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**The Razumkov Centre  
Arseniy Yatsenyuk Foundation Open Ukraine  
Centre for International and European Studies  
at Kadir Has University**

# **ENHANCING SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION AND PROSPECTS FOR THE TURKISH-UKRAINIAN COOPERATION**

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The publication contains the key speeches delivered by the participants at the Conference on 'Enhancing Security in the Black Sea Region and Prospects for the Turkish – Ukrainian Cooperation', which was held on 13 May 2011, in Istanbul. It also contains the articles written by the Ukrainian and Turkish experts.

The book is aimed at: evaluating the complex processes, which occur in the Black Sea region; analyzing interests of the key regional and global players, which intersect in the region; highlighting the current state of the Ukrainian-Turkish relations; and developing prognosis on the prospect of partnership between Kyiv and Ankara.

The publication will be useful for parliamentarians, governmental officials, journalists, independent experts, students of international relations, and everyone interested in developments in the Black Sea region and the Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation.

Reprinted or used materials must refer to the publication.

The opinions expressed in the publication do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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CONTENTS

**ENHANCING SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION AND PROSPECTS  
FOR THE TURKISH - UKRAINIAN COOPERATION**

**FOREWORD**

UKRAINE – TURKEY: EXPERT DIALOGUE . . . . . 96

**CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS**

UNITING EFFORTS IN THE REGION

*Mustafa Aydın* . . . . . 101

THE UKRAINIAN-TURKISH PARTNERSHIP: GOALS AND PROSPECTS

*Valeriy Chalyi*. . . . . 104

TODAY AND TOMORROW OF THE BLACK SEA REGION

*Dimitrios Triantaphyllou* . . . . . 107

CREATING EFFECTIVE FORMS OF COOPERATION TO RESOLVE REGIONAL CONFLICTS

*Oleh Shamshur* . . . . . 113

ENERGY COMPONENT OF THE BLACK SEA REGION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

*Mykhailo Honchar*. . . . . 117

THERE ARE AMPLE GROUNDS TO FURTHER THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN UKRAINE AND TURKEY IN THE FUTURE

*Mitat Çelikpala* . . . . . 123

THE UKRAINIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

*Maryna Vorotnyuk*. . . . . 127

SHARED ASPECTS OF TURKEY AND UKRAINE IN RELATIONS WITH THE EU

*Sinem Akgul Acikmese* . . . . . 131

UKRAINE AND TURKEY: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS THE INTERNAL MODERNIZATION TOOL

*Oleksandr Chalyi*. . . . . 135

**ARTICLES**

THE UKRAINIAN-TURKISH PARTNERSHIP:  
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

*The Razumkov Centre*. . . . . 139

THE COMMISSION OF THE BLACK SEA: A 2020 VISION FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION

*Mustafa Aydın, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou*. . . . . 157

THE WAY FORWARD FOR TURKEY AND THE EU: A STRATEGIC  
DIALOGUE ON FOREIGN POLICY

*Heather Grabbe, Sinan Ülgen*. . . . . 166

**APPENDIX**

COUNTRIES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION: GLOBAL PEACE INDEX . . . . . 176

## UKRAINE – TURKEY: EXPERT DIALOGUE

On 13 May 2011, in Istanbul, the Centre for European and International Studies (CEIS) at the Kadir Has University and the Razumkov Centre, with the support of Arseniy Yatsenyuk Foundation Open Ukraine and the German Marshall Fund, held the international conference on **“Enhancing Security in the Black Sea Region and Prospects for Turkish-Ukrainian Cooperation”**<sup>1</sup>.

The event was attended by experts and academics from Turkey and Ukraine and the representatives of international organizations. The Ukrainian side was represented by Oleksandr Chalyi and Oleh Shamshur (Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine), Andriy Shevchenko (MP), Maryna Vorotnyuk (Senior Research Fellow of the regional branch of the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Odessa), Mykhailo Honchar (Director of Energy Programs of the Nomos Center), Oleksandr Dombrowskyi (Director of the Institute for Global Transformation), Valeriy Chalyi (Deputy Director General of the Razumkov Centre). The Turkish side was represented by academics of the Kadir Has University – Mustafa Aydin, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Sinem Akgul Acikmese and Mitat Çelikpala, members of other Turkish research institutions and representatives of PABSEC.

The conference saw discussions on the following issues: the approaches towards enhancing security and stability in the Black Sea region; the prospects for Ukrainian-Turkish partnership; the process of European integration of both states; the potential development of the Ukrainian-Turkish relations and the region per se.

The participants emphasized the geo-political and geo-economic importance of the Black Sea region as a sphere of influence for global and regional players, and a new strategic frontier, located at the crossroads of several major transport routes (including energy routs) connecting Europe and Asia.

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<sup>1</sup> The idea of establishing the Ukrainian-Turkish expert dialogue occurred in November 2010 during the meeting of Valeriy Chalyi, the Deputy Director General of the Razumkov Centre and Mustafa Aydin, the Rector of Kadir Has University (Istanbul) in Kyiv. Arseniy Yatsenyuk Foundation Open Ukraine joined the project. The project is up to date due to the intensification of partnership between Kyiv and Ankara, with the parties seeking to bring the bilateral cooperation on a strategic level. On the other hand, due to complex, contradictory processes in the Black Sea region, where Ukraine and Turkey play an important role. We hope that the international conference in Istanbul will be the start of a long-term productive cooperation between the Ukrainian and Turkish research institutions.

It is hard to disagree with the participants' opinion that the Black Sea region does not represent a geopolitical entity, but rather a “hub” of competing and conflicting interests, an arena for confrontation between macro-regional entities. **The region's structure is very diverse in terms of economic growth, systems of governance, human development index, and geopolitical interests of the states comprising the region. The struggle for resources, investments and leadership is growing. ‘Frozen’ conflicts and unresolved territorial issues make the situation even more complicated.**

The overall picture of the region is outlined in the analytical articles in this publication. **The authors have outlined ways and mechanisms on how to ensure sustainable development and to enhance regional stability,** which include the following points:

- a) introducing a sustainable development model as the basis for regional cooperation in the Black Sea region; implementing mechanisms to improve business environment and to enhance economic activity; promoting entrepreneurship by removing various barriers that hinder trade and economic relations;
- b) intensifying dialogue on security and confidence-building measures;
- c) modernizing the existing regional structures of cooperation (primarily, the BSEC); ensuring the promotion and coordination of regional cooperation at all levels;
- d) promoting intercultural and interconfessional dialogue;
- e) increasing the role of civil society in decision-making process in the region<sup>2</sup>.

**Obviously, the regional countries are interested in stability, energy security, and sustainable development of the Black Sea region. In this context, the uniting factors are cooperation in non-confrontational areas, “desecuritization” of the Black Sea area, confidence-building measures, and modernization of the existing mechanisms for cooperation.**

Particular attention was given to presentations by the Turkish counterparts, which discussed Turkey using economic ties to strengthen relations with countries in the region; introducing “soft power” approach and “zero problems with neighbours” policy; and putting forward pragmatic initiatives on security cooperation.

Today Ankara is trying to act as a security mediator, not only in the region, but also on a wider scale – from the Balkans to the Middle East. Turkey has demonstrated an effective socioeconomic development, strengthened domestic market and is actively attracting foreign investments (in 2010 Turkey's GDP growth was 8.7% – almost double of the global rate – 3.9%<sup>3</sup>). By combining the Islamic and European traditions, it coordinates a balanced and efficient foreign policy.

<sup>2</sup> See the article by Mustafa Aydin and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou “The Black Sea Commission: Prospect of the Black Sea Region Development by 2020” in this publication.

<sup>3</sup> For reference: in 2010, economic growth in the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development was 2.7%, in the euro-zone countries – 1.7%. See: V. Sved. Reflections on Some Results of the Official Visit of Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Ukraine – <http://islam.com.ua/articles/actuality/analytic/652/>

Successful development of Turkey, based on effective use of trade relations and good governance, could serve as a model for many Arab countries. Another attractive element is the experience of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which gave the country the world-famous statesmen such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Ahmet Davutoğlu<sup>4</sup>.

As a result, there are obvious reasons for Ukraine to develop relations with Turkey. Therefore, the Ukrainian-Turkish partnership has been central to the conference agenda. The participants stressed a non-conflictual history of the Ukrainian-Turkish relations, with a recent intensification of contacts between the countries.

The strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey was actively discussed at the conference. In particular, it was mentioned that Ukraine has ill-founded declarations of strategic partnership with many countries. At the same time, it was emphasized, that the Turkish side is rather cautious towards this formula of relations with Ukraine. **However, the conference participants agreed that countries have a significant potential for bringing the relationship between Ankara and Kyiv on a level of strategic partnership in the long term.**

**When discussing the current state and prospects for the Ukrainian-Turkish relations, the participants focused on the following areas and issues:**

**1. The development of trade relations and economic cooperation.** Obviously, the Ukrainian market is attractive for Turkish businesses. However, Turkish investment, and joint long-term projects (in energy sector, transport, coal industry, military-industrial complex, aerospace industry etc.) are of a great interest for the Ukrainian side. In addition, the creation of a free trade area (FTA) with Turkey, in future, will enable Ukraine to join a wider free trade zone, which also includes Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, the doors to the markets of the Middle East might be opened. However, it is clear that FTA with Turkey is largely dependent on progress in negotiations on FTA between Ukraine and the EU – given the fact that Turkey is a member of the Customs Union with the EU.

A perspective of joint large-scale transportation projects also seems to be attractive. In particular, Ukraine is interested in Turkey to join the Ukrainian-Belarusian-Lithuanian project on building a railway route for a container train “Viking”. The Turkish side put forward the idea to create a transport corridor “Ukraine, Turkey and Egypt” as well as the second corridor – from the Baltic coast to the Red Sea.

**2. Visa regime.** The participants stressed that both countries should work together in dealing with the issue of liberalization of visa regime<sup>5</sup>. Obviously, the asymmetry

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> In particular, visa fees for short-term trips, which the Ukrainians pay when crossing the border with Turkey, are going to be cancelled. Thus, the short-term stay in the Turkish territory is reduced from 90 to 60 days. At the same time, Ukraine will have to introduce a similar scheme for Turkish citizens. – See: S. Sydorenko. Friendship for Years and Billions. – Kommersant, January 26, 2011 – <http://www.kommersant.ua/doc.html?docId=1573883>

of visa regime (i.e. visa restrictions on the Ukrainian side) creates certain problems for the development of humanitarian links and business contacts etc. However, the introduction of a visa-free regime between the two states largely depends, *firstly*, on the progress with the Action Plan on visa-free regime between Ukraine and the EU, and *secondly*, it is necessary to create a single readmission space between Ukraine, the EU and Turkey. (This refers to progress on the readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey that Ukraine also insists on)<sup>6</sup>. Thus, considering the difficulties in visa dialogue between Ukraine and the EU and problems in negotiations on the readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU, it is quite difficult to predict a clear progress in liberalization of visa regime between Ukraine and Turkey.

**3. Resolution of “frozen conflicts”.** According to experts, it is necessary to strengthen the Ukrainian-Turkish cooperation on resolving “frozen conflicts” in the region and to prevent further militarization of the Black Sea area. Active conflicts (such as the issue of Kurdistan in Turkey and Iraq) and four “frozen conflicts” (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh) complicate the security situation in the region. Today, there is a certain balance of forces with regards to conflict resolution efforts in the region. The *status quo* is maintained. However, if the situation remains the same, it will continue to threaten security and stability in the region. Evidently, there is a need to develop new approaches and joint mechanisms on how to resolve the regional conflicts. Ukraine’s OSCE Presidency in 2013 provides a good opportunity for that.

**Militarization represents a dangerous trend in the region**, which is encouraged by the following factors:

- a) worsened situation around the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh;
- b) unresolved territorial disputes over the Caspian Sea and an increasing combat potential of the Russian and the Azerbaijan Navies;
- c) the issue of NATO’s expansion to the East;
- d) worsened security situation in the North Caucasus;
- e) Russia’s attempts to raise the combat potential of the Black Sea Fleet<sup>7</sup>.

**4. The humanitarian cooperation.** A poor level of cooperation in the humanitarian sphere was underlined. The experts drew attention to the fact that citizens of both countries know very little about each other’s history and culture. Relations between the states are undermined by some outdated stereotypes. The Turkish mass media does not pay special attention to Ukraine and the news on Ukraine are sporadic and superficial. The Ukrainian media also rarely reports on Turkey. Contacts between the Ukrainian and Turkish expert communities are insufficient. The participants of the

<sup>6</sup> Readmission Agreement between Ukraine and Turkey came into force in 2006.

<sup>7</sup> See in detail: Crimea, Ukraine, the Black Sea Region: Security and Development. Analytical Report of the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2011, No.4-5, p.15.

conference emphasized the need to launch joint research projects and to prepare joint publications on issues in the Ukrainian-Turkish relations.

**5. European integration.** During discussion on the European integration, the experts focused on some shared elements in the EU integration process, such as similar issues in visa dialogue with the EU and the EU involvement in resolving border disputes (i.e. Turkey-Greece, Ukraine-Moldova). It was also emphasized that for Ukraine, which is at final stage of negotiations on the FTA with the EU, it might be important to consider the Turkish experience of membership in the EU's Customs Union (since 1995).

The difficulties and problems in negotiation process of Turkey and Ukraine with the EU, which today have no clear membership perspective, were mentioned. However, there was an opinion that **for Turkey, as well as for Ukraine, European integration is important not as a way of joining the EU, but more as a tool for internal modernization.** Some participants stressed that the EU, itself, has been acting as a driver for socioeconomic and political reforms in both countries.

The experts emphasized that the EU, when talking on the 'Europeanness' of the two states, takes into account the importance of developing relations with Ankara and Kyiv. This is due to their strategic position, their role as energy transit states, their significant economic potential, and strong economic ties with the EU etc.

All the abovementioned aspects create favourable conditions for Turkey and Ukraine to coordinate their actions in relations with the EU, and for productive cooperation in various fields in the format of "EU-Turkey-Ukraine" triangle.

**Therefore, when taking into account the potential in relations between Turkey and Ukraine, it is reasonable to say that both countries play a key role in the EU strategy towards the Black Sea.**

**The conference showed that the Ukrainian-Turkish partnership has a strong potential for development. The countries can further cooperation in trade, energy, transport and security issues. The common position of Ukraine and Turkey may influence the development of a new security system in the region. It is necessary to unite efforts in rethinking the content of regional cooperation and to push for creation of a zone of security, stability and sustainable development in the Black Sea region.**



## CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

# UNITING EFFORTS IN THE REGION



**Mustafa Aydın,**  
*Rector of Kadir Has University  
(Istanbul)*

This conference is a joint initiative by the Kadir Has University and the Razumkov Centre, with support of the Open Ukraine Foundation. We very much hope that this cooperation between the Ukrainian and Turkish research institutions will continue and flourish in future. I am very grateful to the Razumkov Centre for the idea to organize today's meeting. In fact, we are already discussing what we can do after the conference: joint publications, reports. So, I believe, today is only the beginning of a very fruitful cooperation between our institutions of Turkey and Ukraine.

I would like to highlight certain aspects of security situation in the Black Sea region. In my opinion, it is passing through a period of inactivity. This is not necessarily a bad thing in the Black Sea context, as we have just come through a very intense period, during which, many actors – including the United States, the European Union, Russia, Turkey, Romania and many others – were all vying for influence in the region. Unfortunately, this did not do much to improve the security situation in the region.

Ukraine remained outside of the discussion most of the time, which is both strange and fortunate. It was strange, because Ukraine is one of the largest countries of the region, which could have an impact on regional politics. It was also fortunate, because Ukraine did not become involved in all the competition and discussions, which, during those years, went nowhere.

Today we see a kind of moratorium on the Black Sea. This is visible in the decreasing number of academic and non-academic meetings concerning the Black Sea region. Nevertheless, the interest is still there, as the region has become one of the focal areas in world politics since the end of the Cold War.

The Turkish-Ukrainian relations are also an important in this context. In the early 1990s, I was one of the first Turkish academics to be involved in discussions with the Ukrainian counterparts on shaping and improving the relations between the two countries. Back then, both countries were talking about ensuring free and continuing access to and connection through the Black Sea. Unfortunately, that focus of the early 1990s was not sustained for various reasons.

Still, Turkey and Ukraine can have an influence in the region, provided they combine their forces and align their policies. The moment for that has not passed yet. It is still possible to discuss future cooperation, and recently both countries have shown an interest in upgrading their bilateral relations. Right now, they are talking about a possible strategic partnership, about joint cabinet meetings, etc.

It has been 20 years since the Soviet Union collapsed, making today the perfect moment to reflect on what happened in those 20 years, and to assess the future with the insight of that period. So, today is the right moment for our discussion.

Therefore, I consider this meeting to be the first step of a long-term collaboration. People are used to think that the first steps are the hardest to make. But my experience has proven that the first steps are always the easiest. What is truly difficult to make – is to continue with even better projects. I have seen so many first regional initiatives, especially in the Black Sea area. However, the most important is how to follow these first steps? How to build on? And what can be done to enlarge the cooperation?

I have always believed that the Ukrainian-Turkish relationship should be one of the main pillars in the Black Sea politics, in general. I work on security and strategy issues, and from my strategic perspective, when I look at the map of the Black Sea, I see that Turkey and Ukraine should be definitely cooperating much more actively than they are doing at the moment. They should really be strategic partners.

When I look at Turkey and Ukraine and their strategic interests, I do not see any, single contradiction in them. In fact, they are quite complimentary. Therefore, these two countries should be working together to further their own national interests, and I believe, together they can create the necessary weight and balance in and around the Black Sea.

Unfortunately, the interests of both countries in the Black Sea have been marked with ups and downs. Ukraine had chosen to stay away from the Black Sea politics.

Turkey's interest towards the Black Sea region, when you take a closer look, has also shown its ups and downs. In the early 1990s was the peak; then – the decline. Towards the end of 1990s, there was another peak. Now, the interest has declined once again. There are no sustained efforts.

If you look at the history of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which has existed for more than two decades now, you would see that one of the biggest problems of this cooperation has also been its sustainability. We had so many first steps in the Black Sea region; so many organizations had been established. But it is difficult to say that the interests of the members have been taken into account. I believe, this is a major drawback.

How do we get our governments to focus on this region continuously? Otherwise, it will be just at the whims of politicians – they show an interest only when they want to.

Thus, these are the areas, I think, we should be focusing on in our publications and at following meetings, so that we could develop an efficient strategy for the Black Sea region.



## THE UKRAINIAN-TURKISH PARTNERSHIP: GOALS AND PROSPECTS



**Valeriy Chalyi,**  
*The Razumkov Centre*

On behalf of the Ukrainian side, I want to thank for the hospitality at the conference “Enhancing Security in the Black Sea Region and Prospects for the Turkish-Ukrainian Cooperation”. I am sure, the both sides are interested in this event, aimed at strengthening the partnership between the Ukrainian and Turkish think tanks. On the other hand, the conference is of particular relevance, given the new stage in Ukrainian-Turkish relations.

We regard this conference as a part of broader regional cooperation process and will try to formulate some recommendations to our governments on the development of cooperation between our countries and the formation of efficient cooperation mechanisms.

**Obviously, it is important not only to analyze the situation in the Black Sea region, to verify our approaches and views on the events that take place there, but also to evaluate the challenges, achievements and prospects of the Ukrainian-Turkish partnership, to define the roles of our countries as regional players. Nowadays we see the increasing role of Turkey in the region.**

**The changes in the strategic concepts of both countries, the formation of a new strategic vision of regional processes by Ankara and Kyiv can be noticed, including – the evident “desecuritization” of foreign policy, that is the focus on the non-military factors: economics, politics, humanitarian sphere and others. Both sides put forward the initiative to develop the strategic partnership. Therefore, we**

need to clearly understand the meaning, nature and prospects of this partnership, to figure out how we can cooperate at the bilateral and multilateral levels, when taking into account the interests of such important regional players as Russia and the EU.

Discussing the med-term strategy for Turkey and Ukraine in the context of the Black Sea region, we see that “a new game” has begun. The situation in Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan is unstable. And this zone of instability is located not far from our borders.

**For Ukraine, the fact that it is still “between Russia and Europe” is the pressing problem.** Obviously, Ukraine can achieve the goal of becoming a powerful regional state within the international political economic organisations. In Europe, the EU is, of course, such a leading organisation. Thus, the development of relations with Brussels is the only way to maintain the sovereignty and to enhance the regional influence of our country.

**Speaking about Ukraine’s place in the region two things should be kept in mind.** *Firstly*, it is the proclamation of Ukraine’s non-aligned status, which radically changes its approach towards strengthening its national security as well as regional stability, in general. *Secondly*, today the militarization of the Black Sea region takes place. The Russian-Georgian conflict proved it beyond any doubt. For the moment, Moscow plans to update and improve the combat potential of the Black Sea Fleet, and this process is to take place in the next years. It is obvious that militarization does not move us closer to security and stability – on the contrary, it adds to uncertainty and tension in the region.

