Russia relations in assessments of Ukraine’s citizens” of this magazine.

⁴ Under “*other reasons*”, experts proposed their ideas, at that, Ukrainian experts more often noted as the reason for deterioration of bilateral relations Ukraine’s drift westward, a critical attitude of Ukraine’s leadership to the Russian Federation. Also mentioned were the absence of a strategy of development of relations with the Russian Federation, civilisational differences of the two countries, unreadiness of the Russian Federation to see Ukraine as an independent state. Russian respondents noted revision of the common history in Ukraine, a critical attitude of the Ukrainian elite to Russia.

⁵ During the 2006 poll, the subject of NATO was formulated as follows: “further deepening of Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO”, in 2009 – “Ukraine’s intention to join NATO”.

⁶ Under “*other*”, Ukrainian experts reported that nobody won, the parties remained on their positions, and the gas confrontation continued, that the third party won (the EU), that a compromise was reached. Russian experts noted ongoing uncertainty, reluctance of the Ukrainian Government to normalise relations, and loss of both Ukraine and Russia.

positive assessments prevail in both cases – respondents most of all tend to believe that both Ukrainians and Russians positively treat each other. Citizens of Ukraine are more reserved in this respect, but still, they more positively assess the attitude of Ukrainians to Russia than of Russians to Ukraine.

Maybe, the most alarming is that according to the majority of Ukrainian and Russian experts, relations between the peoples of the two countries have deteriorated. Such is the opinion of 77.1% of Ukrainian respondents and 54% - of Russian. None of Ukrainians or Russians reported improvement of relations between the peoples. (Noteworthy, the results of sociological surveys conducted in the recent years in Russia show growth of a critical, cautious attitude of Russians to Ukraine⁷).

Beyond doubt, growing confrontation in bilateral relations, exchange of harsh statements, information wars could not but tell on personal relations, opinions of citizens. The negative information background for Ukraine-Russia cooperation is one of the main reasons for deterioration of relations between the peoples of the two countries.

Of interest in this connection are the expert opinions about the information component of bilateral partnership. According to the majority of experts in both groups, the Russian media cover Ukrainian subjects mainly critically or very critically. At that, deterioration of assessments was noted (mainly on the Ukrainian side). No representative of the Ukrainian side has given a positive answer.

Serious differences are reported in assessments of the coverage of Russian problems by the Ukrainian media. The stand of Ukrainian experts little changed and is actually confined to two opinions – “neutral, reserved” (48.6%) and “mainly critical” (32.4%). Meanwhile, the Russian respondents believe that the Ukrainian media cover the Russian developments either critically or very critically (and the number of those polled who chose the answer “very critically” increased from 18.8% to 65%).

In other words, the information background for bilateral cooperation is rather controversial. According to experts, there is a strong deficit of positive media reports in both countries, the media are mainly disposed to critical assessments.

Different answers were given to the question about the prevailing attitude of the Russian state and political elite to the present Ukrainian leadership. In Ukraine, the number of experts terming that attitude as negative, critical, leaped (from 66.1% to 90.5%). In the group of Russian experts, reverse changes took place – while in 2006, the ratio between those convinced of the negative, critical attitude and those who reported it to be “pragmatic, restrained” made 52.5% to 41.6%, in 2009 – 39% to 53%. As we see, assessments of the parties fundamentally differ.

3. UKRAINE’S POLICY IN RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND RUSSIA’S POLICY IN RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE. INFLUENCE OF STATE AND POLITICAL FIGURES

Expert assessments of Ukraine’s policy towards Russia are far from optimistic. The majority of respondents chose negative colours. Some changes occurred in 2009 – on the Ukrainian side, many more experts now term that policy uncertain and controversial, on the Russian, more people are convinced that Ukraine seeks to improve its standing at the expense of the neighbour, or pursues an openly unfriendly policy (the latter opinion is shared by only 7.6% of Ukrainian experts).

Assessing the Russian policy towards Ukraine, experts used mainly critical wording. By contrast to 2006 (when 57.8% of Ukrainian experts described the Russian policy as the desire to improve its standing at the expense of the neighbour), in 2009, 53.4% assessed it as openly unfriendly. Russian experts, as before, mainly tend to call the Russian policy unclear and controversial, but the number of those who termed it “pragmatic, mutually advantageous partnership” substantially increased.

By and large, expert assessments in this issue coincide with the opinion of Ukraine’s citizens who rather critically assess both Ukraine’s policy towards the Russian Federation, and Russia’s policy towards Ukraine.