**Regarding Ukrainian-Turkish relations. Both countries should work together to solve problems that unite them, particularly focusing on trade, visa liberalisation, free trade area, expanding cooperation in resolving “frozen conflicts” in the region.**

**Firstly.** I consider trade to be the most important factor in Ukrainian-Turkish relations – both Ankara and Kyiv are interested in increasing the volumes of bilateral trade (currently, Turkey is the second largest trade partner of Ukraine). At the same time, Turkish experience of tax reform, reforms in health care system and social sphere would be useful for Ukraine as well.

Obviously, trade relations are significantly important in the debate on the strategic partnership between the countries. Several years ago, the Razumkov Centre analysed the meaning of Ukraine’s strategic partnerships with other countries and concluded that only Russia, the EU and the USA can be such partners. Of course, the situation is changing rapidly, but it is clear that certain steps and achievements in relations Ankara are much more important for Kyiv, than declarations on the strategic partnership. On the Ukrainian-Turkish cooperation agenda, it is much more important to achieve certain objectives.

Historically, Ukraine and Turkey have good relations. There is a sufficient basis for further cooperation. First of all, it involves creation of a free trade area (FTA) between our countries. Of course, Ukraine is trying to protect its economic interests in negotiations on the FTA with the EU and Turkey, but these processes must come to a logical and successful end.

**Secondly.** Liberalisation of visa regime is a very sensitive issue for Ukraine. At the moment, Kyiv is rather holding back. This is an alarming trend that creates obstacles in establishing important contacts, including the business ones. If Ukraine is trying to get visa-free regime with the EU, it has to offer the same to its partners, such as Turkey. Finally, the Ukrainian side should be prepared to compromise.

**Thirdly.** Ukraine and Turkey should intensify its efforts in settling the “frozen conflicts” in the Black Sea region. The OSCE Presidency of Ukraine in 2013 provides it with an opportunity to play a more constructive role, particularly in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

I shall remind you about another important aspect of cooperation. Kyiv and Ankara should unite their efforts in strengthening the efficiency of the regional cooperation structures. This is consistent with the interests of the two countries and with the objective of ‘Europeanization’ of the region, as a whole.

Our countries must strive to achieve the ‘Europeanization’ of economic relations as well. This includes the harmonisation of national legislation with the European regulations and standards. It is essential for us, since both Ukraine and Turkey are moving towards the EU accession.

The EU membership is a distant prospect for both countries, but negotiations continue, and the internal processes of Europeanization should not be hampered.

**Turkey and Ukraine are the regional states. Ukraine also has the potential to play an influential role in the Black Sea region, to be an object rather than a subject of the regional policy. To achieve this, it is necessary to rethink the content of regional cooperation and to combine our efforts with Ankara. Both countries can gain a lot by working together.**



## TODAY AND TOMORROW OF THE BLACK SEA REGION



***Dimitrios Triantaphyllou***  
*Director of the Center  
for International  
and European Studies  
at Kadir Has University  
(Istanbul)*

What I would like to concentrate on are not only Turkey-Ukraine relations. I will mainly focus on the current situation in the Black Sea Region and then talk about the approaches towards strengthening security in the Black Sea region.

These days there is a waning interest in general on the Black Sea Region. This is especially troubling for a variety of reasons. Obviously, the region is in flux. However, it is in flux, in part because it depends on the interests of various actors.

For the EU, the Black Sea region encompasses 10 countries; for the BSEC it consists of 12 member states while for the United States (especially during the eight-year long Bush Administration) the emphasis was on a much wider region, including parts of the Middle East and North Africa. This has created some kind of confusion as to what sort of region to focus on. Is the whether the region is a bridge, a buffer, or an outpost?

Thus, since the end of the Cold War, the role of the Black Sea region is still undefined, although we have had some attempts of regionalism by the indigenous states and actors in the region.

One of such effort was the creation of BSEC in 1992. The BSEC is still the only organization to include all the regional states. Its “inclusive” character, on the other hand, causes certain operational difficulties in terms of creating regionalism.

However, this move towards regionalism, led by Turkey and Russia, as well as other regional states seems to have, for a variety of reasons, been redefined.

This indigenous regionalism, developed with the creation of the BSEC, is now being influenced by the EU, which, in the post-cold war environment, tried to come up with regional approaches in its neighbourhood.

We saw this with the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, starting in 1995 in the Mediterranean area; with the Northern Dimension, in 1999, in the Baltic Sea region; and now the EU has attempted to become an actor in the Black Sea Region with the launching of the Black Sea Synergy in 2008.

However, the global economic crisis forced the EU to pull back and concentrate primarily on its myriad of domestic concerns.

At the same time, the world has been changing and powers such as Russia, China, and Turkey have been emerging in a global context with interests and positions that do not necessarily take into account the interests of the EU.

In addition to the new rising powers, and as a result of the policies of the Bush Administration, there is also a split in the Western world. The ‘West’ now comprises the United States and the EU, with the latter trying to define itself in more autonomous terms from the former, and its democracy promotion strategy in the Black Sea Region (Democracy promotion was a key component of the “color revolutions” in such countries as Ukraine and Georgia).

The EU, on the other hand, has always focused on promoting the virtues of ‘good governance’, which, is a much more subtle, nonpolitical term. However democracy promotion came about because, at that time, the objective was to fight the rising influence of Russia and to show Russia that ‘liberty’ as well as other Western values are reaching its frontiers.

After the change in its administration in 2008, the US stopped focusing on ‘democracy promotion’, and started to think strategically in a global context, primarily, about its own position in the world vis-à-vis the emerging powers.

**The EU has to rethink its policy.** The attempt to differentiate itself from the US made sense during the Bush era, but not today, when the EU is inward looking. One of the issues the EU has not yet considered at this stage – and it is not even debating it – is how to remodel its role, to strengthen its position in Europe and across the global in tandem with the US.

The EU had pulled away from the US because of the latter’s ‘adventurous’ foreign policy, and its democracy promotion initiatives, by trying to promote itself as a ‘soft power’ with its neighbourhood policies in the East and the South. However, in geopolitical terms, the EU still has not developed a vision of itself in the changing world, as to how it views the world and, in particular, how it views its neighbouring regions and the Black Sea region, in particular. Is its, thus, in the interest of the EU to stand on its own in the region, while regional powers (like Russia, Turkey, and not that distant China) are rising, or should it reconsider its relationship with Washington?

**The problem of the EU is that**, as long as it does not have a strategic blueprint, as long as it does not become more assertive in pursuing its own interests, **it leaves the region open to geopolitical rivalry between Russia, Turkey, China, and probably others.**

Consequently, the EU is perceived as being unable to achieve what it is trying to promote: its values and norms, its soft power, good governance, etc. As a result many of the ‘soft power’ cooperative approaches cannot be supported or are difficult to implement.

**Over time the discussion has developed over the issue of securitization.** Even in the context of energy relations, security/securitization plays a role. For Russia, it means bypassing current transit states and building new pipelines and ties with other states; while for the EU it means greater market access and liberalization. Therefore, there is insecurity in the energy sector related to prices, supply and demand.

**Securitization, rather than Europeanization, has become the norm.** This is interesting, because it is also linked to EU-Russia and EU-Turkey relations, since in both cases the emphasis has on the part of the European Union has been the Europeanization of Russia and Turkey respectively. This policy is still in place today. However, one could question whether the policy of Europeanization should remain at the top of the EU’s agenda as both Russia and Turkey have been gaining influence in the world?

Interestingly enough, the crux of the EU-Ukrainian relationship has also been about Europeanization, but in the Ukrainian case, it has been somewhat easier to promote (up to a point), because the Ukrainian elite and the supporters of the Orange Revolution opted for it as well.

However, the desired Europeanization did not happen, firstly, due to the global financial crisis, and secondly, because the EU got tired of the internal struggle within the Orange coalition. Yanukovich’s victory, in February 2010, coincided with an increasingly inward-looking EU. As a result, the lack of interest on the part of the EU and resources regarding Ukraine’s Europeanization process could be perceived as if the EU is turning its back to the values it has been promoting.

The smaller countries of the region have also been affected by the Europeanization debate. Although even in Ukraine, where the elite had easily accepted Europeanization, the securitization of relations is in evidence. This is thus a cause for concern.

The bad news continues. In summer 2010, the EU launched its ENP review process (as to whether the ENP needs to be reformed and how). This process was reasonable at the time, since the ENP was already in existence for 6 years.

Unfortunately with the outbreak of the Arab Spring in late 2010/early 2011, the evaluation of the ENP coincided and was influenced by the events in the South. As a result, within the European Union, an “us vs. them” debate has taken hold.

As a result, countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and even Poland are concerned since they have taken the lead in promoting cooperation and integration within the framework of ENP and especially the Eastern partnership towards their Eastern Neighbors. They are very worried that the Arab revolutions will make the EU divert more funds, attention, and instruments to the South.

In a 16 February 2011 non-paper by the foreign ministers of France, Spain, Slovenia, Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Malta, an appeal was made for more EU funding toward the Southern Neighborhood. The argument is that on a yearly per capita basis, EU funding accounts to €1.80 for every Egyptian, €7 for every Moroccan and €25 for every Moldovan, even though over 65% of its total funds go to the South.

This argument by the Mediterranean EU countries is very relevant as to how the EU will develop its strategy towards the Black Sea Region, given the fact that in 2014 a new seven year budget cycle takes hold.

While the EU is appraising the ENP, it is also attempting to fine-tune its foreign policy instruments by making use of the means provided in the Lisbon Treaty, which has been implemented since December 2009. But here too, many EU member states are questioning whether it actually functions properly. The current priority debate within the EU is more about the Union having a fiscal policy to support monetary union as opposed to an effective foreign policy. As a result, the 'us versus them' debate has become the norm.

On the other hand, the EU, through its policies, has been promoting greater civil society involvement, and creating the proper frameworks for institution building and good governance.

However, with its waning interest in the region, its ability to propel and influence reform, and all the good things it stands for, will wane as no other stakeholder has the ability, influence and will to democratize the region and liberalize its economies. A cursory look at the recommendations published by the Commission on the Black Sea in early 2010 would suggest that none could be implemented successfully without the involvement and guidance of the European Union.

For example, the enhancement of the profile of regionalism in the Black Sea cannot be achieved without the EU as the states promoting regionalism in the early 1990s are reconsidering their support for regional approaches as their power, role, and influence has grown. The EU, which came late into the regional game, seems to have forgotten that it is the only stakeholder that can generate change.

In 2008, the Black Sea Synergy was launched in Kiev with much fanfare, today, however, only 'one and a half' Commission officials work with this regional cooperation initiative, as opposed to the team of officials dealing with the Eastern Partnership.

There are elements of the Eastern Partnership that have been successful, especially its impact it on civil society, however when it comes to some partner-states (i.e.

Belarus), the involvement of civil society remains a challenge. Therefore, the policy is not as cohesive as it should be. This requires the EU leverage to promote the basic element of its 'soft power'-- the ongoing process of Europeanization.

However, the EU is too involved with its own set of domestic problems. One of the leading states to promote the EU foreign policy in the East was Germany. The Black Sea Synergy was a major initiative of the German EU Presidency in 2007. Today, Germany no longer plays such an active role, because of its emphasis on EU domestic politics.

**When addressing the issues of strengthening stability and security, a major element that has been missing is the mechanism for conflict resolution.** One of the problems in the Black Sea Region is conflict amongst the regional players. Many think that there should be an immediate correlation between the regional cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms (especially in the energy sphere).

There is another debate within the EU: it set up the structure for the European External Action Service (EEAS), it abolished the special representatives, because the logic is to strengthen the EU missions on the ground. However, if the EEAS does not soon start operating to its full potential, the experience acquired by the special representatives will be lost thereby creating problems, when it comes to building stability and security in the region.

**Another concern has to do with the BSEC and its top down decision-making structure and mechanism.** Civil society initiatives within the BSEC framework are usually unsuccessful because some member states (Russia, in particular) are concerned about losing control.

The EU is the only element, the only stakeholder that has the ability to influence these processes. However, it is either not interested, not involved or lacks a single position. This has an impact on cooperation at all levels.

And the cooperation at all levels is necessary. For instance, overall regional economic growth between 2000 to the 3rd quarter of 2008 averaged 6% per annum, which is equal to a cumulative real expansion of 68% for the period. Although this growth has been unbalanced and uneven; it implies that there has been prosperity, in the region as a whole, and, as the theory goes, prosperity tends to minimize conflict (albeit, the war between Russia and Georgia, and an increasing concern as to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and, maybe, other conflict zones as well).

**It is the EU that has had the potential and the gravitas to influence the direction of the region, but is not playing up to par.** The US, due to 'reset button' in relations with Russia, has now pulled back and it views the Black Sea as a region of secondary importance. It has left other stakeholders to take the lead in shaping the region according to their interests.

When discussing the aspects of regionalism, one important problem has to be underlined. For example, the questioning of the Schengen Treaty by some EU

member states, fearing the increase in illegal migration from the South, can only generate even more distance between the EU, Turkey and Ukraine.

**Today, there has been much discussion regarding the development of cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey and why it is in the interest of both states.** Today, Turkey is a rising power and there are the numbers and projections to support it. Whether the policies pursued by the current Turkish government continue to be successful, is, however, the topic for other discussion.

Ukraine is important in energy terms, but how is it relevant linked to Turkey, to Egypt, to Algeria and to the rest of the world? We see an immediate link, when a reference is made to a ‘Dialogue of the Seas’ – the Caspian, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the number of issues they link together. For instance, transport (whether maritime or land transport), can only have an impact as a resource with a trans-regional dimension to it. However, how to promote that trans-regional dimension? How can the ‘Dialogue of the Seas’ function?

Interestingly enough, there are the two countries, which have always had a foot both in the Black and the Mediterranean Seas. The first one is Turkey that is, by virtue of its geography, simultaneously present in the South, and the East. The other one is Greece. Greece is the only EU states that is part of the Black Sea Region, and is also a Mediterranean country. However, neither Turkey nor Greece has developed its own Mediterranean policy (they have the Eastern Mediterranean policies, Greek-Turkish-Cypriot policies, but no Mediterranean policy per se).

A focus on the energy sphere shows the clear linkages that are out there – for example, the pipelines going through Turkey, ending up in Ceyhan, connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea.

**Hence, it is the trans-regional dimension of the Black Sea that could be important when it comes to an enhanced Ukrainian-Turkish dialogue and cooperation, since there are several common sectors – such energy, transport, the environment, inter alia – that can only be enhanced through joint efforts between both countries, regionally and trans-regionally as well.**



## CREATING EFFECTIVE FORMS OF COOPERATION TO RESOLVE REGIONAL CONFLICTS



**Oleh Shamshur,**  
*Ambassador  
Extraordinary  
and Plenipotentiary  
of Ukraine  
(Kyiv)*

I will try to keep it concise and present some snapshots on the security situation in the Black Sea area, as well as some ideas on how Turkey and Ukraine can cooperate. First, I would like to state, as a transatlantic fellow of the German Marshall Fund to the US, that we are very happy to contribute to this conference.

I remember very well the meeting in Bratislava in 2004, convened by the German Marshall Fund of the US, where the discussions have started on whether or not it would be productive to launch a ‘thinking process’ on the questions related to the Black Sea security. At that time I was the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, and I remember the discussion as being pretty difficult, since it was not clear, whether the issue actually deserved the attention from major think tanks.

Today, such hesitations seem ridiculous. **It is quite clear now how important the Black Sea has become, because of its strategic location at the crossroads of major transits routes.** This can be positive – in case of the energy transit routes, transport and the various links uniting the Middle East, Asia, to some extent Africa, Europe in general, and Central Europe – as well as negative, when they concern illicit activities like trafficking. Also, we should definitely keep in mind the difficulty of the situation in the region caused by new threats, such as terrorism. All that affects the way the Black Sea countries think about their own security.

So there are definitely a lot of sensitive issues focused in the Black Sea area. Recent developments – such as the so-called Arab Spring, the ongoing operation in

Afghanistan, and the continued instability in Iraq – have only highlighted the strategic importance of the Black Sea region. In this regard it is crucial that the Black Sea remains at the centre of attention. Of course, the heightened interest in the region was also generated by and dependent on the spectacular economic rise of countries like Turkey and Russia, and this has definitely had a long lasting influence on the region.

If you look at the security arrangement in the Black Sea area, there is a very interesting situation. It was mentioned earlier that there is a certain ‘dull moment’ in the security situation in the region. This might be true, but it should also be recognized that it is a deceitful dullness, because all the conflicting strains that have been present in the region have not disappeared. There is a sense of anti-climax after the Russian-Georgian conflict, but tensions and contradictions have not disappeared.

During the 1990s, and especially after 2000, we have succeeded in creating regional, mostly naval related, security arrangements. I remember the fruitful discussions I had with ambitious Turkish diplomats, during my time as the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, regarding issues related to the Black Sea security, including those concerning the BLACKSEAFOR and other arrangements that have worked quite well in the area.

That network of security arrangements looks pretty impressive. In this regard, we should first focus on Ukraine’s initiative on confidence-building measures related to naval activities. It was first proposed by Kyiv in the early 1990s and finalized (if I’m not mistaken) in 2003. Also, the Turkish initiatives on the BLACKSEAFOR and the Romanian proposal on the Black Sea Harmony to improve border security, have been implemented, and all proved to be quite useful.

Regarding the BLACKSEAFOR, we have witnessed a series of activations in the past ten years that went quite well. There was definitely a high degree of interoperability between our naval forces. But, at the same time, what we did not manage to achieve was the development of a mechanism for prevention and settlement of conflicts in the region, as the Russian-Georgian conflict made it clear. **We did not create such a mechanism and, I think, that is one of the lessons we can draw from our efforts to improve the Black Sea security.**

**The Russian-Georgian war destroyed a lot of the trust accumulated during the late 1990s. Today, the Black Sea countries face a major challenge in trying to rebuild that trust,** to make the existing mechanisms function more effectively, and possibly to think about other forms of cooperation which could prevent the recurrence of any conflict similar to the Russian-Georgian one.

The Russian-Georgian war showed that regional measures can be effective in handling such conflicts only to a certain extent. That is the first lesson we should draw from it. Regional measures alone are not sufficient in settling or preventing regional conflicts. Of course, it can be argued that no international organization is capable of that, but I think, it’s really important to understand that, *firstly*, any regional measure

should be designed to complement other existing mechanisms and international organizations.

*Secondly*, I think we should be making far better use of the assets already available in the Black Sea region. Many regional countries take part in different regional mechanisms, and are either the EU or NATO members, or are part of both. This provides with an opportunity to use the existing EU and NATO assets in the Black Sea, while also taking into account the developing cooperation between the EU and other Black Sea countries like Turkey, Ukraine and Russia, and the links between NATO and Russia, Ukraine and Georgia. So we should be making better use of the existing arrangements in the region.

*Thirdly*, it is important to recognize that confidence cannot only be built solely on military cooperation alone. I think we still underuse the possibilities provided by the non-military organizations in the Black Sea area, for example in the economic field. That is, a resource, we should really tap. I also think, it is of the utmost importance that we, as analysts and experts, do not exacerbate the differences in the region. Of course, we should not downplay the differences of approaches and, at times, the conflicting interests, but we should try to understand them and explore options to find a common ground.

**Another factor we should be paying very close attention to, with regards to security in the Black Sea region, are the ‘frozen’ conflicts.** For a while, they were at the centre of attention, and everyone was willing to talk about them. Right now, to use the aforementioned metaphor again, there is a “dull moment”, where the frozen conflicts are concerned. They are not on the table right now, and no one is willing to concentrate on pushing for solutions. But the conflicts in Moldova and the Caucasus have not disappeared and they, undoubtedly, affect the security situation in the Black Sea area in a very negative way. Therefore, we should not be losing track of developments in those areas and we should work together to find solutions that can, at the very least, bring the situations under control, prevent them from deteriorating further, and look for viable, long-term solutions. Because at the moment, the situation in many of the conflict areas has, unfortunately, only gotten worse and more unpredictable recently, and that is a trend we really have to stop.

When speaking on the issue, it would be rather strange not to mention **the role of Ukraine in this set up**. One of the challenges Ukraine is facing right now is the need to reinvent itself. It has adopted a so-called non-bloc status and thereby the issue of joining NATO has been postponed for at least some time. Of course, this calls for a reconfiguration and reformulation of Ukraine’s security policy. During this period of reconfiguring its security policy, **Kyiv should address two issues**.

*First*, the country faces the need of improving and increasing the security component of its foreign policy. For a long time the development of the armed forces was not seen as a priority, but it is very important for Ukraine. And this also relates to

the Black Sea area, in a sense that if Kyiv wants to contribute in a more consistent and productive way in the Black Sea security measures, it needs to have well-equipped armed forces and a functional navy at its disposal.

*Secondly*, apart from military strength, Ukraine should use more of its soft power potential. In this regard I mean economic development, innovation, strengthening democracy. It also includes Ukraine's contribution in fighting issues, such as illegal trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These are the areas, where Ukraine has the potential and experience to contribute to.

**Turning to the bilateral options for cooperation in the Black Sea area, I believe there is plenty Ukraine and Turkey can achieve together.** My experience with Turkish diplomats was generally excellent, and I hope we still see one another as natural allies. Such an approach is very important. I think **Kyiv and Ankara should definitely look to enhance economic cooperation between the two countries.** There are some segments, which are extremely important, such as energy, where cooperation is necessary. Unfortunately, in many senses Turkey and Ukraine act as competitors. I think we should leave that mindset behind us, and think in terms of complementarities and cooperation, and look for the common ground.

**Another important aspect, worth investing in, is the coordinating our efforts to work out concerted actions both on regional and global issues and within the international organizations.** Many of Turkey's and Ukraine's approaches align fairly well, and we can work out our differences.

Finally, both Turkey and Ukraine aspire to become full members of the EU, although it is hard to say right now, when that could become a reality. However, it is a process, and the process is important in itself. We cooperate with the same EU institutions, we work with the same instruments, and we should also look to put those instruments to the benefit of our bilateral cooperation and to the benefit of security cooperation within the Black Sea region as well.

In conclusion, I would say, the situation in the Black Sea area is deeply complicated. We should not be deceived by the apparent 'dullness' of the moment. **We have to concentrate hard on how to develop new mechanisms and to avoid any situation, which might lead to an outright conflict or a pre-conflict situation between the countries of the region. I stress, once again, that we should definitely develop our bilateral cooperation, but we should do so in tandem with international organizations that are already active in the region**



# ENERGY COMPONENT OF THE BLACK SEA REGION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES




**Mykhailo Honchar,**  
*Nomos Centre*  
(Kyiv)

1. The Black Sea Region is a natural connector between the regions with powerful energy production and the regions with high consumption of hydrocarbons. The extractive regions include Russia and the Caspian region with hydrocarbon resources of West-Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, which are part of the Arctic-Arabian belt. The regions of consumption include the EU, plus its neighbours: Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.

2. Traditionally, the European consumers receive the hydrocarbon resources through several communication corridors, which consist of connector systems and groups: oil and gas pipelines, maritime shipping routes, and terminals. Ukraine and Turkey are positioned in a number of connectors.

*Firstly*, it is **the Eastern European multi-connector of the Eastern connector system**, which supplies hydrocarbon by pipelines to the EU, through the territory of Ukraine and Slovakia. *Secondly*, it is **the Trans-Turkish connector system**. It delivers oil from Azerbaijan through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan-pipeline. It has the potential to transport gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran and the Middle East, Iraq and Egypt, as a part of the EU's Southern Gas Corridor project, as well as to transport oil through the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline via Turkey. *Thirdly*, it is **the Caspian-Black Sea-Mediterranean connector system**, which delivers oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan across the Caspian Sea (by tankers); the south Caucasus (by railway); and the Black Sea (by tankers), to the

**Hydrocarbon's Belt (CH-belt) of Eurasia and Energy Connectors of Europe**




Mediterranean region. *Fourthly*, it is the **Black Sea-Central Europe connector group**, which is under development since the second half of the 90s with little prospect. It consists of Odessa-Brody, ‘Southern Druzhba’, and Constanta-Omishal-Trieste oil pipelines, and gas pipelines such as the White Stream and AGRI (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania inter-connector) designed for oil and gas from the Caspian region.

3. The EU policy towards the Black Sea Region is still underdeveloped and is rather amorphous in its nature. At the same time, the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria has contributed to strengthening the European foreign policy in the region, however its success is significantly weakened by a number of factors:

- The lack of a single position, a single voice among the EU member states and the institutional weakness of the European External Action Service;
- Resistance by powerful regional and global actors, which are not interested in strengthening the presence of the EU in the Black Sea region and view the Black Sea as a ‘sea of two powers’.
- Low profile of Sofia and Bucharest in advocating the Black Sea vector in the EU external policies; the lack of their position credibility in Brussels.

**Given the pace taken by Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, it could be predicted that further discoveries of hydrocarbons will take place on the Black Sea shelf. From 5 to 10 years, the Black Sea may become one of alternative sources of**



**energy supplies to the countries of the region.** It is unlikely, that due to the offshore production, these countries will be able to meet their needs in oil and gas completely, but the domestic energy production will play a positive role in strengthening energy security in the region.


The next decade will probably answer the question whether the Black Sea will repeat the success of the Caspian Sea in the 1990s. **However, we can assume that, in any case, shelf exploration race will increase nervousness in the region and may cause an escalation of tension.**

5. The Russian energy strategy, aimed at bypassing the transit countries, represents not only an opposition to the EU pipeline projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor, but a threat to stability of the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region, as a whole.

In the Black Sea Region, there is a clear tendency of a strengthened Russian-Turkish partnership as well as competition in projects on hydrocarbon transits. Turkey, step-by-step, is gaining a dominant position. Ankara has been successfully implementing the EU policies to become a strategic gas connector, just as it had already happened in the oil sector, where it used the US political support for implementation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project.

6. Russia's strategy towards the energy recourses and energy transit (in the Caspian, the Southern Caucasus and the Black Sea regions) is a two-stage algorithm: to bring the competing projects under control and, if it is not possible, to block their

**Russian strategic vision: bypass routes for oil&gas export according to energy strategy till 2030 (more pipes than oil and gas)**



development by all available means, including the escalation of tension in areas of ‘frozen conflicts’, which are in a close proximity to strategic communications.


The current decade will be decisive for the fate of competing gas/oil projects in the Black Sea area. The more successful the EU will be in pushing forward the Southern Gas Corridor project, the greater might be the chances of recurrence of the August 2008 five-day war or the ‘de-freezing’ of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The intention, by the leading countries of the region (primarily by Turkey and Russia), to build up the naval forces capacity may lead to the militarization of the Black Sea area, where the hydrocarbons transit infrastructure is expanding and the projects on exploration and production of hydrocarbons are being launched.

The prospect of increased military activities, the competing interests of the regional states, and the development of several hydrocarbon projects will increase tensions in the Caspian, the Caucasus- Black Sea area, adding up to the existing ‘frozen conflicts’.

It is in the interest of Ukraine and other central and eastern European states to prevent the ‘de-freezing’ of existing conflicts and the emergence of new ones. For instance, Ukraine, since 2009 on a systematic basis has been increasing its purchase

### The scheme of existing and planned oil pipelines and terminals in Black Sea – Caspian Region




volumes of Azerbaijan oil, and since 2010 has started its transit to Belarus via the Baku-Kulevi-Pivdennyi-Brody- Southern ‘Druzhba’ routs.

The existing status quo is also important for further development of the AGRI project.

However, it is not only Russia’s ambitions that are likely to generate tensions in the Caspian-Black Sea region. Recently, amid the growing oil revenues, Azerbaijan has resorted to militaristic rhetoric on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. For instance, on 14 January 2011, during the Governmental meeting, Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, said: “I am confident that a strong Azerbaijan’s army should and will say its word when time will come in the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”<sup>1</sup>. These words may indicate an increasing willingness of Baku to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem by military means (as happened during the operation “Storm” by the armed forces of Croatia, in August 1995, to release the Croatian territories occupied by Serbs). However, as a result such a reaction might be unexpected and could lead to disastrous consequences in the South Caucasus and to impede the development of transnational energy projects in the Black Sea area.

<sup>1</sup> President Ilham Aliyev: “Issue of restoration of Azerbaijan territorial integrity must be solved implicitly”. – Information agency AzerTadzh, January 15, 2011 <http://news.day.az>

**Technical opportunities of oil deliveries for CEE countries**



In this regard, Ukraine, Turkey and Romania should intensify their activities in the framework of OSCE and PACE on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. It would be also appropriate to start relevant consultations with Baku to deter Azerbaijan from solving Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by force.

**Therefore, today both Ukraine and Turkey have a range of security issues to work on together.**

## THERE ARE AMPLE GROUNDS TO FURTHER THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UKRAINE AND TURKEY IN THE FUTURE



*Mitat Çelikpala,  
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It is really difficult to speak about the Turkish-Ukrainian relations. A month ago, a friend of mine asked me to write an academic article on Turkish-Ukrainian relations. I tried to find some documents and analyses on Turkish-Ukrainian relations, however it was almost impossible to find any comprehensively written and well-studied articles on the current state of Turkish-Ukrainian relations.

The Turkish-Ukrainian diplomatic relations go back to the early 1990s, just after Ukraine became independent. Turkey was very quick to establish diplomatic relations and to open a diplomatic office in Kiev. Ankara was very eager to further its relations with the Ukrainian friends. Back then the main focus of bilateral relations was the Black Sea region and its security. But afterwards, the process of increasing cooperation slowed down and it seemed at times that tourism was the only interest. However, there have been other, more recent developments.

In January 2011, the Turkish prime minister visited Ukraine. He was accompanied by a large group of Turkish businessmen, who were eager to further cooperation between the two countries, to strengthen Turkey's presence in Ukraine and to establish joint ventures in different areas. **This mission is part of a policy to turn Turkey into a trading state and a 'soft power' in its neighborhood. This policy is very important. In fact, it is the main aspect of Ankara's new foreign policy.** Turkey is currently very active throughout its neighborhood, from Armenia to Syria and from Libya to Belarus. This development is of a great significance and it appears that

Turkey's new assertiveness has led it to propose a further development of relations with Ukraine.

During the Prime Minister's visit a couple of months ago, it was announced that the leaders of the two countries discussed the possibility of bilateral cooperation on a strategic level. **The establishing of strategic relations with neighboring countries is yet another new phenomenon in Turkish foreign policymaking.** What this means is that Ankara intends to improve relations in the economic, trade, military, political, cultural and other spheres. For Turkey, increasing trade is the priority. By focusing on that, it expects that other areas will see developments as well.

Earlier, in May 2010, Turkey's Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, visited Kiev, where the two countries signed a 2010-2011 Action Plan with an aim to develop bilateral relations. Also, the visit saw both countries issue a joint declaration on establishing a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council. **The founding of such strategic councils is yet another novel aspect of Turkey's foreign policy.** Right now Ankara has set up strategic councils with Greece, Russia, Syria and Iraq; it is looking to develop the ones with Bulgaria and Ukraine.

By establishing these strategic councils, Turkey aims to turn itself into a central power – a center of gravity linking all neighboring countries together. Whether this policy actually works or not remains to be seen, but at this point it may be stated that Turkey aims to play a central role in all the neighboring regions.

As far as the Ukrainian-Turkish relations are concerned, both sides have stated that they are looking forward to, and are optimistic about, improving relations at the strategic level. This involves four main pillars. *First*, it concerns the signing of a free trade agreement, which would greatly further the relations. *Secondly*, it means liberalizing visa regimes, which has important ramifications for business and tourism especially. Thirdly, energy cooperation should be improved, including nuclear power and pipelines, and trans-country transport links. And *finally*, security cooperation should be enhanced. This is an area where the two countries have already institutionalized some of their efforts, especially in the Black Sea, where the BLACKSEAFOR and the Operation Black Sea Harmony are active.

**NATO, the EU, and the Western world, together with Russia, are the main outside factors in Turkish-Ukrainian relations.** Turkey is a NATO-member, whereas Ukraine is not. Ukraine, however, still has a membership perspective. Ankara and Kiev can work together to ensure the window regarding the future Ukraine's NATO membership remains open. With regards to the EU, Turkey is currently negotiating its accession, while Ukraine also has a membership perspective. Once again, the two countries can work together to direct the EU's and NATO's attention to our regional security and other issues. By working in tandem, they could influence all the NATO and the EU-led programmes related to our regions.

**When comparing the Turkey of the 1990s to the Turkey of the 2000s, many differences become apparent.** During the 1990s, security-related issues were the most important for Ankara, resulting in Turkey seeking for support from the international security organizations with the aim of stabilizing its neighboring regions. Since 2000, trade and economic concerns have taken precedence over all other policy areas.

There is an ongoing discussion whether Turkey is part of the new Middle Eastern world or whether it is a part of Europe, but, of course, the European perspective is still the perspective for Turkey. And NATO and EU perspectives must probably be large and be a sort of framework and integration with the West, whether it's under the umbrella of the EU or not, I don't know, which will have some effects and I don't know if it is possible in Turkey's experience on this Europeanization process, but most probably Turkey's experience with NATO, NATO membership or negotiation, could be some other basic aspects of our future discussions or cooperation. Of course, these are not the solution; neither EU nor NATO membership is the solution for our problems. We need some region-based outlook. The EU contributes a lot to Turkey's democratization processes and all those security aspects, but it is not the case.

**In the last decade, Turkey has been trying to turn itself into a central player, by becoming a soft power that links together all its neighbors through trade relations and economic ties.** For example, bilateral trade between Ukraine and Turkey has increased spectacularly. In 1992, the volume of trade was a measly \$125,000. By 1995, it was \$1,500,000, and by 2003 the figure had already risen to \$1.5 billion. The trend continued afterwards, with volumes reaching \$6 and \$8 billion in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The economic crisis caused the trade figures to decrease, but already a new target of \$20 billion has been set for the coming years. This shows that Turkey sees Ukraine as a new actor, a new ally, who it wishes to establish close relations with and extend those relations to other neighboring regions.

**So, in 2004, we first initiated a joint plan on enhanced cooperation and gave our bilateral relations an institutional dimension. Since 2007, a military aspect was added to that and now trade has been introduced as well.** In all of this, it is important to recognize that Ukraine and Turkey are not rivals. In fact, both countries complement each other. Regarding all those security, economic and trade issues both states have their own regions and it is possible to extend their area of influence.

**Another area where Ukraine and Turkey can work together is on the issues related to Crimea.** Turkey has a large Tatar population, and is therefore interested in improving the situation in the peninsula. Ankara is supportive of Ukrainian efforts to develop a more Western and international framework in order to find solutions to Crimea's problems.

**Another common concern is related to the 'frozen' conflicts in the region.** Kiev and Ankara can work together to find solutions to the conflicts in the Caucasus and the other Black Sea coastal states.

In fact, **when discussing the Turkish-Ukrainian relations it is impossible to ignore Moscow.** Russia is a part of the security arrangements in all regions neighbouring Ukraine and Turkey, in the Black Sea, the Caucasus and for Ukraine – in its Western and Eastern territories. The increasing volumes of trade between Russia and the two countries as well as the growing influence of Russian business circles in both Turkey and Ukraine are of a great importance as well. Therefore, both countries will have to develop a new mechanism on how to deal with Russia. It is in the interest of both Ankara and Kiev to act together in order to find ways on how to engage Moscow in finding solutions to the regional issues.

Russia happens to be Ankara's main rival when it comes to Ankara's aspirations to become a regional power in the Black Sea, the Caucasus and, perhaps, the Eastern Europe. For this reason, it is imperative that Ankara continues to cooperate closely with Ukraine within the framework of EU and NATO.

Even though it may seem that Turkey and Russia are working closely together and their relations remain friendly, their interests yet differ. Turkey invests in building a friendly neighborhood. Russia strives to maintain the status quo. Therefore, it is mistaken to think that Ankara's foreign policy is in line with Moscow's. In the future, there will probably be some disagreements and even rivalry on several different issues. Already, Turkey's preparations to establish ties and increase cooperation with its neighbors are a sign of this emerging rivalry.

Russia is an important partner for Turkey, at least if you look at the last decade. Ukraine has also had an experience of cooperation with Russia and will most probably continue to be a strategic partner for Ukraine. However, I am not certain, and we will have to see, whether Russia will establish itself as a stable and a strategic partner for Turkey. Ukraine, in the last decade, with its ups and downs, has accumulated some experience of democratization. Turkey, also, has had some ups and downs in relations with Russia. But it's a fact that Russia will remain an important actor and, most probably, an ally in the future.

**In conclusion, the Turkish-Ukrainian relations most probably will develop based on a trade and economic basis, including energy and some other issues. At the same time, security concerns will still remain important, with a special focus on the Black sea region. In a short-term perspective Ukraine and Turkey should develop their cooperation in order to fight terrorism, illicit trafficking, pollution, and tackle other regional security issues. Therefore, it is clear, that there are ample grounds to further the strategic relationship between the two countries in the future.**

# THE UKRAINIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS



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The Ukrainian-Turkish relations can be viewed as a vital factor of the international constellations in the Black Sea region. In twenty years of cooperation Ukraine and Turkey have reached a stable level of political dialogue, developed a solid legal basis of cooperation. The growing number of high-level visits in recent years might signal the rise of interest of the partners to each other and the willingness to intensify the contacts.

The countries founded the High-level Strategic Council intended to upgrade the relations. Countries took the decision to start the negotiations on visa-free regime and free trade area. There is also a considerable progress in the economic sphere – e.g. the trade volume within the countries reached 7 billion US dollars in 2008 (the volume slowly recovered again after the financial crisis in 2008-2009) and the states declared the intention to reach the amount of 20 billion US dollars by 2020.

The Ukrainian-Turkish relations have been potentially very important and the term ‘strategic partnership’ has been often employed to describe the current state of their development. On the Ukrainian side at certain period it was used non-selectively with lots of declared, but non-existent strategic partnerships. Turkish authorities are using the term ‘strategic partnership’ regarding the relations with Ukraine with caution saying that these relations are strategic in some spheres, or they are moving towards the strategic partnership, but still are not fully strategic. Apparently, there is

a discrepancy in perceptions of the parties on the level of partnership and still much has to be done to fill the declared partnership with concrete essence.

**Although there is an objective *potential* for strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey, the current level of bilateral relations, unfortunately, does not meet the requirements for this strategic partnership.** The absence of any deep contradictions and conflicts between the states and “geographic maxima” (the Black Sea does not divide, but unites the countries), obviously, cannot substitute for the sense of strategic partnership.

For a long time the cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine had an imprint of being defensive in its nature – against the Russian regional ambitions. Countries searched for a solution by creating a counterbalance against Russia and this type of interaction inevitably led to the creation of a certain institutionalized culture of cooperation, some sort of insecurity culture. Since the early and mid-1990s the situation has changed considerably, but, still, the inertia of such thinking continues to be an integral part of bilateral relations. With this in mind, we do not consider the Ukrainian-Turkish relations to be situational or simply a ‘defense reaction’ against Russia – as they are potentially important per se.

From the early 1990s, the Ukrainian-Turkish relations have evolved towards the full economization of partnership. Both partners had focused on economics, as the basis for cooperation, hoping (in functionalist logic) that successful results in the economic sphere will ‘spill over’ towards other domains.

So far, there are no really intense contacts in many other spheres. Unfortunately, the cultural dialogue is also unsatisfactory – people in both countries are almost ignorant of each other’s history and culture. For instance, the Turkish mass media doesn’t pay special attention to Ukraine and the news on Ukraine are sporadic and superficial. The same situation is in Ukraine. What is also problematic that the countries have a different historical perspective of one another. Ukraine has inherited the Soviet historiography and the view on Turkey when both states belonged to different camps. In this sphere, some joint projects between the Ukrainian-Turkish experts and historians are needed to rewrite the history in order to overcome the stereotypes. Therefore, if we talk about the strategic partnership, we have to work on this very direction as well.

Besides, in other spheres certain processes impede the cooperation. Certain aspects of trade look troublesome for partners: Ukrainian export is mainly comprised of raw materials, while Turkey has a considerable negative trade balance with Ukraine. Besides, the level of investment is notably low. The existing visa regime needs some improvement too: the Ukrainian citizens get visa at the border, while the Turkish citizens have to apply to Ukrainian consular bodies in Turkey. At the same time, the issue of visa-free regime with Turkey is closely linked to Ukraine’s negotiations on visa-free regime with the EU, and, supposedly, the introduction of the

latter should precede the elimination of visas with Turkey. Thus, certain issues on the Ukrainian-Turkish bilateral agenda require a scrupulous study in order not to impede the cooperation.

The next factor that should be taken into consideration is the impact of domestic constellations. Ukraine and Turkey have much in common: both are preoccupied with domestic political processes, both countries are now trying to figure out their place in the regional security architecture, both are striving for the EU membership.

Ukraine has just recently rediscovered the South; before its foreign policy was constrained within West-East dichotomy – in a search of its civilizational and geopolitical harbor (either in the West or the East). This started to slowly change in late 1990<sup>th</sup>, but still much has to be done to overcome this inertia.

In the Turkish case, we witness the evolution of the Turkish foreign policy and, unfortunately, in our opinion, there remain less favorable conditions for the strategic partnership between the countries to be realized in future. Turkey is getting much more pro-active, it is pursuing a new ‘zero problem’ policy with its neighbours. Turkish authorities always stress the necessity to become a global player, not just a regional one.