Experts differently assess the influence of state and political figures in Ukraine and Russia on the development of bilateral relations. The range of assessments is largely illustrative. The sympathies of experts are apparently predetermined by their different motivation. But in this case, some general trends are observed.

According to Ukrainian respondents, in the Ukrainian state and political establishment, the greatest positive influence on the development of bilateral contacts is exerted by K.Hryshchenko (balance of influence: +64.7), V.Lytvyn (+43.8), A.Yatseniuk (+33.3). Russian experts produced another top 3 Ukrainian leaders: V.Lytvyn (+58), P.Symonenko (+48), V.Yanukovych (+44). The influence of V.Yushchenko and Yu.Tymoshenko was assessed the most critically.

Comparison of expert assessments of the influence of Russian state and political figures shows serious differences. According to Ukrainian experts, the Russian state and political elite exerts negative rather than positive influence on the development of bilateral cooperation. Assessed especially critically was the Ukrainian activity of V.Zhirinovskiy and Yu.Luzhkov.

Russian respondents, on the contrary, are convinced in the positive influence of all persons proposed for assessment (except V.Zhirinovskiy). Especially positively they assess the activity of D.Medvedev (+76), S.Lavrov (+70), V.Putin (+56). As we see, the difference in assessments is striking. The Ukrainian expert community is evidently critical to the activity of the Russian elite regarding Ukraine, Russian experts stick to the opposite opinion.

⁷ For more detail see the article “Ukraine-Russia relations in assessments of Ukraine’s citizens”, pp. 72-84 of this magazine.

4. SITUATION IN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA: COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENTS

The picture of expert assessments of the situation in Ukraine and Russia in different sectors gives grounds for the following conclusions.

First. In the period under review, both Ukrainian and Russian respondents steadily more critically assessed the socio-economic situation in Ukraine than in Russia. At that, assessments of both parties have notably deteriorated. By and large, the ratio of negative assessments of the state of Ukraine's national economy by Ukrainian and Russian experts made 81.9% to 91%, of the Russian – 32.4% to 59%. (It should be noted here that in 2009, Russian assessments of the state of their national economy substantially deteriorated, compared to 2006). According to representatives of both groups, the well-being of the Ukrainian population is much lower than in neighbouring Russia.

Second. Representatives of both expert groups more critically assess the home political situation in Ukraine than in Russia. Similarly negative assessments of home political stability in Ukraine were produced by both Ukrainian and Russian experts (78%). Assessments of Russia were also very close (6.7% and 6%). Such expert opinions are attributed to permanent conflicts in the top echelons of power in Ukraine, confrontation between the President and Prime Minister, growing with the presidential elections in sight. Quite expectedly, experts much lower assessed the level of trust in the authorities in Ukraine than in Russia. Such assessments correlate with the opinion of representatives of the expert communities about the international esteem of the countries. Respondents in both groups more critically view Ukraine's image on the international scene.

Third. Experts note that Russia yields to Ukraine in some indicators of democracy development. This primarily refers to the freedom of mass media. The ratio of critical assessments for Ukraine and Russia produced by Ukrainian experts was close to 1:13 (6.7% to 88.6%). Russian experts are less united in their opinions but they, too, gave preference to Ukraine. (It should be noted, however, that in that group, scepticism about the freedom of Ukrainian media sharply increased (from 19.8% to 75%). Meanwhile, both Ukrainian and Russian experts more critically view the situation with protection of civil rights and freedoms in the Russian Federation. The prevailing opinion in both groups of respondents is that the situation in inter-ethnic relations in Russia is worse than in Ukraine. Noteworthy, both Ukrainian and Russian experts more critically assess fighting corruption of the authorities in their country than in the neighbouring state.

Over the period under review, differences in expert assessments of the international image of Ukraine and Russia decreased. While in 2006, both groups mainly positively assessed the image of Ukraine and more cautiously – of Russia; in 2009, critical assessments notably dominate. Probably, one of the reasons is presented by the unfavourable international echo of the “gas war” between Ukraine and Russia, lost, according to the majority of respondents, by both parties. Scepticism especially increased in the assessments of Ukrainian respondents.