Turkish democracy is represented as a ‘soft power’, and Turkey positions itself as a model for the transformation in the Muslim countries. This seems to be a totally new diplomatic vocabulary, a new conceptual approach in Turkish foreign policy. The problem of Turkish ‘Westernness’ is much debated these days. I would not agree that the West is losing Turkey. I would rather say that it is Turkey who is losing the West as its only reference point and shelter. Turkey does not want, any longer, to be associated solely with the West, but it is more inclined to act unilaterally, as a big power, on a much wider geography.

Besides, we see a transformation of the traditional Turkish ‘status-quo’. Turkey had sustained a well-thought approach of preserving a ‘status-quo’ in its neighborhood. That was chosen to cope with the ‘scourge of geography’ – a difficult geopolitical position, which presented Turkey with numerous threats. Now, with the new foreign policy paradigm and the increased resources, Turkey is willing to act, not in a reactive, but in a rather proactive way.

As we can see, this happens at the most vital directions, which are necessary for Turkey in order to define itself – with the US, the EU and with separate European states. In relation to Ukraine, however, Turkey prefers to preserve its ‘status-quo’, partly because of Russia, partly because it prioritizes its engagement with other ‘more’ important partners.

Therefore, when taking into consideration Turkey’s growing pro-activeness, Ukraine is most likely to be at the bottom of its priorities agenda. Ukraine is literally lost between the different directions of Turkish foreign policy – the EU, Russia, the Caucasus. It is viewed by Turkey, not as a separate direction of foreign policy, but as a

part of its regional perspective. If we have to move towards the strategic partnership, we have to take this into consideration and to adjust our strategy.

**To sum up, a clear perspective on both sides is needed. Hopefully, the negative trends could be reversed and the strategic partnership, voiced in the 1990s, could be materialized.**

Cooperation with Turkey represents an important instrument for Ukraine to rediscover the South (as an equally important foreign policy direction) and to overcome the ‘West-Russia’ dichotomy. Ukraine is vital for Turkey too; in the light of the increasing pragmatism in Turkish foreign policy and its desire to use its ‘soft power’, Ukraine seems to be a natural partner.



# SHARED ASPECTS OF TURKEY AND UKRAINE IN RELATIONS WITH THE EU



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I am going to focus on the **shared keywords** of Turkey and Ukraine in their relations with the European Union. Certainly, in a general context we are talking about two different stories of the EU adventure with both countries. On one hand, Turkey is an accession country, which is on the negotiation table since 2005 with nearly 50 years of association experience. Turkey applied for membership in 1987 and it was only in 1999 that it was accepted as a candidate country. On the other hand, Ukraine has contractual relations with the EU since the collapse of the Soviet Union under the framework of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and has been negotiating association since 2008 as a neighbor country. As a neighbor country, Ukraine is a part of the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership.

I am not going to detail the history of relations of both sides with the European Union. Instead, I would like to point out **seven shared keywords** in Turkey's and Ukraine's relations with the Union. In other words, these two countries are not similar in their European processes; however they do share some aspects in their bonds with the EU.

**The first shared keyword is *negotiations*.** Yes, both countries are negotiating different things; however the common fact is that they are both on the negotiating table. When the EU was convinced that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, it decided to start the accession negotiations with Turkey. Even though the wording of the roadmap for negotiations did not include very promising sentences, Turkey was on the table for 18 years after the application for membership. The

negotiating framework suggested that this is an open-ended process, the conclusion of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand.

Moreover, the EU suggested that Turkey might get permanent derogations from a free movement as well as agriculture and structural funds. This was not offered to any other candidate before. The negotiations began in 2005, and so far only one chapter has been provisionally closed. Thirteen are open at the moment, and most of the other chapters cannot be opened and the opened ones cannot be closed because of political reasons due to Cyprus issue and French blockade.

Even though Ukraine is not negotiating membership, it is at the table with the EU to strengthen the political association and economic integration through the conclusion of the Association Agreement. This agreement will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (signed in 1998) as soon as it enters into force. Since 2008, there have been nearly twenty rounds of talks on the association. Moreover, with Ukraine's entry into WTO, the EU has launched the negotiations on the establishment of the Free Trade Area.

Thus, the logic and spirit of negotiations govern Ukraine and Turkey's bilateral relations with the EU.

**The second shared keyword is the recognition of 'Europeanness' of the two states by the EU.** Let me reiterate Herman von Rompuy's words. In October 2010, when he met the Ukrainian Prime Minister Azarov, he told that: "Ukraine is a European country and the core values on which our societies are built remain the same". Even though Ukraine is not a candidate country at the moment, the EU acknowledges Ukraine's European aspirations and welcomes its European choice. In his other speech von Rompuy says: "Ukraine as a European country shares a common history and common values with the countries of the EU".

Since Turkey is an accession country, the discussion of its 'Europeanness' is not a question any more, at least in formal discourse. In 1997, at the Luxembourg summit, Turkey was acknowledged as a "European country destined to join the EU". However, the unofficial discourse questions Turkey's European credentials.

In other words, even though both sides are officially declared as European, the EU stresses the importance of common values and common history with Ukraine, whereas we do not see much or even any references in the Turkish case.

**The third shared keyword is EU's role in *domestic political reforms*.** In other words, the EU has somehow acted as a catalyst in triggering democratic reform process, both in Turkey and Ukraine. Membership conditionality has been the key in Turkey's political transformation since 1999. Prominent cases of change such as the abolition of death penalty (in all cases including terrorism); the right of broadcasting in languages traditionally used by Turkish citizens other than Turkish as well as learning those languages; more freedom of expression; and finally the civilian control over the military (especially the change in the composition and the role of the National

Security Council is worth mentioning). However, since early 2006 we see the decline in the EU's transformative power in Turkey.

In the case of Ukraine, 2004 Orange Revolution demonstrated Ukraine's determination to deepen the process of domestic reform. In other words, the EU became the instrument for the consolidation of democracy. In 2005, in the ENP Action Plan the EU has listed its priorities, which included strengthening democracy and rule of law, democratic elections, ensuring freedom of media and expression and etc. In 2009, the Association Agenda between Ukraine and the EU included, for instance, the constitutional system of effective checks and balances between the state institutions through an inclusive reform process and fight against corruption.

The difference between the Ukraine's integration and the Turkish accession process is that the EU does not apply membership conditionality in the case of Ukraine. However, the fact that Ukraine has an access to the EU funding for reforms acts as a good stimulus.

**The fourth shared keyword is the *vitality discourse*.** At the official level, we sometimes hear that the EU needs Turkey, or the EU needs Ukraine. This is a similar argument for both sides, based on their position as energy transit routes, possession of young population and potentially growing economies at a time when the EU is dealing with an economic crisis.

Energy security is one of the key aspects in this context. In early 2009, due to the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine, the EU came to the realization that Ukraine is indispensable for the European Union, however it focused more on diversifying its energy routes. Turkey is also a major energy corridor for the Union. Thus, their vitality stems from similar arguments.

Moreover, there are two other important moments that shape the EU's policy towards Turkey and Ukraine. Firstly, it is the fact that Ukraine has close relations with Russia, and secondly, it is the proactive Turkish foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. Thus, the EU does not want to alienate both countries, and tries to integrate them into the EU frameworks at the deepest level.

**The fifth shared keyword is the *strength of economic relations*.** Both countries have strong economic relations with the EU. Turkey has a customs union with the EU since 1995, and represents one of few states (European micro-state, such as Monaco) to have this type of relations with the EU. Even, when Turkey-EU relations were very tense in 1997 (at the time Turkey was not admitted as a candidate country) the only thing Turkey could do was to freeze the political relations, and did not do anything on the economic side. In case of Ukraine, the Free Trade Area is one of the most important issues, guiding its relations with the EU at the moment.

**The sixth shared point is the *visa struggle*.** There is no doubt that visa-free travel is one of the most important benefits for citizens in gaining the EU-membership. In case of Ukraine, EaP and Neighborhood Action Plan included ways in which visa-free

regime could be ensured. Since Viktor Yanukovych has become the president, Ukraine has adopted the key acts that brought the national legislation (the border management and migration) in line with the European standards. In this context, illegal transit migration is decreasing, the readmission agreement has been implemented since 2010, and visas for the EU citizens have been abolished since 2005. Thus, there is a clear progress, although the visa-free regime represents a longer-term perspective.

Turkey has special rights for free movement of people, stipulated in the Association Agreement and the follow-up documents. However, those legal acts have not been implemented properly. For the last couple of years, Turkish citizens have been demanding their rights deriving from those texts (as in the case of visa-exemption for lorry drivers, when entering the EU states).

The most important problem for the EU is the fear of mass migration from Turkey as well as from the Turkey's neighborhood. The EU has offered visa-facilitation in return for the conclusion of the readmission agreement. Negotiations on this readmission agreement have ended. However, the EU is using "visa-dialogue" terminology rather than "visa-exemption", as was requested by Turkey. That is the reason why Turkey did not sign the readmission agreement.

**The final shared keyword is the *EU involvement in border issues*.** The EU promotes good neighbourly relations with Turkey and puts this, as a political criterion to be fulfilled, prior to gaining the EU-membership. In this context, Cyprus is a major stumbling block for the advancement of negotiations. Since Turkey does not open its ports for Greek-Cypriot ships and aircrafts, eight chapters cannot be negotiated and no more chapters will be provisionally closed other than the sole-opened one. The EU has also been imposing the solution for the outstanding problems between Turkey and Greece, such as the continental shelf and the airspace etc. Moreover, (even though it is not a political criterion) the EU, in almost every progress report, stresses the necessity that Turkey should open its borders with Armenia.

In the case of Ukraine, the EU is an actor at the Moldova-Ukraine border with its Border Assistance Mission (BAM) conducted under the Common Security and Defense Policy. This operation known as EUBAM to Moldova and Ukraine is considered as the most effective civilian operation conducted along the sidelines of a protracted conflict. With this operation, the EU aims to stop the illegal cross border activities i.e. human trafficking, smuggling and other illegal trade.

**In conclusion, several shared 'keywords' have been guiding both Turkey's and Ukraine's relations with the EU. Whether an accession or a partner country, Ukraine and Turkey are the two key states in the EU's emerging Black Sea strategy. Turkey's potential, as a decisive power in the region, as well as Ukraine's close ties with Russia move the two countries to the center of the EU's Black Sea initiatives. Thus, this centrality argument can be the concluding 'keyword' in the Turkey-EU-Ukraine trilogy.**



# UKRAINE AND TURKEY: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS THE INTERNAL MODERNIZATION TOOL



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**What is the idea of the European integration for the Ukrainians?** For majority, it is claimed to be a national idea. This is the only idea that is supported at the national level by over 70% of the population and virtually by 100% of the Ukrainian elite.

**For an average Ukrainian** “European” means the “best.” Therefore, in their daily life, they make ‘European-style’ renovations in their homes, buy European cars etc. In a way, European integration for an ordinary Ukrainian is a new kind of communism, which, in Soviet times, was considered synonymous with “paradise”. Nowadays, Ukrainians want to be in Europe, want to be in the EU, because European life appears, like a paradise to them.

**For the Ukrainian elite** the European integration is, primarily, a key identification idea that enables to draw a clear boundary line between Ukraine and Russia. Russians belong to the Eurasian civilization, Ukrainians – to the European. That is why we are different, that is why Ukraine is not Russia.

**For the Ukrainian technocrats** the European integration is a key idea of transformation and modernization of Ukraine. There is a clear understanding in society that, in order to modernize the country, there is no need to reinvent the wheel – it will be enough to renovate the country according to the EU values, norms and standards.

However, the question is: “At what stage is Ukraine today in the process of European integration?”

The European integration of Ukraine can be divided into two well-defined periods.

**The first ‘romantic’ period started in 1994 by signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU.** It lasted up until 2006-2007. At that time, most of the Ukrainian political elite believed that Ukraine had a chance to join the EU. Those expectations intensified after the “Orange Revolution”, whose leaders promised to join the EU as early as in 2006-2007.

However, in 2007, it became clear that Ukraine had no prospects of gaining the EU membership, primarily due to clear messages from Brussels and Berlin. It was a tough geopolitical reality, and I (at that time the advisor on Foreign Policy to President of Ukraine) had to convince Mr. Yushchenko of that. This enabled us to achieve a special agreement with the French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007 on the possibility of signing the EU Association Agreement, which would have had a similar title as the EU agreements that other Eastern European signed in the 1990s but, unlike them, would not provide a membership perspective. **In other words, the second ‘pragmatic’ period of the Ukrainian integration has begun in late 2007.**

In practical terms, while building a relationship with the EU it is crucial to understand whether the country has prospects of the EU membership or not. In the first case (and this applies to the current state of relations between Turkey and the EU) they are subject to only one question: “When and how will a candidate country introduce all the necessary EU norms and standards?” These are no longer the interstate relations.

In the second case (relevant to the relations between Ukraine and the EU) a country that has not received a membership perspective, can build its relations with the EU solely on the interstate level. That means it is free to choose independently and selectively, which of the EU norms and standards it is ready to introduce, and which it does not consider to be appropriate.

Currently, as it is known, Ukraine is at the final stage of negotiations on the Association Agreement with the EU. It also seeks to achieve an ambitious goal of establishing a visa-free regime with Europe. There are all prerequisites to complete negotiations by the end of 2011. However, the creation of a free trade area (FTA) remains the key challenge. Unfortunately, after the “Orange Revolution”, Kyiv agreed to the EU proposal for the FTA to be deep and comprehensive.

I think this format is unfavourable for Ukraine, since, in economic terms, the EU is a strong partner, when Ukraine is the weak one. For Ukraine, the best formula of negotiations with the EU on the economic integration could be the experience of Switzerland that is to negotiate on every single sector of the economy (the so-called Sector-Wide Approach). Unfortunately, the EU has imposed the Norwegian formula on Ukraine – negotiations on a comprehensive and deep format.

I am sure that our Turkish counterparts are aware of what an inconvenient and ‘aggressive’ partner the EU can be in trade negotiations. For instance, it does not agree

to provide Ukraine with the free access to the EU market for the goods and services, which are fundamentally important to Ukraine: such as agriculture, metallurgy and chemical industries, transport services etc. Therefore, the negotiations are very complicated.

In addition, since we are approaching the final stage of negotiations, Russia has been persistent in offering the alternative – the Customs Union. For Ukraine, this proposal is unacceptable in terms of its civilizational choice. However, if the EU does not make significant compromises in negotiations on the FTA, in economic terms, the Customs Union with Russia may have certain economic advantages for Ukraine. Ukraine is now right in the midst of geopolitical and economic competition between the EU and Russia. However, there is a high chance of signing the Association and the Free Trade Agreement with the EU as well as of establishing mutually beneficial relations between Ukraine and the countries of the Customs Union by the end of 2011.

**What do Ukraine and Turkey have in common in the process of EU integration, and how can we help each other?** Until recently, Ukraine and Turkey have not coordinated their positions on the European integration process. A preference was given to the direct bilateral negotiations with the EU.

Today, the perspective of the EU membership, both for Ukraine and Turkey, will be closed, at least, for the next 10-15 years. *Firstly*, the EU expansion process, as a geopolitical project, has been almost completed. This is a decisive moment for the EU, since its main challenge today is to maintain itself within the current borders, rather than to continue the expansion.

*Secondly*, modern Turkey should not seek to become the EU member due to its own geopolitical ambitions. If Turkey wants to become a global player on the international arena (as our Turkish counterparts have stated in their speeches), then this desire contradicts the EU membership.

In 2002, I asked my Russian colleague: “Why does not Russia seek to become the EU member?” and got a clear answer: “Great powers do not join alliances, but create their own. If a great power joins a union, it stops being great by the definition”. If Turkey’s aspiration is to become a great power, it should not become the EU member. In geopolitics, one should know this like alphabet.

**Therefore, for Turkey, as well as for Ukraine, European integration is not a matter of joining the EU, but an internal modernization tool.** However, as a potential great power, Turkey should build its own (rather than European) identity. Ukraine, however, is not a great power, and it seeks to strengthen its European identity through the process of European integration.

Thus, **the new geopolitical realities create new opportunities for the Ukrainian-Turkish relations, including the sphere of European integration.**

**First of all, it is coordinating our positions in negotiations with the EU on the visa-free regime.** Here, Ukraine and Turkey could use the potential of the Council of Europe.

**Ukraine's and Turkey's position on trade and economic negotiations with the EU require coordination, especially within the WTO.** For Ukraine, the Turkish experience of the Customs Union with the EU, and how Turkey combines it with a number of free trade agreements with other states, is of great importance.

**Joint position of Ukraine and Turkey on European security may play a key role in the formation of the new Euro-Atlantic security architecture.** It is very important, in a situation, where the US has nearly started to reduce its strategic presence in Europe, and the EU cannot be responsible for the security in Europe on its own.

**In general, common challenges that Ukraine and Turkey face in their relations with the EU and the lack of real membership perspective for both countries provide new unique opportunities for the Ukrainian-Turkish strategic dialogue on European integration.**



## ARTICLES

The Razumkov Centre

# THE UKRAINIAN-TURKISH PARTNERSHIP: SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

Over the past 20 years, the Black Sea region has undergone fundamental changes caused by collapse of the so-called «socialist camp», the end of the Cold War, and the formation of new independent states in the Black Sea region. These changes have created an entirely new geopolitical situation in the region, in particular leaving behind the image of the Black Sea as the “sea-for-two”, i.e. the area of confrontation between the West (represented by Turkey as the member of NATO) and the East (the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact).

On the other hand, despite these changes, the Black Sea region for two decades did not establish itself as an integral unit with a certain regional identity; and as a multilateral cooperation of countries, which have common goals and interests and promote their joint efforts in world politics<sup>1</sup>. Today, the Black Sea countries are members of different economic, political and military macro-regional structures (i.e. EU, NATO, CSTO, CIS) – and this membership primarily determines their position in the region. The only organization that encompasses all countries in the region – the BSEC – is too amorphous and weak to form and implement policies, which are truly

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<sup>1</sup> This is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that various international political and economic actors define differently the boundaries of the region and the countries that belong to it (of course, apart from the coastal ones).

regional and aimed at identifying and implementing common interests and goals of all regional actors, including security and stability in the region.

In these conditions, two blocks of issues, related to cooperation of the Black Sea countries, can be distinguished: problems in bilateral and multilateral relations, addressing which, is a task of primary importance, when it comes to security.

The relations between Ukraine and Turkey – one of the recognized regional leader – play an important role in the region. Revitalization of these relations, bringing them up to the level of strategic partnership would, *firstly*, contribute to strengthening peace-making initiatives in the region; *secondly*, it would balance the growing ambitions of Russia, in particular, in its attempts to monopolize energy transit across the region; and *thirdly*, it would foster “Europeanization” of both countries and relations in the region, in general.

## **FEATURES AND PROBLEMS OF THE BLACK SEA REGION<sup>2</sup>**

**Geographical location of the Black Sea region – as the region of «three seas», connecting the Caspian and the Mediterranean – makes it an extremely sensitive region in geopolitical terms.** In recent years, the region acquired a new geo-strategic feature as an essential connecting link in transportation of energy resources from the Caspian region to Europe; as a platform with actors to compete for influence over wider geographical processes, covering Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. Political and economic interests of many regional and global players converge there. The situation is aggravated by both ‘frozen’ and active conflicts in the region, an increasing rate of cross-border crime, an emergence of the so-called ‘new threats’ (drug trafficking, cyber crime, WMD proliferation etc.)<sup>3</sup>.

**Three different world cultures – Christianity, Islam and Western secular culture – overlap and coexist in the region.** Recently, however, there has been some growing tension in such a “triangle of cultures” related to the emergence and strengthening of radical movements (“political Islam”, “political orthodoxy”, xenophobia, etc.), which represent a real threat to security and stability in the Black Sea region and to a wider geopolitical area.

**Thus, the US diminished interest and the EU’s weak policy towards the Black Sea region enhance the increasing role of regional states, which struggle for leadership and control over the situation in the region.** Russia’s regional ambitions, for instance, represent a source of instability, which, on one hand, relate to the continuous attempts to return Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine under

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<sup>2</sup> For more on the situation in the Black Sea Region see: Crimea, Ukraine, Black Sea Region: security and development. Razumkov Centre’s analytical report. – National Security and Defence, 2011, No.4-5, p. 2-20.

<sup>3</sup> “Frozen” conflicts include the situation in Transnistria, Nagorny-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, active ones – so-called “Kurdish problem” in Turkey.

its sphere of influence, and on the other, to exert political pressure on European states by exploiting Europe's dependence on Russia's energy.

**In combination, these factors lead to an increased vulnerability of the Black Sea region towards negative external influences and internal threats.** The analysis of developments in recent years gives grounds to assume that the binary confrontation of the Cold War may have been replaced with the new division lines in the region i.e. zones of "privileged" interests of several regional and global players.

**Such a development does not meet the objective of establishing the Black Sea region, which is ready to cooperate and, which makes a full use of its potential.** Therefore, the Black Sea region requires a comprehensive rethinking of the processes, which undergo in the region; a search for adequate solutions to regional challenges and threats; a modernization of existing cooperation mechanisms; and an efficient use of available resources.

**It is obvious that the situation in the region is determined by various factors. On one hand, it is influenced by the leading global players. On the other, it is a system of dynamic bilateral relations, among which the Ukrainian-Turkish relations are of particular interest.**

## UKRAINE AND TURKEY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

### UKRAINE

**Since the early 1990s Ukraine has been trying to establish itself as a regional leader** – as delivered in the President's last Annual Message to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (in April 2011)<sup>4</sup>.

Several steps have been made in this direction – successful and those, which could have been successful, if implemented with consistent and sustainable efforts. Thus, in 1993, Ukraine put forward an initiative to ensure the naval security of the Black Sea region<sup>5</sup>. After lengthy negotiations in April 2002 in Kyiv, the heads of foreign services of the six Black Sea states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Turkey) signed the *Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Naval Sphere on the Black Sea*<sup>6</sup>. The document is currently in force, including the annual thematic naval exercises «Trust»<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> It means that Ukraine should develop a comprehensive regional policy in order to assert itself as an influential player in the Black Sea region.

<sup>5</sup> The negotiations (10 rounds) on this issue took place during 1998-2001, since it was actually the first European experience of multilateral discussion of the security issues in the naval area

<sup>6</sup> The main areas of cooperation, defined by the Document, include: cooperation and contacts in the naval area, cooperation in the prevention of environmental threats, in counter-terrorism, including assistance in combating organized crime, drug and weapon trafficking, as well as development of cooperation in search and rescue and other activities.

<sup>7</sup> Thus, Trust-2009 exercises were held in September in Ukraine (in Crimea), theme of exercises – "Organization of Assistance for the Distressed Ship (Vessel)".

**Today, however, the internal political instability, inconsistent foreign policy, and limited economic and military resources make it impossible for Ukraine to implement its leadership ambitions.** During the years of independence and mainly due to internal issues, the country has gradually lost an opportunity for political leadership both in creating the “Baltic-Black Sea arc” (in particular, the Community of Democratic Choice, CDC) and in forming an effective political and economic core of the Black Sea region (GUAM-ODED)<sup>8</sup>.

**Ukraine’s political and economic position in the region has weakened.** With the commissioning of the Russian Blue Stream and the Nord Stream pipelines, Ukraine has lost its monopoly over transit of the Russian gas to Europe, and following the construction of the South Stream, it risks losing the status of a transit state, too.

The Kharkiv agreements, by extending the lease of the Sevastopol naval base by Russia for 25 years, have weakened Ukraine’s positions in dialogue with Russia, narrowed its prospects for ensuring security in the Black Sea region, and created the unnecessary risks to its own national security.

**In such conditions, Ukraine has to adequately assess its own capabilities and prospects in the region and to find its own “niche” in the region’s development, while ensuring its stability and preventing its militarization.**

This does not mean that Ukraine has to give up its national interests and conform to the rules of the ‘big politics’ led by major regional and/or global players. Sustainable development and security of the region comply with national interests of Ukraine as well as other countries in the region. It is amongst the regional states Ukraine should seek reliable partners to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

**In this sense, the development of cooperation with Turkey is of great importance for Ukraine.**

## **TURKEY**

**Over the last decade, Turkey has successfully implemented a programme of economic modernization and strengthening of national security.** Nowadays, it is ahead of all the EU countries in terms of the pace of its economic development and is ranked the 2<sup>nd</sup> in the world (after China); in 2010 Turkey was ranked the 15<sup>th</sup> in the world by GDP.

**Turkey has also significantly stressed the regional dimension of its foreign and security policy.** It introduced four successful regional security initiatives: the Black Sea Partnership (launched in 1999)<sup>9</sup>, Black Sea Littoral States Border/Coast Guard

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<sup>8</sup> Thus, at Baku summit in June 2007 the initiative to create an international peacekeeping battalion, which would act under the aegis of the UN and OSCE in order to maintain peace in conflict zones, was put forward. However, it ended in talk.

<sup>9</sup> The annual international naval exercises, which are usually held in the territorial waters of Turkey and have a thematic focus.

Cooperation Forum (2000)<sup>10</sup>, BLACKSEAFOR (2001)<sup>11</sup>, anti-terrorist operation the Black Sea Harmony (2004)<sup>12</sup>. In August 2008 (after the Russian-Georgian military conflict), Turkey proposed a plan for settlement of the situation – the Platform of Stability and Cooperation in the Caucasus according to the formula 3+2 (three South Caucasus republics – Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia and Russia and Turkey)<sup>13</sup>.

The country has also been strengthening the military component of its national security system<sup>14</sup>. Today, Turkey’s Armed Forces are the largest in Europe and the second in NATO (after the US) according to the number of personnel and weapons.

**In relations with countries of the region, Turkey has adopted “zero problems with neighbours” strategy with a special emphasis on ‘desecuritization’** (i.e. the emphasis in inter-state relations is primarily placed on trade, economic, cultural, humanitarian spheres). Overall, Turkey positions itself as a state, which connects not only territories, but also cultures and civilizations. The important aspect of this policy is the establishing of strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries (for the moment the strategic cooperation councils are established with Iraq, Greece, Russia and Syria)<sup>15</sup>.

**Turkey, today, plays a leading role in strengthening confidence and security in the Black Sea region. Therefore, the strategic partnership with Turkey is extremely important for Ukraine to enhance security and stability in the region, as well as to its own national security.**

## THE UKRAINIAN-TURKISH COOPERATION TODAY

The Ukrainian-Turkish relations have been developing in favourable conditions: both countries and the people do not raise questions of reviewing the history, have

<sup>10</sup> Member states: Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine.

<sup>11</sup> Member states: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine. Ukraine ratified the Agreement on Group Establishment in June 2003.

<sup>12</sup> The operation is combined with the NATO antiterrorist operation “Active Endeavour” in the Mediterranean, involving Russia and Ukraine as well. Permanent cooperation centre of operation “Black Sea Harmony” is located in Karadeniz Ereğli (Turkey). Ukrainian liaison officer is constantly working at the Centre, who is authorized to act as a contact person between the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey.

<sup>13</sup> At present the Platform is under discussion. It should be noted that this is not the first initiative of Turkey in respect of settlement of the situation in the southern Caucasus. Specifically, in 1999 then-President of Turkey S.Demirel proposed Stability Pact for the Caucasus, based on the principles of the OSCE and the Balkan Pact (Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe).

<sup>14</sup> The current military-political course of Turkey is formalized in the “National Security Strategy” (March 2006). By definition, it is of defensive but active nature and includes initiatives and actions that would have a positive impact on the regional and macro-regional security.

<sup>15</sup> However, it should be noted that conflicts with its neighbors are not always possible to avoid. Thus, currently there are tensions in Turkey’s relations with Armenia, Israel, Syria, Iraq.

no territorial claims or other unresolved issues with each other. On the contrary, Turkey has provided Ukraine with significant assistance related to the settlement of Crimean Tatars<sup>16</sup>. Ukraine, on the other hand, actively participates in Turkey's peacekeeping initiatives in the Black Sea region, as well as together with Turkey in NATO programmes (in particular, the PfP and Air Situation Data Exchange<sup>17</sup>).

**It should also be mentioned that Turkey was among the first countries, which recognized Ukraine's independence<sup>18</sup>.** The basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries was signed in May 1992, during the official visit of then-President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, to Ankara. Currently, the Ukrainian-Turkish bilateral relations are based on strong contractual terms: generally 83 documents have been signed, which regulate a wide range of issues – from economic, political and military cooperation to a cultural exchange. **In 2003, relations with Ukraine have become an official priority in Turkish foreign policy<sup>19</sup>.**

Over 20 years of Ukraine's independence, the Ukrainian-Turkish relations have experienced its ups and downs. The recent dynamic in cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey, however, has become upward, and there is a shift from cooperation to a strategic partnership between the two countries.

**1. Political and diplomatic contacts have intensified.** Thus, in 2010 and early 2011, there was a series of meetings at the top- and the highest levels. In May 2010, the

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<sup>16</sup> It should be noted that sometimes the Ukrainian politicians and the media express concerns about the use of Crimean Tatars by Turkey to destabilize the situation in Crimea and its autonomy on ethnic grounds. However, Turkey has never made any steps to violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine by using the 'Crimean Tatar' factor.

<sup>17</sup> NATO program within the PfP (*Air Situation Data Exchange – ASDE*) was launched in 2001. Ukraine joined the program in 2008 by signing the Memorandum with the Alliance and Hungary (on exchange of information between the "West" Air Command Station (Lviv) and Control and Reporting Center of Hungary (Veszprém)), in May 2010 – such Memorandum was signed with Turkey and provides for the data exchange between the "South" Air Command Station (Odessa) and Control and Reporting Center of the Turkish Air Force (Erzurum).

<sup>18</sup> As early as in March 1991, then-President of Turkey T. Özal came with an official visit to Ukraine, during which he suggested to create area of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Declaration of Principles and Objectives of the Relationship of Two Countries was signed; in November 1991, (i.e. before the Ukrainian referendum on independence) Turkey announced the establishment of consular relations with Ukraine; on December, 16 1991, Turkey officially recognized the state independence of Ukraine. On February 3, 1992, Protocol on Establishing Diplomatic Relations was signed; on May 4, 1992 – Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation and Intergovernmental Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation. On 3 April, 1992, Turkish Embassy in Kyiv started its work, on January 3, 1993 – Ukraine Embassy in Ankara.

<sup>19</sup> By Resolution of the Prime Minister, Ukraine is listed as "leading countries, with which Turkey will develop relationships to model level in the short and medium term".

Minister of Internal Affairs of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu, came to Kyiv with an official visit, during which the parties signed the Action Plan for 2010-2011 and advanced the Joint Declaration on Establishment of Strategic Partnership. The parties also hold the seventh session of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Turkish Commission for trade and economic cooperation. Following its results, the Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine, Serhiy Tihipko, said: “Turkey is one of Ukraine’s most important partners. For this partnership to be most effective, we are currently developing a clear step-by-step plan of joint actions for further economic integration. We must use our potential to the maximum to develop a mutually beneficial partnership in trade and economy between our countries”<sup>20</sup>.

In June 2010, the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich came to Ankara with a working visit. A landmark moment of the Ukrainian-Turkish cooperation was the meeting of the President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Kyiv (January 2011), during which the parties signed six intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in economic, energy, defense and transport sectors, as well as the Joint Declaration on Strategic Council of High Level<sup>21</sup> between Ukraine and Turkey.

During the visit, Erdogan also took part in the XV joint session of the Ukrainian-Turkish Business Council and the business forum<sup>22</sup>. The meetings discussed the possible participation by the Ukrainian companies in tenders to supply weapons for the Turkish Armed Forces<sup>23</sup>; the purchase of the Ukrainian aircrafts An-148 by Turkey; and the launch of the Turkish satellite by the Ukrainian “Dnipro” launch vehicle<sup>24</sup>.

**Overall, following the results of the meeting, the President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister of Turkey, at a joint press conference, announced the transition from “friendship and cooperation” between the two countries to the level of “strategic partnership”.**

**2. Trade and economic cooperation became sustainable.** In 1992, trade turnover between the two countries amounted to only about \$120 million, but since 1995 this figure has been annually exceeding \$1 billion. Since mid-2000s, Turkey is ranked

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<sup>20</sup> Ukraine and Turkey intend to actively deepen their bilateral relations – Tihipko. – UNIAN, May 26, 2010.

On February 22-23, 2011, regular meeting of the Joint Ukrainian-Turkish Commission on international road carriage of passengers and cargo;

<sup>21</sup> See: Official site of the President of Ukraine – <http://www.president.gov.ua/news/19198.html>

<sup>22</sup> It should be noted that during this visit the Prime Minister of Turkey was accompanied by three ministers of the Turkish Government (Energy and Natural Resources, Transport, Industry and Trade). Along with the official delegation, about 600 representatives of Turkish business community arrived.

<sup>23</sup> In 2000, Turkey adopted the military modernization program until 2025, estimated at \$ 150 billion.

<sup>24</sup> *Rasat satellite* was launched into orbit in August 2011.

**Dynamics of Goods Trade between Ukraine and Turkey**  
(*\$ mln.*)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>Trade turnover</b>	1148	1489	1277	2352	2642	3159	4622	6583	3079	4324
<b>Export</b>	1009	1277	946	1941	2034	2390	3650	4633	2127	3026
<b>Import</b>	138	211	330	411	607	769	972	1950	952	1298
<b>Balance</b>		1065	616	1530	1427	1621	2630	2683	1174	1728

second (after Russia) among consumers of the Ukrainian exports, and Ukraine has the largest surplus in trade with Turkey (table “*Dynamics of Goods Trade between Ukraine and Turkey*”<sup>25</sup>), which, unfortunately, is not the same with trade in services<sup>26</sup>.

Positive dynamics of the Ukrainian-Turkish trade (even given the significant drop in its volumes up to \$ 3.1 billion during the crisis in 2009) led the leaders of both countries to forecast reaching the level of \$20 billion by 2020. However, there are several problems to remain in trade and economic relations between the two states, such as imbalance of bilateral trade; quotas set by the Turkish government on certain types of metal products, originating from countries which are non-EU member states and/or do not have a Free Trade Agreement with the EU; an increase in customs duty rate on imports of hot and cold roll, which limits opportunities for Ukraine in this sector.

Investment cooperation requires intensification. In the beginning of 2011, the direct Turkish investments in Ukraine amounted to \$150.6 million, with a significant share of them allotted to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC). Ukraine’s direct investment, according to analysts’ estimates, was only \$100.8 thousand<sup>27</sup>.

**However, it should be noted that funding of the joint projects in Ukraine by the Turkish side is much bigger, than the volume of its direct investments.** According

<sup>25</sup> Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. – Site of Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, <http://www.ukrexport.gov.ua> The main products of *Ukraine’s exports to Turkey* are steel rolling, coal, fertilizers and others chemical products, and *those of imports from Turkey* – textiles, machinery, household chemicals, agricultural products.

<sup>26</sup> In services trade Ukraine’s balance has been negative since 2005 (in particular in the pre-crisis 2007 it was \$ 47.9 million) – primarily due to Turkey’s significant advantage in providing tourist services. According to travel agencies of Ukraine, since mid-2000s Turkey has been visited annually by 600-700 thou. of Ukrainian tourists. Instead, Ukraine – by only about 40 thou. of Turkish citizens. One reason for this – presence of rather strict Ukraine’s visa regime for citizens of Turkey.

<sup>27</sup> It should be noted that official figures are incomplete as a result of confidentiality of information on the volumes of certain types of investment both of Ukraine and to Ukraine (according to the Law of Ukraine “On State Statistics). See: Situation and prospects of Ukrainian-Turkish relations: Research Note. – <http://www.niss.gov.ua/artikles/472>

to the Ukrainian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, up till now, the Turkish companies in Ukraine have implemented 128 large-scale construction and financing projects with the total value of over \$3 billion<sup>28</sup>.

**3. Inter-regional cooperation has been developing.** Over 25 agreements are concluded between the cities and administrative territories of Ukraine and Turkey (including 11 agreements signed with settlements of the ARC). In particular, such twin cities are Kyiv and Ankara, Istanbul and Odessa etc. The Association of Ukrainian Cities comprises the Turkish department. However, the humanitarian and cultural potential of this type of cooperation is not properly used. These links are often mostly formal, with contacts established solely at the official level.

**4. Work is performed on reconciling interests and addressing problems that hinder further development of relations.** The results of the formal meetings and negotiations show that Ukraine is primarily interested in: joint projects in the transport sector (including the transportation of energy resources); increasing trade and investment. Turkey's primary interests comprise the establishing of a visa free regime and creating the Free Trade Area (FTA) with Ukraine.

- **Abolition of visa regime by Ukraine for the Turkish citizens**<sup>29</sup>. The start of the process was announced by the President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister of Turkey in Kyiv in January 2011. Erdogan said the Agreement on Abolition of Visa Regime should be prepared concurrently with the preparation of readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU<sup>30</sup>. According to preliminary

<sup>28</sup> In particular: construction of the "Donbass Arena" stadium ("Enka" company), a new terminal at the airport "Boryspil" ("Doğuş" company), road construction in preparation for Euro 2012 (ONUR), development of cellar communications networks ("Çukurova" and "Turkcell" companies) etc. See: Investment cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey (2010).- Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, <http://www.ukrexport.gov.ua>

<sup>29</sup> For the moment, Turkey has visa-free regime with over 60 countries. In Ukraine, the abolition of visas, leading to the uncontrolled influx of labour force, raises concerns. However, living standards in Turkey today are quite comparable with the Ukrainian ones, therefore Turkish foreign labour migration is unlikely to constitute a real threat to Ukraine.

<sup>30</sup> Negotiations between Turkey and the EU on Readmission Agreement were initiated in 2009. Insisting on signing the Agreement the EU tries to protect member states against the penetration of illegal migrants through Turkey territory. According to some data, about 100 thousand illegal migrants get to the EU countries annually through Turkey. The EU is ready to take on half the cost of their deportation from Turkey. For its part, Turkey demands the abolition of visas for Turkish citizens in their travel to the Schengen countries. In February 2011, the EU ministers approved Readmission Agreement with Turkey, but refrained from visa liberalization, proposing «visa dialogue» instead. Foreign Minister L.Davutoglu reacted negatively to this offer: «We expect that the EU Council will mandate the European Commission to start negotiations with Turkey. While these expectations are not implemented, the readmission agreement will not be signed and executed. as Turkey will not act unilaterally». See: Resolution of the EU ministers does not meet Turkey's expectations. – <http://turkey-today.ru>, February 27, 2011.

data, the two agreements shall be signed by the end of this year and submitted for ratification. Ukraine is interested in ratifying agreements before Euro 2012, because, *firstly*, it will increase the tourist flow from Turkey not only for the championship, but further on, and *secondly*, it will promote business contacts and enhance the investment cooperation. Today, the Turkish side has provided for consideration with its version of the Agreement on Abolition of Visa Regime; in April 2011, the negotiations on the agreement have started.

- **Conclusion of the Ukrainian-Turkish FTA agreement.** According to the Ambassador of Turkey to Ukraine Ahmet Meric, the creation of FTA could double the volume of bilateral trade. However, this agreement must be consistent with the negotiation process on signing of a deep and comprehensive free trade area between Ukraine and the EU, and has to consider the Turkish membership in the EU's Customs Union. In case of signing the FTA agreement with the EU (even in the absence of such an agreement with Turkey) the Turkish market should be opened to the Ukrainian goods, while the Ukrainian to Turkish would continue to remain regulated.

In addition, an opening of the Ukrainian market for Turkish products can create certain risks for national producers. Therefore, Ukraine in the process of negotiations on FTA offers a number of compensatory measures, including: an abolition of import duties on export of the Ukrainian metal and metal products (i.e. pipes), an open access for the Ukrainian companies to certain Turkish projects (including the infrastructure projects), the strengthening of cooperation in the defense-industrial sector. Ukraine's participation in building the nuclear power plant by Russia in Vilayet Ichel was also discussed<sup>31</sup>.

**To sum up, both parties are interested in further development of cooperation and solving problems that impede that cooperation as soon as possible. Both countries are interested in security and stability in the Black Sea region. Both, pursue the European integration and attempt to 'Europeanize' (to a various extent and in different ways) their societies as well as their domestic and foreign policy. Finally, the two countries are complementary to the transport and communication corridor between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, Ukraine and Turkey are desirable political and economic partners in the Eurasian part.**

## **PROSPECTS FOR A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN UKRAINE AND TURKEY**

As noted above, in January 2011, the President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister of Turkey announced the transition of relations between the two countries from "friendship and cooperation" to a "strategic partnership".

Today, it is quite difficult to provide with a clear understanding the parties have on nature and content of the proclaimed partnership. Obviously, the main component of bilateral relations will remain the trade/economic one. However, the development

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<sup>31</sup> Relevant agreement with Russia was ratified by the Parliament of Turkey in July 2010.

of trade and economic links are not enough to establish a truly strategic partnership. It is necessary to activate other areas as well i.e. security cooperation; settlement of “frozen conflicts”; cooperation with the EU and other macro-regional actors; cooperation in transport and energy spheres. The development of relations in the humanitarian sphere requires some special attention.

## SECURITY POLICY

**Enhancing cooperation on strengthening security in the Black Sea region.** Security cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey is essential to maintain the balance of power not only in the Black Sea region, but also in the Eastern Europe. The situation in this sense is very complicated, because, on the one hand, both countries are, to some extent, dependent on Russia, while, on the other, Russia is trying to restore its dominant influence in the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region. Hence, Turkey has a special interest in “Europeanization” of Ukraine, its integration into the EU, and in Ukraine’s independent foreign policy<sup>32</sup>. Ukraine is also interested in preserving the balance of power, although its refusal to join NATO and the prolongation of stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol have strengthened Russia’s position in the Black Sea region.