5. PROSPECTS AND PRIORITIES OF PARTNERSHIP

The majority of representatives of both expert groups are sure that the forthcoming years will see no fundamental improvement of the relations of Kyiv and Moscow. Both Ukrainian and Russian respondents tend to believe that in the foreseeable future, instability will persist, relations will aggravate regularly. Expert opinions show varied trends. Among Ukrainians, the number of those who predict instability increased (at the expense of straight sceptics), among Russians, the number of experts expecting instability, on the contrary, declined, while the number of those who believe that the relations will deteriorate increased. Of course, the “conservation of instability” noted by experts is unlikely to meet the interests of both countries.

In other words, experts suggest that Ukraine-Russia relations will see hard times. Such pessimistic forecasts are prompted by the deterioration of the atmosphere of cooperation, complication of the bilateral dialogue, absence of serious changes for the better, and non-elaboration of strategic approaches to the development of partnership between Kyiv and Moscow.

Judging by expert assessments, Ukraine has no clear strategy of action in relations with Russia. Experts differently view the existence of such strategy regarding Ukraine in Russia. The absolute majority of Ukrainian respondents are sure that Ukraine has never had such strategy (in 2006, this answer was given by 85.3% of those polled, in 2009 – 90.5%). The opinions of Russian experts notably changed – the number of sceptics decreased from 82.2% to 45%, while the percentage of those who are convinced that the Russian Federation has a strategy of relations with Ukraine increased accordingly – from 15.8% to 38%. Demonstratively however, 17% found it difficult to answer this question.

Those assessments make one note a clear deficit of ideas of the prospects of relations of the two countries, as before, cooperation is managed manually, without detailed calculation of the consequences of today's actions.

Differences in opinions of Ukrainian and Russian experts about the priority factors conducive to rapprochement of the two countries are demonstrative. For Ukrainian experts, the most important factors of rapprochement include: political will of the state leadership, coincidence of economic interests and kinship between residents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. For Russians – common historic past, political will of the state leadership and common borders. Ukrainian respondents are more pragmatic – for them, the political-economic factor is important, while the common history is secondary. Common historic past is the main connecting link for Russians.

Also worth notice, in 2009, compared to 2006, the share of Russian experts viewing external threat and religion (Orthodoxy) as uniting factors substantially increased. For Ukrainian respondents, those factors remained of little importance. For Russian experts, the importance of the common border also notably

increased, with the decrease in the importance of economic interests, kinship between the residents of the two countries, cultural kinship, adherence to democratic values.

The overall picture of assessments of the prospects of rapprochement of the two countries is completed by the expert opinions as to what steps of Ukraine would best meet Russia's interests. Opinions of representatives of both expert groups fully coincided. Both Ukrainian and Russian respondents believe that Russia would be happy with such actions of Ukraine as refusal from the decision to join NATO in the future, extension of the term of Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing in Crimea and transfer of Ukraine's gas transportation system under joint control.

Such rating of national priorities of the Russian Federation in relations with Ukraine is evident and causes no doubts. Russia makes coordinated efforts to bar Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic course, tries to establish control of the gas transportation capacities of the neighbouring country to build up its position of an "energy superpower", and preserve its military presence on the Crimean peninsula. This is the officially declared triad of key interests of the Russian Federation in relations with Ukraine. That is why experts prioritised those hypothetical actions of Ukraine in the Russian interests.

In other words, the thing is that Russia's interest lies in strategic geopolitical concessions of Ukraine, making it a dependent state moving in the wake of the Russian policy.

Noteworthy, against that background, both groups of experts pay little attention to pro-Russian steps of Ukraine for promotion of reintegration processes in the post-Soviet space, previously being an area of conflicts in bilateral relations. Experts are especially cool to the importance for the Russian Federation of Ukraine's deeper involvement in SES, more active participation in the CIS, joining CSTO.

The rather painful "language issue" – the official status for the Russian language – is not a key priority either. Geopolitical control is more important than the humanitarian factor.

Both Ukrainian and Russian experts agree that building relations in line with the European norms, rules and standards is the main line of normalisation of Ukraine-Russia cooperation. Similarly important for Ukrainian respondents is steadfast observance of the principle of non-interference in home affairs of each other (Russians ranked it third). Russian experts consider transparent, mutually advantageous cooperation in the gas sector to be the second most important aspect of

normalisation of cooperation (Ukrainian – third). To be sure, the gas issue is top on the agenda in bilateral cooperation, and its settlement would substantially mitigate tension in the dialogue between Kyiv and Moscow, minimise the threat of "gas wars" in the future.

Noteworthy, the humanitarian factor (mutual guarantee of national cultural needs of Ukrainians in the Russian Federation and Russians in Ukraine) receded into the background in both groups, along with interaction between civil society institutes⁸.