Active participation of both countries in the regional security initiatives (i.e. *BLAKSEAFOR*, “Black Sea Harmony” etc) becomes more important. Both countries should share their vision of regional security and coordinate their bilateral cooperation respectively, as well as to take measures in promoting multilateral cooperation to combat terrorism and cross-border criminal activities.

**Strengthening efforts in seeking ways to settle the “frozen conflicts”** (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny-Karabakh), which have a negative impact on the prospects of the Black Sea region, including its investment attractiveness and a long-term planning of global projects. These conflicts are also central to smuggling, illegal arms trade and drugs and human trafficking and cross-border crime, which threaten regional security. In addition, a continuous tension between the conflicting parties adds to the process of militarization of the Black Sea region.

In particular, it is necessary to use Ukraine’s OSCE presidency in 2013, which enables cooperation with Turkey to play a more constructive role in resolving Nagorny-Karabakh conflict.

**Actively use a bilateral dialogue of the two countries with the EU.** Recently, there has been a growing interest of the EU in the Black Sea region. The impact of the EU is high, because its policy initiatives (such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Black Sea Synergy, the Eastern Partnership) are aimed bringing Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine closer to the EU. At the same time, the

<sup>32</sup> In this context the fact that Turkey was one of the first to welcome the decision of CNSD of Ukraine dated May 23, 2002 on course to join NATO.

EU has a strategic partnership with Russia. For those countries in the region, which are non-EU members, the EU has become the most important economic partner. For most of them, it is a catalyst for social and political change.

Thus, there is a need to clarify the EU position regarding the implementation of the Black Sea strategy. Turkey and Ukraine should also work on ways to get the EU involved in the Ukrainian-Turkish strategic cooperation and to improve security and stability in the Black Sea region.

**Strengthening defense, military and military-technical cooperation.** Bilateral cooperation in defense sector is based primarily on the intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in the Defense Industry (May, 1998) and the Agreement on Mutual Protection of Classified Information and Material Exchanged in the Process of Cooperation in the Defense Industry (November 2000). In particular, according to the Agreement of 1998 International Research Center of High Technologies was established and has been operating in Gebze (Turkey)<sup>33</sup>. In addition to the regional peacekeeping and counter-terrorism programmes, both countries participate in multilateral cooperation activities: both Ukraine and Turkey are members of the Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial Council, established in 1996 to maintain peace and stability in the region; the countries also cooperate within the NATO «Partnership for Peace» Program<sup>34</sup>;

**However, the potential for cooperation in this area is not used to the full extent.** Ukraine is among ten largest exporters of military technology and its maintenance. However, this potential remains unfulfilled, primarily due to: the lack of financing and investing in the Ukrainian defense industry, the lack of orders from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine<sup>35</sup> and no proper strategy for promotion of the Ukrainian military products to the world markets<sup>36</sup>.

On the other hand, since 2006 Turkey has chosen to develop its own defense industry, to produce weapons in compliance with NATO standards by using its

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<sup>33</sup> Practical activities are carried out mainly in the forms of joint projects with the use of intellectual potential of Ukrainian researchers; research areas: bio-and nanotechnology, microelectronics and radio-detecting.

<sup>34</sup> In particular, substantial assistance in the field of military education to Naval Forces of Ukraine and other Black Sea states is provided by PiP Training Center of the General Staff of Turkey Armed Forces, established in 1998, where the operational training of officers of multinational staffs on crisis management, terrorism, legal issues of operations, humanitarian aid during natural disasters, on civil-military cooperation issues etc is carried out.

<sup>35</sup> The average share of military expenditures of NATO countries, intended for the purchase of industrial complex products, is about 20% of the defense budget, in Ukraine – less than 5%.

<sup>36</sup> Although the Ukrainian defense industry has something to offer for the consumers. Thus, at the International Exhibition “IDEF 2011» (May, 2011, Istanbul) the State Company “Ukrspetsexport” presented ATGM “Skif”, system of optical-electronic protection against MANPADS “Adros”, layouts of the main battle tank “Oplot”, armoured personnel carrier БТP-4, armoured prime mover MT-JIB, as well as promotional information about the capacities of Ukrainian companies on repair and modernization of armoured vehicles, aircraft, RLS.

internal resources and a closed-cycle production<sup>37</sup>. Turkey's main partners are such NATO-member states as Germany, the UK, the US, France.

Despite all the above, **the cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine in defense and military technical spheres has a good development prospect**. Turkey is still interested to cooperate in shipbuilding (including the project on corvettes designing), aviation industry, high-tech electronics; production of Turkish tank; familiarization with the parameters of development and production of the Ukrainian tactical missile system etc. **Undoubtedly, a more active use of Ukraine's potential in bilateral cooperation in defense sector would contribute to bringing the relations between the two countries up to the level of a strategic partnership.**

## TRANSPORT

As noted above, **the significance of the Black Sea region, as a major transcontinental transport corridor, is growing**. It should be noted that Ukraine and Turkey together share the largest territory (about 3000 km out of 4090 km, or 73% of the total length) of the Black Sea coastline<sup>38</sup>. In other words, these two countries, which are located on the opposite shores of the Black Sea, represent the «widest gate» between Europe and Asia, the North and the South. This creates both conditions for competition and opportunities for cooperation in the long-haul transportation and transit.

**A strategic partnership involves minimizing competition and strengthening cooperation with an emphasis on mutually beneficial projects.** These developments can be seen in results of the January meeting between the President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister of Turkey. The Governments of Ukraine and Turkey reported on development of a new transnational transport corridor that will connect the Eastern and Central Europe with the Middle East and Asia. A number of joint projects, involving the third countries, are planned. In particular, Turkey has put forward the initiative to build transport corridors by routes Ukraine-Turkey-Egypt and the Baltic Sea-the Red Sea (Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Syria and Jordan). Ukraine, in its turn, has proposed Turkey to join the railway project “Viking”

<sup>37</sup> In this context, *firstly*, the considerable attention of Turkey Government to the financing of education and science, which amounts by 2013 will be increase to 2% of GDP (today – about 0.7%) is representative. It increases funding of scientific and technological sphere by the private sector. Most of the leading Turkish companies already have research and development divisions and it is planned that by 2013 about 150 thousand people will work in this sector. *Secondly* – the Turkish practice of creation and development of technology parks network: thus, if in 2003 two industrial parks operated, where 100 skilled workers implemented 200 projects, in 2008 already 30 parks were operating, the number of qualified staff has increased to 2,000 persons, and the number of projects – to 4,000.

<sup>38</sup> Ukraine – over 1 500 km, Turkey – around 1 500 km. *To compare*: Russia – around 400 km.

(Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania). An intergovernmental agreement on organizing international direct freight rail and ferry services was signed.

**The Ukrainian-Turkish transport cooperation is fast growing in aviation, maritime and road carriages.** And, if air flights (including regular) are primarily related to the tourist flows<sup>39</sup>, the sea and road carriages have great prospects to increase transcontinental flows of freight. Today, Ukraine and Turkey have three ferry lines<sup>40</sup> operating on a regular basis; in January 2011 freight carriages Odessa-Istanbul were initiated within the new ferry route “*Blacsea Express*”. The project involves the transit of cargo through Ukraine to Poland and other European and Baltic countries. It is expected to attract the Turkish companies to the Ukrainian-Belarusian-Lithuanian project “Viking”. Practical implementation of rail and ferry carriages Odessa-Samsun is launched, that will further be involved in the system of ferry lines between Ukraine, Bulgaria and Georgia.

Implementation of this project will create a new EU-Turkey transport corridor and will enable to transport and transit cargo from Europe through Turkey to the countries of the Middle East with minimum time spent.

**Creating transcontinental transport corridors, in which Ukraine and Turkey will play a key role, will really correspond to the strategic partnership status.**

## ENERGY

**Energy relations are characterized as rather competitive between the two countries, with their unilateral efforts to ensure their own energy security, as well as participation in transcontinental energy transit projects.** However, the joint tripartite enterprise JSC “Gastransit” represents a positive example of cooperation between Ukraine, Turkey and Russia in the energy sector. In 1999-2001 the parties implemented a project to increase capacity of the pipeline Ananiiv-Tyraspil-Ismail, which enabled to significantly increase the transit of the Russian gas through Ukraine to Turkey and to Balkan states.

**A characteristic feature of Turkey’s energy policy is the consistent policy of diversification of gas supplies.** Today, through the main pipelines, the country receives natural gas from Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. In addition, LNG terminal is built on the Mediterranean coast, which allows importing liquefied gas from major gas producing regions in the world.

**This energy policy allows Turkey to stand strong** in negotiation processes and to refuse disadvantageous contracts (although Russia still has the leading positions

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<sup>39</sup> Ukraine has the second place (after Germany) by the number of cities, to which the “Turkish Airlines” make regular flights.

<sup>40</sup> Between ports of Illichivsk-Derndzhe, Evpatoria-Zolhundak and Skadovsk-Zolhundak.

in the energy cooperation)<sup>41</sup>. Ukraine's positions in energy cooperation with Turkey are much weaker than that of Russia. Only a few of the Ukrainian companies are involved in development of a pipeline infrastructure in Turkey<sup>42</sup>.

**Meanwhile, for Ukraine, which has a significant experience in construction and exploitation of pipelines, hydropower plants and other energy facilities, cooperation in the following areas can be promising:** joint exploration and extraction of oil and natural gas in the Black Sea; implementation of joint projects in the renewable energy sector; Ukraine's participation in creating the nuclear energy sector in Turkey; increasing export of coal to Turkey (which plays a significant role in its energy supply).

**For Ukraine, it is also important to coordinate its efforts with Turkey in building the South Stream gas pipeline** in the Black Sea due to high environmental risks, and due to the fact that the Russian project goes against Ukraine's policy, which is primarily aimed at preserving the status of a leading gas transit state to Europe. **It is also important to work on the construction of LNG terminal in Odessa and the supply of raw materials, by taking into account the problem of congestion of Turkish straits**<sup>43</sup>.

## HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION

**Cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, which comprises interpersonal contacts, cooperation between non-governmental organizations and institutions, and culture, traditions and information exchange, is a significantly important element of a strategic partnership, since it provides with public support in each of the countries.**

Currently, the humanitarian cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey is based on the Intergovernmental Agreement on Cultural Exchange of 1996 and the Agreement in Education of 1998. Certain measures have been implemented under these agreements: performances of creative groups, exhibitions, students and teachers exchange (the agreement have entered into in more than 10 universities from both

<sup>41</sup> Thus, in 2003 in response to Russia's attempts to use Turkey's dependence on Russian natural gas for pressure in matters of usage Turkish Straits, Ankara has found alternative sources and methods of gas supply and reduced indicated dependence up to 75%, in 2008 – up to 63% (dependence on supplies of Russian oil – 30%). In September, 2011, Turkish energy company informed of the refusal to extend in 2012 long-term contract with OJSC "Gazprom" for supply of 6 billion cubic meters of gas (through Ukraine), because it was not satisfied with the price terms.

<sup>42</sup> In particular, Sumy SPA named after Frunze is involved in the construction of compressor stations on Turkish pipelines; "Metinvest" company supplies products for pipeline projects; other Ukrainian companies are involved in Turkey's energy projects.

<sup>43</sup> From this perspective, the main focus should be on the potential supply of Azerbaijani gas through the Georgian port of Poti, where the liquefaction plant is being built.

countries), translation of literature and scientific work; language learning (particularly in Ukraine, over 1,500 students study the Turkish language in high schools and higher educational establishments<sup>44</sup>.

As mentioned above, cooperation agreements were signed between the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine and TV and Radio Broadcasting Company of Turkey, as well as between the Ukrainian State Agency “Ukrinform” and the Turkish News Agency.

However, despite all these measures, media coverage of bilateral relations, culture, history of each other in both countries is very fragmented. The level of interpersonal contacts, knowledge of each other culture, traditions and current affairs is low. The development of cooperation between the non-governmental organizations and research institutions is insufficient as well. **As a result, the goal of a strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey expressed at the highest political level, might not receive an adequate public support in both countries.**

**Therefore, when taking into account the issues in humanitarian cooperation as well as the above problems in the Black Sea region, in general, it is appropriate to consider carefully the initiative to create the International Black Sea Academy (IBSA).** IBSA has to be an extensive network of educational establishments of different profiles (both humanitarian and science) and with different levels of accreditation (from colleges to universities), as well as – relevant research centers that will work at the universities. For instance, the University of Black Sea Region Languages and Cultures, institutes of sea ecology, conservation and restoration of cultural monuments; tourist service colleges etc.

The IBSA could, in particular, provide with quality education to future civil servants, diplomats, public figures, businessmen etc. **It is the joint training that gives the cumulative effect for sustainable interpersonal contacts** that will further (with the Academy graduates holding key posts in their countries) play an important role in strengthening political, economic and humanitarian relations between countries in the region. On the other hand, IBSA could become the integrating center of the network of universities and research institutions operating in the Black Sea region.

It would be appropriate if, *firstly*, all the BSEC member states participated in the establishment and maintenance of the IBSA and, *secondly*, the Academy would be established in the Crimea. **Not only Crimea’s geographical location at the centre of the Black Sea region, but also the fact that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is a unique area in Europe, with relatively conflict-free coexistence of different ethnic groups, Islamic and Christian communities, could play in favor of it. This experience of tolerant coexistence and interaction could be spread through**

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<sup>44</sup> With the exception of the Crimea. See: Language, in which Ukraine might tell the world about itself. – Modern education, 2010, <http://s-osvita.com.ua>

the IBSA, which, in turn, would contribute to strengthening the principles of tolerance and understanding between the people of the Black Sea region.

### **RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE ON FORMATION OF THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND TURKEY**

**When evaluating the prospects of the Ukrainian-Turkish strategic partnership, one should consider the impact Russia and the Russian-Turkish relations (which are defined as strategic and formalized in the activities of the appropriate high-level Council) have on cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey.**

On the one hand, Turkey, today, is dependent on Russia's energy supplies and its transit; it is also interested in maintaining the positive trade and economic relations with Russia. Russia also represents a part of security systems in all Turkey's neighbouring regions (the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East). Therefore, in foreign policy, Turkey tends to make decisions by taking into account the interests of Russia, especially when they coincide with Turkey's own position. A good example was the refusal by the Turkish side to allow the U.S. Navy to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to provide with economic and humanitarian aid to Georgia during the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008. When explaining such a decision by Ankara, the Foreign Minister Davutoglu said that, unlike other European countries, Turkey cannot afford isolationist policy toward Russia.

On the other hand, the current foreign policy of Turkey is aimed at strengthening its position of a regional leader and to enhance its mediation efforts in solving global problems. All that contradicts Russia's goal to preserve the status quo and to continue to have a dominant influence on the processes in the neighbouring regions. That certainly goes against the interests of the Caucasus states, Ukraine and Belarus. There is also a conflict of interest between Turkey and Russia concerning the transport and energy policy in the Black Sea region, in particular, in relation to the construction of "Nabucco" pipeline, which violates Russia's monopoly on gas supplies to Europe.

It is clear that Turkey's increasing cooperation with countries of the Black Sea region is a manifestation of neglect towards Russia's regional leadership aspirations. Moreover, there is a chance Russia would try to resist the implementation by the Turkish side of its regional cooperation projects that would force Ankara to consider Russia's possible reaction further on.

**To sum up, we can state the following:**

**Today, there are complex and contradictory processes in the Black Sea region due to many factors, including the fundamental changes that have occurred over the past 20 years both in the Black Sea countries and on the international arena, as a whole. The Black Sea region, so far, failed to establish itself as an**

integral formation, as an association of countries that have common interests and promote them effectively in world politics.

Political and economic interests of many regional and global players compete there. Recently, the region saw a decline of the US's interest in the region and a weakness of the EU's Black Sea Policy; the influence of regional powers in their struggle for leadership in the region is increasing.

The situation is aggravated by the 'frozen' and active conflicts, cross-border crime, and the emergence of the so-called 'new threats'. In combination, these factors lead to an increased vulnerability of the Black Sea region towards negative external influences and internal threats.

In these conditions, it is necessary to rethink the processes that take place in the region; to search for adequate responses to regional challenges and threats; to effectively use the available resources; and to update existing cooperation mechanisms.

The situation in the Black Sea region is defined by the influence of external players and the nature of bilateral relations between the regional states, where the Ukrainian-Turkish relations represent a particular interest.

The Ukrainian-Turkish relations have been developing in rather favourable conditions. The political and diplomatic contacts have intensified recently; cooperation in trade and economy has increased. The work is ongoing on reconciling interests and addressing problems that hinder further development of bilateral relations between the two states.

Kyiv and Ankara are both interested to develop cooperation to the level of a strategic partnership. Both countries are interested in enhancing security and stability in the Black Sea region. It is also important that Ukraine and Turkey are complementary for transport and communications corridor between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, and are desirable partners for the Eurasian states.

For a truly strategic partnership, it is necessary to intensify cooperation in various areas i.e. security sector, the settlement of 'frozen conflicts', cooperation with the EU and other macro-regional actors, transport and energy sphere, aerospace, military and technical sectors etc. It is also important to develop cooperation in the humanitarian sphere.

The increased use of Ukraine's potential in bilateral cooperation in these areas would contribute to bringing the relations between the two countries up to the level of a strategic partnership.

The Ukrainian-Turkish partnership is important to ensure security and stability in the Black Sea region and in a broader geopolitical area as well.



# THE COMMISSION OF THE BLACK SEA: A 2020 VISION FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION



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## ABSTRACT

The Black Sea region is coming into its own, although, it is at times a contested and dangerous neighbourhood. Despite heightened interest in the region, its real priorities and needs are still being largely ignored by insiders and outsiders alike. What is needed are regional solutions for regional problems.

The authors present the key findings and recommendations of the Commission on the Black Sea, a civil society initiative comprising a number of current and former policy-makers, scholars and practitioners both from within the region and from outside, with the purpose of contributing to a joint vision and a common strategy for the Black Sea region by developing new knowledge in areas of key concern.

The Black Sea region is a contested neighbourhood and the subject of intense debate. This reflects the changing dynamics of the region, its complex realities, the interests of outsiders and the region's relations with the rest of the world. Its strategic position, linking north to south and east to west, as well as its oil, gas, transport and trade routes are all important reasons for its increasing relevance.

Despite heightened interest in the area however, the region's real priorities and needs are still being largely ignored. In part this can be attributed to the failure of the regional actors to produce an agreed vision for the future. The emergence of the Black Sea as a region-between-regions and the conflicting agendas of powerful local

and external players distort the necessary regional focus and blur outcomes. Thus, a reassessment of the region, with all of its problems and priorities, is urgently needed. This will provide all actors involved with a better understanding of what can be done, as well as allowing them to develop innovative approaches to problems, thus enhancing the region's security, stability and welfare. The emergence of a peaceful and cooperative Black Sea region would be of benefit to all.

With this in mind and with its overarching approach, the Commission on the Black Sea has sought to promote an inclusive strategy taking into account the needs, priorities and interests of all stakeholders in four essential areas: peace and security, economic development and welfare, democratic institutions and good governance and, finally, regional cooperation. The Commission has come to an understanding that the region's future lies in further democratization and economic integration with the wider world.

The rationale behind the preparation of this report has been the increased geopolitical volatility of the region which, in certain places, can ignite at any given moment into open warfare. The area's unresolved conflicts retard economic development and have the potential to flare up into wider conflagrations. They impact regional stability and security and, unless tackled, threaten far greater international ramifications. But it is the Commission's conviction that it is realistic to envisage a cohesive, developed, integrated and stable region. To do so:

The regional actors must renounce the use of force in their political relations and respect each other's territorial integrity, the inviolability of their borders, international treaties and the rule of law in their dealings.

Interested outsiders must support efforts to secure good governance, the creation of interdependencies and the regionalization of the Black Sea's politics and economy.

The international community must encourage cooperative efforts and confidence-building measures as well as actions in favour of the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Black Sea politics works best if the approach is regional. The states in question should be encouraged to seek regional solutions for regional problems. The stakeholders must face up to the need to tackle tasks together and allow for non-state actors such as the business sector, NGOs and civil society to play a real role in shaping solutions.

## **KEY FINDINGS: AN ASSESSMENT**

The Black Sea region's state of play and its increased relevance to various stakeholders suggest that much needs to be done to ensure that it evolves peacefully and constructively and that it becomes a reliable community that poses no threat to itself or to its neighbours. This in turn implies an emphasis on security concerns, sustainable development, regional cooperation and good governance. What comes as a surprise perhaps is that the tools needed to address these challenges already exist.

These include regional organizations, financial institutions geared towards the region and many already existing policies and initiatives.

A major drawback is an across-the-board lack of political support and understanding, within the region and internationally, of the already existing processes of regional cooperation. The analysis provided by this report finds that regional cooperation is fundamental if we are to achieve security, stability and economic and social development. Regional cooperation is not an end in and of itself but rather a gradual and multifaceted process which is long-term in scope. By its very nature, it brings state and non-state actors together in a way which takes us towards this goal. In the short term though, the focus should be on well defined problems, yielding visible results, which can be seen and felt by ordinary people.

Current attempts at policy coordination in the Black Sea region, embodied in several regional institutions and multilateral forums, fail to deliver substantive results. A persuasive indicator of political commitment to constructive regionalism is the willingness of participating countries to allocate resources, commensurate with their possibilities, to regional projects and to build the required capacity for the joint administration of those resources. However, failure or the endless delaying of cooperation bears with it costs for the people of the region. These include adverse economic effects and obstacles to free trade which in turn slow growth and welfare.

The composition of the Black Sea region is highly diversified in terms of the size and power of its countries, their systems of governance, the sophistication of their economic and financial structures and human development indicators. Considering such diversity, it is difficult to create comprehensive regional integration schemes in the conventional sense, at least in the short term. This should not however, be an obstacle to broad ranging cooperation but rather an incentive to creative thinking and pragmatic action. It is realistic for the Black Sea to become a model for new and imaginative types of positive relationships which bind rather than divide in a region that has been fragmented for far too long. The best way to achieve this is in a multilateral and regional format. Setting up or bolstering existing regional frameworks for policy coordination among stakeholders that would ultimately reduce instability does not have to entail immense political or financial costs. It would though, require a change in the mind-set of policy-makers to comprehend the value of regional approaches to policy-making.

Around the Black Sea, there are two opposing conditions that affect the potential of regionalism. On the one hand, economic difficulties and the need for managing regional public goods such as the environment, trade and financial stability have generated demands for regional cooperation, integration and policy coordination. These need to be strengthened and efficiently channelled into regional policy-making. On the other hand, important security issues such as the unresolved secessionist conflicts undermine the drive for regionalism and obstruct collective action and

institutions. These adverse security conditions need to be eliminated or their impacts reduced.

The role of the European Union (EU) is key. Three of the states of the Black Sea, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania are EU member states while Turkey is negotiating its accession. The impact of the EU is extremely high as its power of attraction and policies, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership, target Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, while it has a strategic partnership with Russia. The EU has also become, for those states of the region which are not members, their most important economic partner. For most of them it is becoming a catalyst of social and political change too. There is thus a need to clarify the Union's status with regard to the formulation of regional policies and outputs.

It is the view of the Commission that the primary responsibility for articulating a clear and coherent vision of what the Black Sea region should look like in 10 years time rests with the regional actors themselves. If they prove to be unable or unwilling to do so, it is to be expected that the geopolitical forces now at play will continue to pursue their respective, and not necessarily convergent, agendas. This is not an attractive proposition for the stability, security and prosperity of the region. Where a regional initiative does not attract the interest of all participants, the wish of certain members or sub-groupings to coordinate and cooperate should be respected by others, insofar as such cooperation is not directed against the non-participants. Those who do not take part should not prevent others from going ahead, and in turn the participants should leave the door open for them to join at a later stage.

All the Commission's recommendations are meant to mobilise international and local interest in the Black Sea region. The current conjunction of developments including the global financial crisis, the post-August 2008 setting and the discussion of a new European security architecture should be seen as a wakeup call that the region is in need of serious attention and concerted action. The focus here is on a select number of recommendations which the Commission feels should generate support in order to enhance the profile of the wider Black Sea region and to contribute to its regional appeal. This set of recommendations makes no claim to be exhaustive, but we hope it will serve as a point of departure for further discussion.

## **POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **2020 VISION – A BLACK SEA DIMENSION**

The setting of consensus targets for the region is important. We should work towards proposing mid-term recommendations with 2020 in sight. We assume that by then, the countries of the Western Balkans will have become EU members, that there should be a clearer picture regarding Turkey's membership and debate on which, if

any, of the other countries of the region will join, will have crystallized. This would entail the creation, by the countries and actors of the region, of a new overarching concept and policy: a Black Sea Dimension. The aim of this would be to promote regional cooperation while anticipating changes in the neighbourhood. The necessity of thinking about a new concept for the region is only underscored by the fact that most existing ideas and policies for and about the Black Sea were conceived before the August 2008 war. The Dimension should also take into consideration ongoing discussions regarding a new European security framework. The 2020 vision needs to be developed into a clear strategy which should mark the culmination of several linked initiatives.

### **ENHANCE THE PROFILE OF BLACK SEA REGIONALISM**

The first chapter in the history of BSEC has ended but a new one has not yet been properly opened. It is in need of rejuvenation. Preparations should begin without delay for a summit in 2012 to mark the twentieth anniversary of the organization. This must not be a mere festive occasion. It should be an opportunity to renew the commitment of its members to regional cooperation and to inaugurate an overhauled BSEC in order to make it a more relevant regional organization with greater clout. Such steps, which should be in line with other international commitments undertaken by BSEC member states, could include:

Setting specific targets and deadlines for the development of a system of legally binding commitments and implementation mechanisms. These should cover the main areas of BSEC concern where a regional approach provides value added compared to the individual efforts of member states.

Agreeing on a substantial augmentation of the BSEC budget, based on proportional contributions, in order to enable BSEC to co-finance major projects of regional interest. This could also be done through the creation of specific funds, similar to the Hellenic Development Fund. The resources of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank should be harnessed for this.

Adding a specific security dimension to BSEC activities, relying mainly on confidence-building measures and increased transparency.

Developing an inclusive mechanism for regular consultation and coordination between BSEC and all the other regional organizations and initiatives (governmental and non-governmental) as well as with “extra-regional” partners.

All members should undertake to actually devote, as opposed to just declaring that they will, at least one cabinet meeting a year to an examination of Black Sea regional cooperation matters and to report accordingly to their parliaments as well as to the BSEC parliamentary assembly.

BSEC’s rebirth, expanded role and enhanced regional relevance should be symbolized by giving it a new name. A region-wide awareness raising competition

could be opened for everyone in the region to suggest what it might be and also to design a new logo and flag for it.

### **DEAL WITH THE CONFLICTS: START REAL SECURITY DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES**

As part of our 2020 vision we see an urgent need to tackle the protracted conflicts and other outstanding issues of the region. The Commission proposes to establish a high level consultative group in order to assess the issues and search for solutions. The group should eventually suggest ways to provide international guarantees for the implementation of any peace agreements. In the interim it should propose confidence-building measures in order to mitigate the corrosive impact of the conflicts on the goal and vision of putting the whole Black Sea region at a qualitative new level. The feasibility of an international gathering, preferably at a summit level, involving the Black Sea states and international stakeholders should be the end point for any or all of these processes.

There is a need for the region's stakeholders to contribute to the ongoing debate about a new security architecture for Europe, as this discussion has immediate ramifications for the Black Sea which could be described as the shared neighbourhood of both the EU and Russia. As part of this discussion, a renewed assessment of already existing mechanisms, such as the OSCE or the CFE treaty, and agreed upon measures under such mechanisms, is needed. Within this context, the Commission proposes a number of confidence-building measures from hotlines between foreign ministers to regular meetings of senior officials of the foreign and defence ministries of the region in order to stress the need for regional solutions to regional problems. Establishing a structured security dialogue on relevant issues ranging from civil protection to coordination regarding man-made or natural disasters, migration and organized crime would be a valuable addition.

### **FOCUS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES THAT MEET COMMON CHALLENGES AND REAL NEEDS**

Promote the principles of sustainable development as the guiding philosophy of regional cooperation in the Black Sea area. In this way we should seek to restore and preserve a rational and enduring equilibrium between economic development and the integrity of the natural environment in ways that society can understand and accept. Rational responses to the consequences of climate change and the responsible use of natural, human and societal resources are essential components of such a development model, which should be translated into coherent policies at national and regional level. Human and knowledge capital should be considered an integral part of a sustainable development model.

Since the on-going global financial and economic crisis has severely affected most countries in the Black Sea region, it is essential to supplement the mitigation measures taken in each country with a concerted regional approach to post-crisis recovery programmes relying on the concept of sustainable development.

Since economies are increasingly interlinked, decisions or actions in one country often impact neighbouring states, thus creating common challenges which require cooperation and communication. The basis for such cooperation may entail undertaking new initiatives to create physical linkages, for example cross-country infrastructure and institutional linkages. These could include policy coordination and harmonization, cross-country regulation, enhanced information sharing in order to stimulate growth and overlapping activities. Alternatively, the basis of cooperation may be economic security oriented, in the sense of avoiding misunderstandings or undertaking policies which may have adverse ‘beggar thy neighbour’ impacts. Cooperation could also aim to mitigate the negative effects of economic downturns, to pool information or resources to create early warning systems or reciprocal assistance mechanisms or to reduce the vulnerability of countries to crises in the future and to devising forms of insurance. The key is for cooperation to meet real and identified needs which have tangible, achievable solutions and appropriate cost benefit ratios.

Take policy measures to improve the business environment and to facilitate greater economic activity across borders. These should include concrete steps to facilitate business activity by removing various non-tariff barriers that hinder trade, investment or financing. This may be done by agreements relating to specific activities, for example customs procedures and visas or in the form of a comprehensive trade facilitation deal.

Conduct regular policy dialogues between relevant officials concerned with important sectors of the economy that would benefit from cooperation such as finance, transport, energy, environment, fisheries and so on.

## **PROMOTE AND COORDINATE REGIONAL COOPERATION SCHEMES AT ALL LEVELS**

Any examination of work done on the region shows that numerous schemes, programmes and initiatives, whether governmental or non-governmental, not-for profit, EU-led or with a thematic focus, have been actively promoting regional cooperation for years. However, the need to make this work more visible and coordinated is necessary if the potential of the Black Sea, as a region, is to be fully unleashed.

There is also a need to move beyond the top-down approach promoted by organizations such as BSEC and others, to assure that civil society plays a role in the development of the region. If we are to assume that civil society refers to uncoerced

collective action around shared interests, purposes and values, there is much to be gained from the greater involvement of the business sector at national and regional levels, NGOs, women's groups and youth in Black Sea regional activities.

Identifying issues which could be better addressed regionally rather than nationally is a priority. Doing this would serve as a good tool for coordination between institutions and programmes with a regional cooperation dimension. Working on this could also help to draw in all relevant actors in the fields of their concern. The selection of key subjects which need addressing would also assist donors, governments and investors in deciding on their funding priorities. Lessons should be drawn from the experiences of other areas which have faced or are dealing with similar issues, such as the Baltic, the Balkans, the Danube region and so on.

### **PROMOTE INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE**

A clear encouragement and sponsorship of intercultural dialogue among the people of the Black Sea would support regional cooperation. A useful example that could serve as an inspiration and model is the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures which is based in Alexandria in Egypt and operates within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Another reference is the Alliance of Civilizations which was established in 2005, at the initiative of the Governments of Spain and Turkey, under the auspices of the United Nations. Similar models should be encouraged at the sub-regional level. Intercultural dialogue should be promoted hand in hand with interfaith dialogue, aimed at bringing together the religious leaders of the region's confessions. Cooperation between universities should be enhanced as should student exchange programmes in order to create linkages and networks between young people of the Black Sea. A joint Black Sea Studies graduate programme needs to be established between the region's universities in order to create academic linkages for the future. In terms of the media there are few foreign correspondents from Black Sea countries reporting on events in one another's countries. This means that what news there is often comes from external sources not well attuned to the interests of their readers or viewers. Funds should be found to address this probl

### **PROMOTE THE TARGETED TRAINING OF PROFESSIONAL GROUPS**

There is a need for the targeted training of public servants, diplomats, young leaders, parliamentarians and business leaders throughout the region. This should aim to improve the number of well-trained individuals at the service of their countries. However, above and beyond that, training people together is a way to promote the cooperation of local public officials and others on issues of common concerns, such

as the environment, which contribute to regional development. The creation of a Black Sea Training Academy for example, would help streamline such a process.

### **PROMOTE GOOD GOVERNANCE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE**

The involvement of civil society in policy-making is linked to good governance and solid institution building, which all countries in the region have signed up to through their membership in the Council of Europe. Programmes should be implemented such that a focus on civil society is enhanced. Efforts should be made to encourage cooperation between civil society organizations in Black Sea countries including the conflict regions. More funds should be devoted to programmes and projects encouraging active and professional involvement of civil society in policy-making throughout the region. Countries should take practical steps in developing e-government services both on national and regional levels. Business organizations such as chambers of commerce and employers' organizations and trade unions should also be encouraged to talk to one another in order to find and propose regional solutions for regional problems. One idea could be the creation of a cooperation council for business organizations and chambers of commerce under the aegis of the renewed BSEC enhancing the scope of the already existing BSEC Business Council.

# THE WAY FORWARD FOR TURKEY AND THE EU: A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE ON FOREIGN POLICY



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## INTRODUCTION

Turkey's negotiations to join the European Union (EU) have slowed considerably. Brussels and Ankara used to open four chapters<sup>1</sup> a year, but this year only one (on food safety, veterinary, and phytosanitary policy) has been opened, with the chapter on competition postponed until 2011.

Around half of the 35 negotiating chapters are frozen on the EU side, principally over the unresolved division of Cyprus and French President Nicolas Sarkozy's opposition to Turkish accession. Every chapter opening has to be agreed to unanimously by all 27 EU members, so blocking the chapters is easy. Not surprisingly, the pace of Turkey's own work to open more chapters has also slowed, and the country did not meet the benchmarks on time to open the chapter on competition as planned this month.

There is still hope for some kind of deal to allow progress on implementing the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which requires Turkey to admit Cypriot-flagged vessels to its ports and airports. Such a breakthrough would unblock many chapters, restoring much-needed momentum to the accession process and encouraging Turkey's transformation into a more European, open society. If Turkey could open Chapter 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights that would help to speed up contested internal reforms long demanded by the EU. Similarly, it would be in the

<sup>1</sup> The subjects for negotiation are divided up into 35 "chapters."

EU's own interest to open Chapter 15 on energy to engage Turkey as a key partner for Europe's energy supply. But both are blocked by Cyprus.

If the latest efforts fail to achieve a breakthrough, the hold-ups to the negotiations should not prevent engagement in other key areas. Cooperation on foreign and security policy brings many benefits for both the EU and Turkey and is essential to help both manage the many problems in their mutual neighborhood. Joint work that keeps officials busy and politicians meeting frequently would also prevent the atmosphere from becoming more acrimonious if the negotiations remain stalled.

Improving relations will require a parallel track for Ankara and Brussels to discuss major regional security issues. A good basis is the relationship between EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. They are already talking in an atmosphere of trust about sensitive issues in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Now this dialogue should be widened to include the EU foreign ministers and senior officials, and deepened through regular exchanges.

## **WHY START A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE?**

Before the Lisbon Treaty went into effect this year, Turkish ministers discussed foreign policy issues during Troika meetings with Ashton's predecessor, Javier Solana, and the current and future presidencies. Previously, Turkish ministers met their EU counterparts at the intergovernmental conference to open accession negotiations every six months. But such opportunities are now rare.

Now that this system has been replaced with twice yearly "ministerial political dialogues" between Ashton and Davutoglu, Lisbon has created a golden moment to open new channels to Turkey also for ministers, officials, and diplomats. Ashton is also chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, vice president of the European Commission, and head of a new External Action Service (EAS) that will represent the EU abroad and manage external relations in Brussels. While the new system is being built, the EU has an opportunity to rethink how it engages with Turkey on foreign policy issues, and create a new channel for dialogue at several levels.

The accession process should remain the center of the EU-Turkey relationship. Ideally, Turkey and the EU should talk about foreign policy issues in the context of the negotiating chapters on external relations and on foreign, security, and defense policy (Chapters 30 and 31, respectively). However, while these chapters are blocked because of unresolved problems with Cyprus and Greece, the EU and Turkey need a new, more effective way to discuss strategic questions.

The new channel should not undermine the potential to accelerate accession negotiations. To avoid Turkey skeptics in the EU using it as the basis for a "privileged partnership" that diverts Turkey from the accession track, an effective foreign policy dialogue should discuss only strategic issues, not bilateral ones. Such a channel could

even help to reinvigorate the accession process by reminding the 27 EU countries and Turkey of their many shared interests.

This does not mean starting a “trialogue” of EU-Turkey-Russia summits.<sup>2</sup> Turkey and Russia have two quite different relationships with the EU. To hold summit meetings with both of them together would devalue Turkey’s status as a candidate for EU membership.

Moreover, Turkey’s strategic approach to foreign relations is more like the EU’s than Russia’s is. Turkey is more of a long-term foreign policy player than Russia, and Ankara is closer in its thinking to the EU, giving priority to maintaining a stable neighborhood that allows economic activity to flourish. Turkey is sometimes more concerned than the EU about preserving the status quo and generally less concerned about promoting democracy and human rights abroad. But Ankara’s overall approach is more familiar and agreeable to EU diplomats than Russia’s.

Turkey is also more than a “strategic partner,” the status the EU has accorded to Russia; conversely for Turkey, the EU is more than a foreign country with which it has diplomatic relations. The most important feature of the accession-based relationship for foreign policy is the sense of common destiny it gives to both sides.

This sense of common destiny and strategic orientation toward EU membership made Turkey positively inclined to follow EU preferences in foreign policy in the years surrounding the start of negotiations in October 2005, including alignment with EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) positions.

But as the pace of accession negotiations has slowed, Turkey has moved into a more neutral position, assessing each case on its merits, and has disagreed with the EU more often, most notably on Iran. If the accession process stalls completely and the relationship sours further, the more nationalistic forces in Ankara will be tempted to turn Turkey against EU positions and interests.

Both the EU and Turkey have much to gain by working together on countries and issues such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, nuclear nonproliferation, or the Middle East peace process. Conversely, both will lose if they start trying to compete in the Middle East, where each has different channels of influence. The EU should make good use of Turkey’s soft power through its long-established commercial, diplomatic, and cultural relationships throughout the region.

Meanwhile, Turkey would benefit from moving in the same direction as powerful EU companies and member states, which possess hard as well as soft power. The EU should also invite Turkey to provide input to the ongoing review of its European Neighborhood Policy, as Ankara has many insights on how best to use EU instruments in the region.

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<sup>2</sup> As proposed by the European Council on Foreign Relations in “The spectre of a multipolar Europe,” ECFR, October 2010.

## WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE EU?

The debate about Turkey's accession prospects in the EU revolves around internal EU issues, particularly the role of Turks and other migrants who reside in Europe and existential questions about the future of the Union. This focus has led many EU politicians to lose sight of the value of working closely with a regional power that has more than 70 million inhabitants and an economy growing much more rapidly than that of any EU country.

Turkey is a serious foreign policy player with a huge presence in its surrounding region. It has 106 embassies and 70 consulates, in addition to cultural offices, with almost 1,000 diplomats. The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency channeled almost \$1.5 billion of Turkish aid to 98 countries in 2009. A major recipient of this aid was Afghanistan, where Turks provided medical treatment to 1 million Afghans; education to 70,000 boys and girls; and training to 13,000 Afghan soldiers and police, while leading the International Security Assistance Force's regional command in Kabul.

Turkey has recently pursued a more visible and vigorous regional engagement policy affecting many areas of shared concern with the EU. The objective of Turkey's diplomatic activism – particularly in the Middle East – is to contribute to the settlement of frozen conflicts, even if concrete results have been few.

The growing portfolio of Turkey's mediation efforts in bilateral and regional disputes is another indicator of its regional influence. Ankara has led diplomatic efforts in and around Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between Bosnia and Serbia, Georgia and breakaway Abkhazia, and Israel and Pakistan. Turkey's third-party involvement in such disputes has bolstered its image as a constructive regional player.

This visible transformation in the scope and ambition of Turkish foreign policy was made possible by growing economic power. Excluding 2009, the year of global crisis, the Turkish economy has grown at an annual average rate of 7.5 percent during the past seven years. As a result, Turkey has become the sixteenth-largest economy in the world, with a GDP fast approaching the \$1 trillion mark, and is much bigger than most EU economies. In the first half of 2010, Turkey scored the fastest growth rate among the OECD economies, at 11 percent. Total trade volume has reached \$243 billion, while inward direct investment reached a total of \$68.4 billion over the last four years.

Turkey's regional engagement is sometimes seen as a threat to the EU's influence, but it could also be a great opportunity if they work in tandem. Turkey's own success in being a majority Muslim country with openly contested elections, in having a vibrant and increasingly open economy, and in improving the cultural freedoms of minorities such as the Kurds are having a demonstration effect across the wider Middle East.

Deep engagement with such a country will itself further the EU's goals to create a more democratic, economically open, and better governed Middle East. By embedding Turkish foreign policy with EU structures and policies, Europeans could dynamize and enhance their own engagement in a region central to their interests.

Moreover, previous enlargements of the EU have shown the power of regular contacts between officials and politicians in changing attitudes, norms, and behavior. Even outside the accession process, engagement that is regular and substantive on urgent issues is likely to bring a common understanding among diplomats, politicians, and even lawmakers in many different parts of Turkey's elaborate foreign and security network. The EU has the opportunity to wed Turkey's ambition to become an important global actor with also becoming a constructive team player.