The poll results show that the expert communities of the two countries are dominated by very critical assessments of the present state of Ukraine-Russia relations. Indeed, the bilateral dialogue abounds in problems whose solution has been frozen because of fundamental differences in the parties' positions. Bilateral relations are affected by the Euro-Atlantic course of official Kyiv, acute problems of cooperation in the gas sector. The level and nature of contacts of the state and political elites are far from optimal. By and large, Ukraine's policy towards Russia and Russia's – towards Ukraine leave much to be desired.

Respondent assessments give grounds to speak of a systemic crisis in relations that will hardly be removed soon. In the foreseeable future, experts predict maintenance of instability, periodical aggravation of relations.


Conflicts in bilateral relations affect the information background for cooperation. According to experts, mass media of both countries operate mainly in a critical mode, covering developments in the neighbouring country. This creates a generally unfavourable information background, as a result, relations between the peoples of Ukraine and Russia are deteriorating. This is a very alarming signal of experts that should be heard by the leaders of both countries.

Representatives of expert communities of the two countries very differently assess the character and specificity of partnership, the problems of cooperation. However, the overall assessments of factors of rapprochement of the two countries reveal a substantial potential for rapprochement of Kyiv and Moscow that should be utmost used for normalisation and development of partner ties.

Experts agree that establishment of mutually advantageous, transparent, partner relations in different sectors of cooperation, without confrontation and conflicts, on the basis of the European norms, rules and standards meets interests of both countries.

⁸ Under "other lines", Ukrainian experts, proposing their ideas, noted among important lines of normalisation of cooperation: joint anti-crisis activities, voluntary and timely withdrawal of Russia's Black Sea Fleet from Ukraine, an official status for the Russian language. Normalisation of relations is also associated with the change of Ukraine's leadership. Russians noted development of trade, change of the model of state development "resting on confrontation with Russia".

Assesment of the present situation of Ukraine-Russia relations.
% of polled experts




Main reasons and factors for the deterioration of Ukraine-Russia relations*.
% of polled experts



* Experts were asked to mark no more than two answers.

Factors exerting negative influence on Ukraine-Russia bilateral relations*.
% of polled experts



* On the scale from "1" to "5", where "1" – the factor has no negative influence and "5" – maximum negative influence. The diagram presents only answers "4" and "5". This diagram does not reflect answers "refuse to say" and "hard to say"

What is the attitude of Ukrainians to Russia, and Russians to Ukraine?
% of polled experts




Assessment of results of "gas conflict" between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009,
% of polled experts



How did the relations between peoples of Ukraine and Russia change?
% of polled experts



What is the prevalent attitude of the Russian state and the political elite to the present Ukrainian authorities?
% of polled experts



Assessment of policy of Russia towards Ukraine,
% of polled experts



Assessment of policy of Ukraine towards Russia,
% of polled experts




The way Russian mass media covers Ukrainian issues?
% of polled experts




The way Ukrainian mass media covers Russian issues?
% of polled experts




Influence of Ukrainian state and political figures on the development of Ukraine-Russia relations, % of polled experts



Influence of Russian state and political figures on the development of Ukraine-Russia relations, % of polled experts



The negative assessments of the state of the following domains of Ukraine*, % of polled experts



* On the scale from "1" to "5", where "5" – excellent, "1" – very bad. Diagram shows the sum of "1" and "2" answers. The diagram does not reflect answer "hard to say".

The negative assessments of the state of the following domains of Russia*, % of polled experts



* On the scale from "1" to "5", where "5" – excellent, "1" – very bad. Diagram shows the sum of "1" and "2" answers. The diagram does not reflect answer "hard to say".

How do you assess the international image of Ukraine? % of polled experts



How do you assess the international image of Russia? % of polled experts




Assessment of relationships development prospects between Ukraine and Russia in the nearest future,
% of polled experts




Does Ukraine have a clear strategy of action with respect to the Russian Federation?

Does the Russian Federation have a clear strategy of action with respect to Ukraine?




Priority factors of rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia?*
% of polled experts



* Experts were asked to mark no more than three options.

What Ukraine's steps would best meet Russian interests?*
% polled experts



* Experts were asked to mark no more than three options.

What, proceeding from the current situation, lines of normalisation of Ukraine-Russia cooperation are the most prospective?*
% of polled experts



* Experts were asked to mark no more than three options.