### **WHAT'S IN IT FOR TURKEY?**

Turkish policy makers tend to view foreign policy cooperation with the EU as a platform that essentially benefits Brussels. Ankara thinks its growing regional footprint and enhanced soft power already allow Turkey to undertake all of the diplomatic initiatives it wants. Many Turkish diplomats and politicians see EU foreign policy as ineffective and often ham-fisted in the Middle East, making them view cooperation as somewhat of a liability. They also point out to observers that if EU capitals had a genuine interest in such an endeavor, the chapter on foreign and security policy would have been opened.

This thinking fails to take into account the likely changes resulting from the Lisbon Treaty. This year, the EU has hit the pause button rather than the reset button with Turkey by spending so long establishing its new foreign policy structures. But in the medium term, the concentration of the powers of the EU institutions in Ashton's hands – with the new EAS supporting her – will turn the EU into a bigger and better foreign policy player. Therefore cooperation with Brussels will provide a much richer menu of options for Turkish diplomacy over time.

A structured foreign policy dialogue would help to restore the environment of mutual trust undermined by the accumulated frustrations of the accession negotiations. Such a foreign policy alliance can also have a transformative effect on the climate of negotiations by bringing Ankara closer to the diplomatic powers of Europe. A permanent collaborative structure would enable Turkey to gain a role in shaping European foreign policy in areas that really matter to Turkey, in particular in Turkey's own neighborhood. Moreover, Turkey's influence in its region will increase as it gains access to EU markets and policy making, which its neighbors lack.

Turkey's fuller engagement with the EU on foreign policy would also positively affect the transatlantic relationship. A number of contentious issues related to policies toward Iran, Israel, and Hamas have surfaced between Ankara and Washington as a result of Turkey's more active and assertive diplomacy in the Middle East. As a foreign

policy actor deeply involved in the Middle East, the United States – even more than Europe – will have to adjust to the new Turkey. In many ways, the transformation of Turkish policy will alter the power relationship between Washington and Ankara. This adjustment will be easier for both sides if the EU remains engaged with Turkey as an instrumental partner in foreign policy. In particular, a stronger Turkey-EU dialogue on foreign policy will allay fears that Turkey is drifting away from the West.

## **THE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE IN PRACTICE**

The purpose of the foreign dialogue is to address issues of common concern without disrupting the chances for renewed vigor in the accession process, preferably through four meetings a year, at the summit, ministerial, and working levels. All of the 27 EU member states and Turkey would participate, with discussion focusing on strategic issues of shared interest, particularly in the region surrounding Turkey and the current EU members.

*Annual Summit.* Once a year, European Council President Herman van Rompuy should chair a special summit on strategic issues in the wider neighborhood, with Turkey represented by both its prime minister and president. President Abdullah Gül is a major foreign policy asset, given his experience in international diplomacy through the Council of Europe and as a very successful Turkish foreign minister. His presence as an elder statesman would prove valuable and provide continuity to the discussion.

*Ministerial.* The Turkish and EU foreign ministers need discussions that are regular but relatively informal. If the dialogue is not institutionalized, it risks being disrupted by the ups and downs of the accession process and Turkish politics. But if such a dialogue is formalized, it risks being blocked by all of the factors that have blocked the accession process.

Ashton and Davutoglu already have an excellent relationship and talk regularly about Turkey's region and many international matters. By bringing in the EU foreign ministers for substantive but informal discussions as well, they can forge a common understanding of the choices confronting both regional powers.

For the 27 foreign ministers, the best format to do this is their informal meetings every six months, known as the "Gymnich." Turkey has been attending special sessions for candidate countries at the Gymnich since accession negotiations began five years ago. This participation should now be scaled up to a foreign policy dialogue between the Turkish foreign minister and his 27 counterparts, chaired by Ashton. The agenda should focus on key mutual interests such as Iraq and Syria, in a half-day or day-long session before the 27 ministers meet among themselves. As chair, Ashton would need to keep the agenda tightly focused on strategic issues and not let it be hijacked by problems in bilateral relations.

Ashton herself needs a more formal dialogue with the Turkish foreign minister. Before the Lisbon Treaty took effect, Turkey had twice-yearly “Troika” dialogues with the EU to discuss foreign policy issues; the three partners representing the EU included the foreign minister of the rotating presidency, Solana, and then-Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn. Now the Troika format is gone, so Ashton needs an intensified dialogue to replace it.

*Working Level.* The EAS will need to find a way to work with the political directors of the EU’s foreign ministries, and Turkey could be involved in some of these new forms of cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty replaced the useful format of the 27 political directors’ meeting prior to the Troika. Now this format could be used to prepare and underpin the political-level meetings of an annual summit and two ministerials a year.

Turkey recently proposed a regular dialogue with the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) ambassadors and informal policy planning talks. This suggestion makes sense, especially as the PSC will soon gain a permanent chair, who could ensure that key regional issues are covered systematically, including areas where Turkey seeks greater involvement, such as the Balkans.

The EU-Turkey Association Council used to be an opportunity for working-level discussions, but is now nearly defunct because of the impasse in accession negotiations. The new channels would not replace it, but supplement the council and allow this format to resume when negotiations get going again.

## **DEFENSE AND SECURITY COOPERATION**

The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)<sup>3</sup> represents another dimension of working-level engagement. It is particularly important given that Turkey has defense and security assets, which can help EU missions in dangerous parts of the world.

To build a strong and sustainable foreign policy dialogue, the EU and NATO will both need to improve security cooperation, which is hindered by the intractability of the Cyprus problem. Cyprus uses its EU membership to block Turkey, while Turkey uses its NATO membership to exclude Cyprus. In particular, Turkey’s exclusion of Cyprus from the strategic dialogue between NATO and the EU, based on the “agreed framework” – which covers all issues between the two relating to security, defense, and crisis management – hinders practical and political cooperation.

In return, Cyprus is blocking the conclusion of a security agreement between Turkey and the EU that would allow Turkey to be more comprehensively integrated into the CSDP. The lack of an EU-Turkey security agreement for the exchange of classified information can put lives at risk if soldiers from EU countries cannot share intelligence and information with their Turkish colleagues in conflict situations in real time.

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<sup>3</sup> CSDP was formerly known as ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy.

Turkey and EU members have found practical solutions on the ground to lessen the risks in the many missions in which Turkey is involved, including in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this situation is perverse and detrimental to the interests of both sides. It prevents the EU from taking advantage of the full range of Turkey's capabilities and assets in CSDP missions. Turkey could substantially reinforce the EU's military and civilian capacities of crisis management. It already outperforms many EU member states in its personnel and financial contributions.

Turkey is also the largest non-EU contributor to CSDP missions and operations. Ankara provided the second-largest contingent of 255 military personnel to EUFOR Althea, the EU's force in Bosnia, and 48 law enforcement officers to the police mission in Bosnia. It has also contributed 55 law enforcement personnel to EULEX in Kosovo and indicated a willingness to increase the number to 150 personnel in 2011.

Turkey has also participated in three past CSDP operations (CONCORDIA, the military operation in Macedonia; PROXIMA, the police mission in Macedonia; and EUPOL, the police mission in Kinshasa), while providing strategic airlift capability for the military peacekeeping operation EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A mutually satisfactory settlement concerning Turkey's overall involvement in CSDP structures would lead to much more meaningful cooperation between Turkey and the EU and maximize the effectiveness of CSDP missions on the ground.

At the same time, Turkey is excluded from participating in European defense industry collaboration under the aegis of the European Defence Agency, even though it has a more significant defense budget than most EU member states. EU member states are unable to carry out expensive developmental projects – such as the unmanned air vehicle or military communications infrastructure – at lesser cost as defense budgets are cut because of Turkey's exclusion. Yet Turkey shares with other CFSP actors the same threat perceptions, priorities, and means to address challenges.

Additionally, the lack of a mutually satisfactory solution to Turkey-EU collaboration on security policy is poisoning the NATO-EU relationship. The lack of a politically negotiated framework makes it nearly impossible for the EU and NATO to coordinate parallel operations, for example, in fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia, or in Afghanistan or Kosovo. Turkey is unwilling to lift its side of the mutual blockade with Cyprus if there is any risk of recognizing Cyprus as a state.

The solution to the current EU-Turkey conundrum needs to consider the two sources of difficulty: institutional rigidities in the CSDP framework and the unsettled problem of Cyprus. Many of the current problems result from Turkey being treated like any other non-EU country. Despite being an EU candidate country for five years and a NATO member for more than fifty years, Ankara is no more integrated into CSDP than Moscow or Mexico City.

For instance, Turkish diplomats complain that even the agreed-upon consultation mechanisms are not being used. They point out that Turkey's request for immediate

consultations with the EU before the EU mission in Georgia was rejected. Turkey was also kept away from the civilian CSDP mission in Iraq. Turkey's status needs to move from that of a third country into a genuine partner in security policy.

Practical arrangements are also needed to embrace Turkey. The following steps would greatly enhance the framework and climate of cooperation between the two partners:

- Involve Ankara in the planning, implementation, and force-generation process for EU-led missions, rather than asking Turkey for a contribution if and when needed after the political and technical planning is already completed;
- Ensure comprehensive and intensive participation of Turkey in peacetime CSDP consultations through permanent and continuing consultations covering the full range of security, defense, and crisis-management issues, in particular at the level of the Political and Security Council and the EU Military Committee;
- Consult Ankara when the EU envisages action near Turkey or in areas of strategic interest to Turkey;
- End the distinction between participation in military and civilian operations and enable increased bilateral contact on crisis management;
- Guarantee a Turkish presence in EU headquarters for operations to which Turkey contributes;
- Enable Ankara to participate in the work of the European Defence Agency;
- Conclude a Security Agreement between Turkey and the EU to allow intelligence-sharing and secure communications;
- Establish a Committee of Contributors at the operational level for any EU-led mission to make decisions on the day-to-day management as well as the strategic direction of the mission; consult on possible adjustments to operational design and objectives as well as on planning the end of the mission and the withdrawal of forces; and provide its assessment of the lessons learned from the mission.

These steps would greatly facilitate Turkey's integration as a valued partner into the CSDP framework. A further constructive step to break the NATO-EU stalemate would be to launch a "NATO-EU Consultation Group," under NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Ashton's leadership, to deliberate on all topics relevant to the strategic partnership between the two organizations. Informal EU-NATO policy dialogues would allow initiatives to develop joint capabilities and increase other forms of collaboration.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

The EU-Turkey relationship has faced inclement political weather over the past few years. Both sides have tried to make headway despite the frequent political storms, but progress has slowed. Now the accession process may have to drop anchor and ride out the storm if there is no breakthrough on the Cyprus issue.

Time is on the side of Turkey's accession to the EU. Over the next years, the benefits of integration will become more evident to EU capitals and to Ankara as the Turkish economy grows, EU labor market needs increase, and problems in the Middle East intensify. Obstacles can fall, too. The 2012 presidential election in France could reduce Paris's hostility, while Germany's debate over multiculturalism may lead to a renewed consensus that makes Turkey look like more of an opportunity than a threat. Even the gloom surrounding the Cyprus talks could lift.

While awaiting a clearer sky for the negotiations, the EU and Turkey both have much to gain by intensifying their foreign policy engagement. Turkey's political and economic transformation over the past decade has helped Ankara to become a more influential regional player. Turkey's growing outreach in the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in the Balkans, its emergence as a responsible aid provider and an active participant in multilateral diplomacy, and the number and scope of its mediation efforts in the Middle East and beyond, all indicate Turkey's potential for increased influence and recognition.

Turkey's regional engagement is an opportunity for the EU. The paradox is that just as Turkey is starting to acquire the capacity to become a valuable partner for EU foreign policy, the distance between Ankara and Brussels has increased. The challenge will be for both sides to bypass problematic areas in accession negotiations and start an institutionalized foreign policy dialogue. The changes brought to the EU's external policy machinery by adopting the Lisbon Treaty can underpin a renewed engagement with Turkey. The new diplomatic service under Ashton's guidance should also allow the EU to engage with Turkey at a working level that parallels the accession process.

The EU should not only see Turkey as a candidate for accession but view Ankara as a significant potential asset for effective multilateralism. At the same time, Turkey should think beyond its accumulated frustrations with negotiations and seize the opportunity to couple its diplomatic activism with a strategic alliance with the EU. Over time, this engagement will strengthen the accession process by forging bonds at the working and political levels, and foster a common understanding of and approach to the many problems that both Turkey and the EU want to solve.

## APPENDIX

# COUNTRIES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION: GLOBAL PEACE INDEX

Most experts identify the lack of security and stability as main problems of the Black Sea region. Meanwhile, such factors as peace, security and stability are known to be the key prerequisites for a sustainable social and economic development and a fruitful international cooperation. The level of personal, social and national security depends on many internal and external aspects. Therefore, identifying factors that promote/hinder the peaceful development is an essential step, when analysing the situation in a country (or a region) and searching for effective solutions to improve it.

A few years ago, the Australian Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) initiated a project, whose goal was to quantitatively evaluate or to measure the Global Peace Index (GPI) for individual countries and regions. The specified index was calculated by taking into account 23 indicators, selected on the basis of data availability that reflect the presence/absence of peace and the important factors that may influence (both internally and externally) the formation and development of a peaceful society. Additionally, the auxiliary indicators that mainly evaluate the state of democracy, political stability, the level of welfare, had also being taken into account<sup>1</sup>.

The comparison of indexes enables to rank the countries (regions), whose indicators have been analyzed<sup>2</sup>. The overall scores and ranks are determined based on the weight coefficients of internal (60%) and external (40%) sub-indices of country's 'peacefulness'. A bigger weight of the internal sub-index is based on the assumption that an increased level of internal peacefulness corresponds to the reduced likelihood of external conflict.

The IEP, in association with the *Economist Intelligence Unit*, published the report "Global Peace Index" (GPI), where peace indices of the countries are calculated, based on indicators from a previous year (in some cases – two years), and ranked according to the Index.

- Study results enable to identify the following **drivers of peace**:
- Good relations with neighbouring countries
- Low level of corruption

<sup>1</sup> More details on the methodology and data sources see: Macintyre, T., Schippa, C., *The Global Peace Index 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, SIPRI YEARBOOK 2010; *Global Peace Index, 2011 Methodology, Results and Findings* (Institute for Economics and Peace: Sydney, 2011).

<sup>2</sup> In 2010, 149 countries were analyzed; in 2011 – 153 countries.

**INDICATORS USED FOR CALCULATION OF THE GLOBAL PEACE INDEX****I. 23 indicators, divided into three key thematic groups:**

(1) **Domestic and interstate conflict:** number of external and internal wars fought; estimated deaths due to internal and external wars; level of organized internal conflict; relations with neighbouring countries

(2) **Societal safety and security:** level of perceived criminality in society; number of refugees and displaced persons as percentage of population; political instability; level of respect for human rights; potential for terrorist attacks; level of violent crime; likelihood of violent demonstrations; number of police and security officers (per 100,000 people); number of jailed persons and homicides (per 100,000 people).

(3) **Militarization:** military expenditure as a percentage of GDP; funding for UN peacekeeping missions; ease of access to small arms and light weapons; number of armed services personnel (per 100,000 people); imports and exports of major conventional weapons and number of heavy weapons (per 100,000 people).

**II. Auxiliary indicators:**

- level of democracy (in particular, competence and efficiency of public administration)
- institutional stability and sustainability of political process
- international openness
- participation in regional integration
- demographic situation
- inter-cultural and inter-faith relations
- education
- welfare

- Good Governance
- High level of income per capita
- Secondary and higher education
- Freedom of speech and media independence (freedom of information)
- High degree of regional integration
- Good relations with neighbouring states;
- Respect for human rights and tolerance;
- Low levels of corruption;
- Equitable distribution of wealth<sup>3</sup>.

Societies, with such characteristics, have a considerable potential for security (in its broadest meaning). They are more inclined to cooperation and mutual assistance in crisis situations; more resistant to various shocks. The list above may serve as a benchmark in determining the necessary steps to achieve a high level of peacefulness and security in a country.

One of the most important results of the GPI 2010 study was to identify the connection between the level of peacefulness and other indicators of a successful social development i.e. income per capita, living standards, level of freedom, sustainability, and an equitable distribution of wealth<sup>4</sup>. The relationship between

<sup>3</sup> Peace, Wealth and Human Potential. 2010 Discussion Paper. Institute for Economic and Peace, p.25. – [www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/2010/2010%20GPI%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf](http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/2010/2010%20GPI%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> Peace, Wealth and Human Potential. 2010 Discussion Paper. Institute for Economic and Peace, p.4. – [www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/2010/2010%20GPI%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf](http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/2010/2010%20GPI%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf)

Global Peace Index-2011								
Rank	Country	Score*	Rank	Country	Score*	Rank	Country	Score*
Top-10 with the best GPI			Black Sea region			Top-10 with worst GPI		
1	Island	1.148	40	Romania	1.742	144	Central African Republic	2.869
2	New Zealand	1.279	53	Bulgaria	1.845	145	Israel	2.901
3	Japan	1.287	65	Greece	1.947	146	Pakistan	2.905
4	Denmark	1.289	59	Moldova	1.892	<b>147</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>2.966</b>
5	Czech Republic	1.320	69	Ukraine	1.995	148	Democratic Republic of Congo	3.016
6	Austria	1.337	109	Armenia	2.260	149	North Korea	3.092
7	Finland	1.352	122	Azerbaijan	2.379	150	Afghanistan	3.212
8	Canada	1.355	127	Turkey	2.411	151	Sudan	3.223
9	Norway	1.356	134	Georgia	2.558	152	Iraq	3.296
10	Slovenia	1.358	147	Russia	2.966	153	Somali	3.379
			<b>92.5</b>	<b>Average</b>	<b>2.2199</b>			

\* lower score corresponds to the higher level of peace  
 Source: *Institute for Economic and Peace, www.visionofhumanity.org*

peace and development is evident in the examples of individual states, but also in the regions and unions of states.

The authors of GPI do not distinguish the Black Sea region in their research. Greece belongs to the Western Europe, and other nine (out of ten) states of the Black Sea region – to the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). These two regions ranked 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> in GPI-2010 and GPI-2011 peacefulness rankings.

However, the countries of the Black Sea region can be singled out and their indices analysed. According to the study results, their indicators are worse not only in comparison to the top-10 countries with the best indices (table “*Global Peace Index 2011*”), but also in comparison to an average indices of the regions to which the authors have allocated them (an average score for the Western Europe is 1.52; for CEE is 2.00).

The countries of the Black Sea region in 2010 (GPI-2011) were ranked quite poorly, ranging from the 40-th (Romania) to the 147-th position (Russia). Russia traditionally belongs to the 10 most troubled countries. An average rank for the Black Sea region is 92.5, and the average score – 2.20, which is roughly similar to the indices of the Middle East and the North Africa (92 and 2.23, respectively).

**We might consider the fact that the Black Sea region was evaluated as more peaceful compared to 2009, when its average indicators were at the level of the**

Sub-Saharan Africa. Such an improvement was possible due to certain positive developments of some individual states.

**Ukraine and Georgia**, for instance, have improved their indicators. The formal reason for Ukraine's index increase (1.995 against 2.115 in 2009) was its internal political stability following the 2010 presidential election (the pro-presidential parliamentary majority, the loyal Government, the improved relations with Russia). Georgia's ranking (2.558 against 2.970 in 2009) was positively influenced as a result of the government's measures to strengthen the internal security situation, the end of 2008 conflict and the decline in political disputes with its neighbouring states.

**Russia's** peacefulness indicator has slightly increased (2.966 against 3.013, respectively) due to the absence of casualties at the Georgian-Russian border. However, Russia is still among the top-10 least peaceful countries (ranked 147<sup>th</sup> out of 153). Its overall score is affected by the attacks in Moscow (40 dead and 100 wounded in the explosion in the underground, in March 2010; 36 dead and 180 wounded, in the Domodedovo airport, in January 2011) and other regions of the country, high level of arms export, high number of heavy weapons per capita, suicide statistics, high level of perceived criminality in society, high number of internal security officers and prisoners (per 100 thousand of population)<sup>5</sup>.

**Thus, based on the GPI, it may be stated that, despite some positive changes, the Black Sea region continues to be one of the least secured parts of the world. Problems, which affect the security situation, hinder social and economic development and impede fruitful cooperation between the countries of the region. The key to improving the situation is the formation and development of indicators that are characteristic of the most successful and peaceful countries, such as: the good governance; low levels of corruption; respect for human rights and tolerance; freedom of information; access to education; equitable distribution of national wealth; favourable conditions for businesses; normalization of relations with neighbouring countries.**

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<sup>5</sup> Global Peace Index 2011. Methodology, Results and Findings. Institute for Economics and Peace, p.22. – [www.visionofhumanity.org](http://www.visionofhumanity.org)